

Open Research Online

The Open University's repository of research publications and other research outputs

From security to self-expression: The emergent value pattern and the changing role of religion

Thesis

How to cite:

Lassander, Mika (2011). From security to self-expression: The emergent value pattern and the changing role of religion. PhD thesis The Open University.

For guidance on citations see [FAQs](#).

© 2011 The Author



<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

Version: Version of Record

Link(s) to article on publisher's website:
<http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21954/ou.ro.0000ed62>

Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. For more information on Open Research Online's data [policy](#) on reuse of materials please consult the policies page.

oro.open.ac.uk

From security to self-expression

The emergent value pattern and the changing role of religion

Mika Lassander

Doctor of Philosophy

2010

The Open University

Department of Religious Studies

DATE OF SUBMISSION: 3 AUGUST 2010

DATE OF AWARD: 17 JANUARY 2011

Abstract

Religious change is a slow process of adaptation to changed realities of existence where maintaining both emotional and cognitive functioning of the worldview for the individual is central. A shift in human priorities from security to self-expression is linked to increased feelings of security, and after this shift a pluralistic context can further facilitate the development of morality and values that transcend local conventions and traditions. New kinds of worldviews, such as contemporary Paganism, emerge to support and legitimise these new values and modes of interaction. For this thesis, I employed a pragmatic mixed-methods methodology in which psychological value survey data was collected and analysed first, followed by thematic interviews that assist in explaining and interpreting the findings.

Young Pagans continue to emphasise the importance of altruism, unlike young Christians, because Paganism works better as a support for altruistic values for people with post-materialist priorities. The majority of Pagans operate on egalitarian modalities of interpersonal relations and their value pattern is characterised by universalistic rather than in-group focused altruism. The lack of a clear collective identity and the consequent lack of an encompassing boundary have shifted the focus in Paganism from talking about boundaries and community to talking about social interactions, concrete relationships between individuals, and to recognising the innate human need to cultivate these relationships. In short, research about Paganism illustrates the way in which contextual factors slowly change the type of people's worldview, without implying increasing rationality; rather, frameworks that have been like templates – providing exemplars – are restyled as trellises that provide footholds to support individual growth.

Table of Contents

List of Figures6

List of Tables7

Introduction.....9

 The discursive context and the purpose of this study..... 12

 Institutional inertia and symbolic interactionism..... 14

 Research premise and hypothesis 15

 The purpose of the study..... 16

Religious change as a social research problem 19

Contemporary Paganism27

Methodology30

 The logic of enquiry.....31

 Pragmatism and the compatibility thesis35

 Mixed-methods approach38

1. Society, religion, and values42

 1.1. The social context: external influences on values.....43

 The classical approaches.....43

 Socio-economic context and the dynamics of value priorities46

 Persisting cultural differences.....49

 Exposure to plurality of life-worlds.....52

 1.2. Moral intuition, justification, and the use of cultural matter54

 The broadening of social horizons and evolution of morality54

 Cultural differences and universals.....57

 The social intuition model of morality60

 1.3. Values as connectors in social networks.....65

 The concreteness of relationships and the fluidity of networks.....65

 Global networks of weak ties.....67

 Summary and theoretical framework.....68

2. The Pagan survey.....71

 2.1. Theoretical background of the survey instruments.....72

 Basic human values72

 Modes of interpersonal relations.....78

 2.2. Survey procedures.....81

 Data collection methods.....82

 Questionnaire design.....83

 Translation procedure86

 2.3. Participants.....87

The Pagan survey	87
The Open University student survey	90
3. Religious belonging and values.....	93
3.1. Data from the European Social Survey	94
Country samples	95
Method of classification into groups	98
Groups based on religious self-identification.....	100
3.2. Validating the theoretical value model.....	102
Reliability of the scales	103
Testing the relational value structure	104
3.3. Covariates	107
Religious activity as a factor in the Pagan group	109
3.4. Results	109
Country	111
Birth cohort.....	112
Religious belonging.....	115
Discussion.....	124
4. Modes of interpersonal relations	128
4.1. Testing the Individualism–Collectivism model.....	129
Scale correlations and description	132
Dimensionality of the scales.....	134
4.2. Exploring subgroupings within the samples.....	135
Discriminant analysis	138
Cluster profiles	140
4.3. Linking the modes of interpersonal relations to values.....	142
Value differences between clusters	143
Discussion.....	145
5. Pagans out of the woodwork	148
5.1. Interview and analysis methods.....	150
Themes emerging from the interviews	152
5.2. Important things.....	153
The Golden Rule, individual freedom, and responsibility	153
A sense of community	155
Joy of life, self-expression, and personal development.....	157
5.3. Opportunities and dangers.....	160
The changing narrative of the world	160
Increasing dialogue and maturation of Paganism.....	163
Opportunities for fundamentalism.....	166

Users and abusers in the Pagan movement	168
5.4. Claiming space for Paganism	170
The connected individual.....	170
Flexibility of beliefs, not one true doctrine.....	172
Homecoming.....	175
Discussion.....	177
6. Restyling religion: from moulds to trellises	183
6.1. The undeniable decline of traditional religious belonging	183
6.2. Religion as a quasi-object.....	186
Actor-Network theory: bridging the objective–subjective divide	186
Complexity.....	189
Evidence from data and implications for the study of religions	191
6.3. Two ways to use religion.....	193
6.4. A revised model of religious change	197
The case of contemporary Paganism	200
Conclusion	202
Security, tradition, conformity – and bigotry?	203
Self-expression: selfish egoism or universalistic individualism?.....	206
Concluding remarks	208
Acknowledgements.....	211
Appendix A, Ethics committee approval.....	213
Appendix B, Survey invitation letter	214
Appendix C, Survey questionnaire	215
Appendix D, Interview information and consent form.....	223
Appendix E, Interview topics	224
Appendix F, Value item scores per group	225
Appendix G, Individualism–Collectivism item scores per group.....	227
Appendix H, Pattern factor matrices for Individualism–Collectivism	228
Appendix I, Scree plots.....	230
References	231

List of Figures

1.	Model of relative positions of the ten motivational value types	76
2.	Value structure for the Christian groups	105
3.	Value structure for the Pagan group	106
4.	Value change per cohort in the three countries	111
5.	Value change per cohort	114
6.	Cohort-to-cohort value change per religious group	116
7.	Openness to change values for the three birth cohorts for each group	118
8.	Conservation values for the three birth cohorts for each group	118
9.	Self-transcendence values for the three birth cohorts for each group	121
10.	Self-enhancement values for the three birth cohorts for each group	121
11.	Dimensionality of the scales	134
12.	Relative positions of the Open University student and Pagan clusters on the two value indices	144
13.	Themes emerging from the interviews	152

List of Tables

1.	The ten value types	74
2.	The horizontal and vertical dimensions of individualism and collectivism	80
3.	The Pagan sample	88
4.	The Pagan paths represented in the sample	90
5.	Comparing the Pagan and Open University student survey participants	91
6.	The European Social Survey sample demographics by country	99
7.	Groups based on religious self-identification	101
8.	Values of Cronbach's coefficient alpha for the value types per group	103
9.	Mean scores for higher-order value types per birth cohort	113
10.	Mean scores for higher-order value types per group	117
11.	Mean scores for Openness to change and Conservation values	119
12.	Mean scores for Self-transcendence and Self-enhancement values	123
13.	Component inter-correlations	133
14.	Descriptive statistics for component-based scales	133
15.	Mean scale scores of Open University students and Pagans in clusters	137
16.	Rotated standardised discriminant function coefficients	139
17.	Centroids of clusters on the discriminant functions	140
18.	Mean scores on the higher-order values of Open University student and Pagan clusters	143

1 - FEB 2011



The Open University

EX12 Revised 27 January 2010

RESEARCH SCHOOL

Library Authorisation Form

Please return this form to the Research School with the two bound copies of your thesis to be deposited with the University Library. All candidates should complete parts one and two of the form. Part three only applies to PhD candidates.

Part One: Candidates Details

Name: Mika Lassander

PI: X7277427

Degree: PhD

Thesis title: **From security to self-expression: The emergent value pattern and the changing role of religion**

Part Two: Open University Library Authorisation

I confirm that I am willing for my thesis to be made available to readers by The Open University Library, and that it may be photocopied, subject to the discretion of the Librarian.

Signed:  Date: 20th of January 2011

Part Three: British Library Authorisation [PhD candidates only]

If you want like a copy of your PhD thesis to be available on loan to the British Library Thesis Service as and when it is requested, please tick Section A of this form.

The University has agreed that your participation in the British Library Thesis Service should be voluntary. Please tick either (a) or (b) to indicate your intentions.

(a) ☒ I am willing for The Open University to loan the British Library a copy of my thesis.

(b) ☐ I do not wish The Open University to loan the British Library a copy of my thesis.

Signed:  Date: 20th of January 2011

Introduction

Is there a difference in the values of people with traditional and those with new religious worldviews, or between the values of Atheists and Pagans? What is the connection between religious change and intergenerational change in social values? In this study I explore how the value priorities of people with different positions on religion vary from generation to generation. I ask how and to what extent religion is connected to the values that motivate people's behaviour and to what extent religious change and the emergence of new religions result from a broader change in these values. I argue for an explanation of the relation of religion and values by which new religions are seen as indicators of an emergent value pattern and a consequent change in the role religion has in people's lives.

In Europe Christianity has traditionally been seen as the framework that provides explanations, norms, hope, and the essence of values for people. Because many generations have lived in a religiously homogeneous society, this particular religion has become reified as part of the natural order of things for people, its beliefs the true doctrine that cannot conceivably be challenged. The salience of Christianity as a source of values can therefore be seen as a result of induction during childhood and the further experience

individuals have had growing up in a social context where monopoly of the traditional religion went largely unchallenged. This tradition, however, is now in decline. Particularly since the Second World War, it has been increasingly challenged, not only by other traditional religions such as Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism, brought to Europe by immigrant populations, but also by the proliferation of new religious movements, new interpretations of traditional religions, and a secular worldview. It appears that in contemporary Europe some kinds of worldview are growing while traditional Christianity is in decline.

For example, even though about 72% in England and Wales Great Britain identified themselves as Christians in the 2001 census (Focus On Religion 2004), much lower figures identification are consistently found in social surveys. David Voas and Steve Bruce (2004) report that according to the pooled 2000 and 2001 British Social Attitudes survey data 54.2% of people in England and Wales identify themselves as Christians. Further, the level of affiliation has fallen for each successive generation for the past century (Voas & Crockett 2005). The European Social Survey obtained similar figures for the UK in 2006 with 48.5% identifying as Christians (Jowell & Central Co-ordinating Team 2008). However, Britain is arguably a country with an unusually long history of contact with other cultures and religious traditions; it also experienced early industrialisation and subsequent economic and social changes, and was at the centre of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. These factors may have contributed to the decline of traditional religion in Britain, although a similar decline is also evident elsewhere.

In the Republic of Ireland the percentage of the population belonging to the Roman Catholic Church has fallen from 95% in 1961 to 87% in 2006, and the number of people who state that they identify with no religion has increased from 0.04% to 4.39% in the same period (Central Statistics Office 2007). Ireland's religious pluralism is to a large extent influenced by an immigrant labour force. Muslim and Hindu minorities are growing,

but other minority religions are also emerging, and belonging to the Catholic Church appears to be in slight decline among the Irish. In Finland, belonging to the Finnish Lutheran Church has declined from 92.4% in 1960 to 81.8% in 2007 (Kääriäinen, et al. 2005; Kääriäinen, et al. 2009). Like Catholicism in Ireland, the Lutheran religion in Finland has formed part of the national identity. In Finland this was emphasised after the post-independence civil war as the unifying national religion, and further during the Winter War in the form of the nationalistic slogan “for home, faith, and fatherland”. Furthermore, Finland has always been culturally isolated, has had a strict immigration policy and language requirements that limit the use of an immigrant labour force, and has remained a relatively homogeneous society to this day. Ireland and Finland are both characterised by late and relatively rapid industrialisation and economic growth.

Social value studies have related gradual change in people’s priorities to sustained and long-term changes in the socio-economic context. The change in priorities has been characterised as a shift from values that emphasise security to values that emphasise individual self-expression (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Consequently, individualisation, social fragmentation and weakening social bonds have become central themes in the descriptions of late modern societies. This shift appears to have occurred in all the countries that have experienced similar socio-economic progress. According to this view the modernisation of Western societies has led to a cultural state where freedom of choice is highly valued. In religious studies the proliferation of new religious movements has been observed coinciding with this value shift. This can be seen as a result of a process where aspiration towards being a unique individual undermines the authority of collective norms. Further, because the institutional differentiation of societies and the impersonal logic of the market economy weaken the influence of the Church, the State, and other extrinsic sources for norms and values, new religions have found open ground to claim. Finally, increases in

scientific understanding along with these changes also give more credence to a secular-rational worldview.

This line of argumentation is the mainstay of classical religious change and secularisation theories, but in this study I focus on the curiously concurrent proliferation of new religious movements and the increasing popularity of a secular-rational worldview. The naïve question I began my research with was: is this religious change really all about being unique, or about being more rational? However, I refine this by linking the question of religious change to the more general value change and ask how and to what extent changing value priorities contribute to religious change or secularisation. In other words, in what ways is religious change, and particularly the emergence of new religions, an outcome of a broader change in social values?

The discursive context and the purpose of this study

The notion that societal and cultural changes in the last decades have had an impact on religion is not exactly novel. Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead (2005) argue that in today's world spirituality is a growing phenomenon at the expense of religion. They say that people are increasingly more often clients of one of the plethora of spiritualities, rather than adherents of a traditional congregational religion. However, changes are also appearing in modes of belonging in traditional congregational religion, and in how that belonging is viewed.

Steve Bruce and David Voas (2007) argue that people's attitudes towards religion have changed. The old typology dividing religious movements into church, sect, denomination, and cult-type organisations has lost its validity. Ideologies of equality and pluralism have introduced the necessity for increased tolerance for deviance from the religious norm. Lack of commitment to dominant religions and suspicion towards overtly religious behaviour have undermined the social acceptability of traditional religious

institutions. This has led to a situation where “sects and cults are no longer regarded as especially deviant, while churches and denominations are not necessarily respected” (Bruce & Voas 2007, p. 14). Bruce and Voas suggest an alternative typology for classifying religions, tapping into differences in tolerance towards outsiders on one axis and tolerance towards unorthodoxy among adherents on the other. This translates to four types of religious organisations: liberal, devout, activist, and rigorist. Together with Heelas and Woodhead’s observations, their research points to a trend where religious structures and old institutional constraints are melting away and becoming meaningless. What makes these observations significant for my study is that they point to a change in the way people “use” religious matter, and more fundamentally to changes in what people see as important in their lives.

I use the term “religion” rather loosely instead of either reverting to the trend of using “spirituality” or using a combination of both, for example, religion/spirituality. Religion as a term is a convention – such as in the name of the discipline Religious Studies – and I do not wish to break this convention in this study. Because my intention is not organisational classification, or in the strictest sense sociological or functional analysis, but rather my interest is in the relevance of religion to individuals, I use the term in an anthropological sense to refer to

a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in people by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence, and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic (Geertz 1966, 90).

Following Geertz’s definition it doesn’t matter if we say religion or spirituality, because they both are words for people’s inner motives. Furthermore, the definition points to the process whereby these motives are made legitimate, personally fulfilling, and socially acceptable. This process of legitimation is central to my argument.

Institutional inertia and symbolic interactionism

Conventional wisdom states that religions influence values through influencing the choices people make in their criteria for moral judgements (Schwartz & Huisman 1995). Cipriani sees values as the essential content of religion and the diffusion of those values as its main function (Cipriani 2001); and according to Durkheim religion is a system that represents social ideals (Durkheim 2001, pp. 310–311). Both of these views portray religion as a conservative force in society, and that portrait is framed by the premise of a homogeneous society. That premise, however, is crumbling.

Interactions between societies have increased with trade, and modernisation has changed the locus of power from traditional authorities to mercantilist and capitalist hands. Particularly during the last half of the twentieth century, escalating globalisation and trivialisation of global communication has challenged the idea of culturally homogeneous nation states. Religions are no longer repositories of societies' shared values, because societies are increasingly composed of individuals with disparate cultural backgrounds or religious views and trans-cultural networks of connections. It is not tenable to assume that these individuals share values just because they inhabit a particular geographic location.

According to Herbert Blumer's symbolic interactionism model, people act towards things based on the meaning those things have for them (Larson 1986, p. 143). These meanings are derived from an individual's needs expressed and enmeshed in strategic social interactions and modified through interpretation that is informed by conventions and other resources available to the individual (Goffman 1970). They develop into normative structures, expressed as the individual's motivational values (Schwartz 1992). In reality, therefore, these structures are fluid and transient, but because the socio-economic context has remained largely the same and traditional religions and other social-structural conventions have been a homogeneous and conservative interpretative framework, the normative structures have had the appearance of being stable and derived from these

conventions. In other words, individuals' needs are linked to their socio-economic context and value change is an important process of adaptation to changes in these contexts. As a conservative force religion may impede normal value change processes by supporting and legitimising certain kinds of value patterns, even though in reality they may contrast with the actual values and motives people have which influence their behaviour. Depending on the severity of this contrast, and on how strongly individuals feel about their value orientation, people may be alienated from a traditional religion that purports to embody shared values, or they may be distressed by a lack of legitimating support for their values or by overt vilification of their needs. For this reason pressure for new frameworks grows. This is the backdrop to my research hypothesis and I will explore the question of society, religion and values further in Chapter 1.

Research premise and hypothesis

The premise of this study is that people's priorities change as a consequence of socio-economic changes (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). In turn, this change has implications for the functionality of the frameworks people have traditionally had available to them as sources of legitimation and support for their values, and ultimately for their needs. My hypothesis is that increasing differences between values supported by the traditional religions and individuals' motivational values is the key factor in religious change. Furthermore, religious change can take many forms: for example, increased popular pressure for the reformation of traditional religions, conversion of individuals to a different religion or a new religious movement, or abandonment of a religious worldview in favour of a secular one.

Secularisation is part of this process, but as an incidental outcome, not essentially as the defining feature. All the factors proposed by the classical secularisation theories are still at play – such as rationalisation, modernisation, functional differentiation, and

pluralisation of societies – not directly, but instead by contributing to the value change.

Similarly, individualism and privatisation have been seen as defining features of religious change, but they are also incidental outcomes. While the emerging value pattern appears to emphasise self-expression, this does not necessarily always translate to individualism.

Self-expression can manifest in the formation of various alternative forms of association between individuals, and instead of resulting in isolated individuals, it may produce complex networks and new types of community and collectivity (Hetherington 1998). New religions can therefore be seen as indicators of an individual's values that are distinct from traditional religious values and more in line with the actual motivational values that have developed through social interactions. For example, Paganism does not provide an individual's values, but it is a network, or an elective community of individuals with similar values, and it acts as a framework for legitimating these values.

The purpose of the study

Instead of a new separate theory of religious change or secularisation, this study aims to revise the old religious change models and integrate them with a general model of social value change. This study looks at the value priorities of members of an emerging religious movement, compares these with the priorities of the mainstream population divided into groups based on their position on religion, and correlates the findings with the general pattern of social value change.

Contemporary Paganism is used as a case study because it is a fast-growing religion which has spread globally and adapted to different cultural contexts, apparently in sync with the social value changes suggested by Inglehart and others (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). The aim is to explore value differences between different religious groupings, with the objective of finding out what kinds of values are legitimised by the different worldviews. In other words, religion is used as an independent grouping variable and values as the

dependent variable. For this purpose a value survey is conducted among Pagans. My hypothesis suggests that individuals belonging to this group will have significantly different values compared to the mainstream population, particularly compared to the active members of traditional religions, with the difference in the direction predicted by general value-change models. Value data for the mainstream population is obtained from the European Social Survey (Jowell & Central Co-ordinating Team 2008).

In order to identify cultural variance, three countries were selected for the study: Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Finland. These have distinct religious, cultural, and economic histories, but they are now on a similar socio-economic level. Ireland is a traditionally Catholic country with a high level of religiosity on any indicator, but it also has a strong pre-Christian Celtic cultural identity that survived the early introduction of Christianity to Ireland, sometimes, and to some extent, intermixed with Christian themes (Bowman 2002). In recent years Ireland has experienced rapid economic growth and pluralisation through immigration, and equality legislation has improved the opportunity for other religions to operate. Also, the Catholic Church has suffered from a series of child abuse cases. These, under global media attention, have arguably diminished the credibility of Catholicism in the eyes of a noticeable number of people.

The UK has a long history of dealing with different cultures, and this has brought it into contact with a broader range of religions and worldviews. In addition, movements such as the Freemasons, other Western esoteric traditions, Theosophy, and alternative spirituality, have had an exceptionally long history in the UK, while the recent growth of atheism and secular humanism is particularly noticeable.

Finland is a comparatively homogeneous and isolated culture, but stands between the Slavic influence from the east and the Anglo-Saxon influence from the south and west, which adds some element of religious and cultural variance. Nevertheless, it is a Lutheran country to the same extent that Ireland is a Catholic one. Unlike Celtic culture in Ireland,

however, the remains of Fenno-Ugric culture were purged during the relatively late Christianisation project and particularly during the Protestant Reformation, which in Finnish is aptly called “religious cleansing”. Lutheranism, and Christianity in general, is seen as a part of Finnishness, and the comparatively liberal Finnish Lutheran Church is viewed as a provider of important social services and moral guidance. Finland also experienced relatively late industrialisation – from the late 1940s onwards, after the war against the Soviet Union. General living standards began to improve significantly in the 1950s, and the economy started to grow rapidly in the 1980s.

To reiterate: the purpose of this two-phase sequential mixed-methods study is to better understand the nature of a change whereby secularisation and new religious movements emerge as significant features of late modern societies. This is done by converging numeric trends on people’s motivational values from quantitative research with the detail of qualitative data from thematic interviews. The reasoning behind this approach is to 1) obtain statistical and verifiable data on the value priorities of individuals with different religious affiliation, and 2) follow up with a few individuals to explore these results in more depth to better understand the links between a general social value change and religious change.

In the first, quantitative, phase, a survey study is conducted to test a hypothesis that relates individuals’ religious association to their value priorities. This is repeated in Ireland, the UK, and Finland. Contemporary Paganism as an emergent religion is compared with mainstream religious groupings. Two sets of control data are used for comparison. The European Social Survey (ESS) provides data on general value priorities in the three countries for the mainstream religious groupings, and data collected from a sample of Open University students – as a proxy for the mainstream population – is used to examine the modes of interpersonal relations and how these relate to values. In the second

phase, a grounded theory approach is used to engage participants in exploring the relationship between worldview and values. Thematic interviews of a small sub-sample of Pagans focus on their views on the relation of Paganism to the mainstream culture, their value priorities, and their view on changes in society and specifically in the prevalent values.

Religious change as a social research problem

According to James Beckford, secularisation as a concept is simultaneously central to academic debate and highly problematic (2003, p. 31). Secularisation theory has been presented as a grand social theory, consisting of high-level constructions describing and explaining the master characteristics or driving forces of social formations, sometimes accompanied by speculation about the nature of human societies. In Beckford's view, however, rather than being a grand social theory, the secularisation concept actually entails a number of theories about the social characteristics of religion. These theories are based upon the rationalist assumptions of modernity and upon the positioning of religion as a construct in social or cultural spheres that are seen as separate from the objective reality of nature (Latour 1993). These assumptions make secularisation theories centrally and ideologically concerned with the decline, erosion, and eclipse of religion as a cultural product (Beckford 2003, p. 32).

For example, Karel Dobbelaere has identified three overlapping dimensions in the process that have been observed as the secularisation of societies: 1) the declining social significance of religion, 2) changes in theology, in religious organisation and in individuals' beliefs, and 3) changes in the relationships between individuals and religious organisations (Dobbelaere 2002). The first of these is directly related to my thesis that general value change from security to self-expression is underlying religious change. The other two can be seen as consequences of this, but I argue that these are not so much

dimensions of change as a revelation of a state of plurality that has always existed at a vernacular level. The openness and recognition of this plurality has been made possible by the value change.

Secularisation models

Secularisation models posit that the rise of a rational worldview and the modernisation of societies are the main causal forces behind the decline of the social significance of religion and of religious beliefs and practices. The rise of the Enlightenment worldview undermined the foundations of belief in the supernatural, and this has eroded habitual religious practices and beliefs. The functional differentiation of modern societies has led to a decline in the central role of religious institutions and of religion as the provider of an overarching regulatory code for the society. These processes result in an overall decline in demand for religion.

These models are embedded in the Enlightenment ideals of modern societies and the scientific critique of religion. For Max Weber, rationalisation did not mean the culmination of the Enlightenment ideal of liberating positivistic science. Instead, he saw modernity as the emergence of the rule of bureaucratic experts who are “specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart” (Weber 1930, p. 182). In Weber’s view of modernisation, societies become progressively “disenchanted”, and religion loses its role in public life. Weber’s “disenchantment” was rephrased in the mid 1960s by Bryan R. Wilson as “secularisation”, referring to diminution of the social significance of religion (Wilson 1966, p. 14). Secularisation of consciousness results when individuals are increasingly able to gain psychological independence from religion. He saw this as unavoidable even though some “non-religious constraints [still] operate to hold men to religious institutions or to persuade them to go through the motions of religious rituals” (Wilson 1982, p. 150). According to Wilson, the driving force behind secularisation, in addition to rationalisation,

was societalisation. Like Weber, Wilson saw secularisation as a process where small close-knit communities are replaced by modern urban societies, states run by impersonal bureaucracies, and large industrial and commercial enterprises. This also entails “a shift in the location of decision making in human groups from elites claiming special access to supernatural ordinances to elites legitimating their authority by reference to other bases of power” (Wilson 1985, p. 12).

At the time Wilson published his *Religion in Secular Society* (1966), Peter L. Berger, an American sociologist, published *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a sociological theory of religion* (1967), the second half of which examines secularisation. The core of his theory was that the emerging religious and cultural diversity of modern societies causes secularisation because it undermines the formerly strong plausibility structures of religious monopolies. According to Berger, social confirmation sustains plausibility. In a pluralistic world people are in constant contact with different forms of belief systems and ways of life, and no one way of living receives strong confirmation (Berger 1967, pp. 150–153; Berger 1979, pp. 17–19). The reason for this, according to Berger, is that

the religious content of the plausibility structures in a pluralistic situation is deprived of its taken-for-granted, objective reality in consciousness, and their reality becomes a ‘private’ affair of individuals, that is, loses the quality of self-evident intersubjective plausibility – thus one ‘cannot really talk’ about religion any more. And their ‘reality’, insofar as it is still maintained by the individual, is apprehended as being rooted within the consciousness of the individual rather than in any facilities of the external world – religion no longer refers to the cosmos or to history, but to individual Existence or psychology (Berger 1967, p. 152).

First, religion becomes a private affair of the individual, related to individual psychology rather than to cosmic reality, and religion is seen as being located within the individual’s consciousness, or personal experience, and next, because of this, one “‘cannot really talk’ about religion anymore”, it has lost its self-evident inter-subjective plausibility (see also Berger 1979, pp. 17–18). In Berger’s model this “talking about” in everyday conversation is what reinforces shared beliefs, and when the shared plausibility of all religious communication is reduced, day-to-day interaction must become increasingly religiously

neutral, and in losing the regular reinforcement of religious glossing-over of daily routines, the plausibility of religion is weakened (Bruce 2001, pp. 88–89).

An alternative explanatory model for secularisation is based on the idea that a lack of competition makes religious organisations complacent and non-responsive to individuals' various and changing needs, eventually resulting in a decline of membership and belief. This religious market model has been used to explain the contrast between secular Europe and religious USA. According to it, free competition, the realisation of consumer society, and the commodification of goods and ideas that is intrinsic in modernisation improve the performance of all actors operating in the same market. As long as religious organisations are free to compete without imposed monopolies or subsidies, vitality of religion follows the pattern of basic social exchanges. Within these social exchanges, people attempt to gain rewards and avoid costs. In this transaction, religion acts as a powerful compensator for human suffering with a promise of postponed rewards (Bainbridge 1997; Stark & Finke 2000). This model assumes that, because there is always human suffering that cannot be satisfactorily or more economically addressed by other means, there is a constant need for religious compensators, and “when these compensators are in short supply, new forms of religion emerge that can meet the demand by offering the rewards necessary” (Fox 2005, p. 298). Variations in religious adherence and devotion on a national level are therefore attributed to differences in the supply of religious services rather than different levels of demand (Finke 1997).

However, the empirical basis of the model has been challenged. Chaves and Gorski (2001) found no support for the claim that religious pluralism is positively associated with religious participation in any general sense and David Voas, Daniel Olson and Alasdair Crockett (2002) found little correlation between pluralism and religious participation. Voas, Olson and Crockett also concluded that the findings that indicate otherwise are based upon an expected, non-causal covariance arising from an error inherent in the

formula used to calculate the correlation. As a result of this critique, the religious market model has lost much of its momentum. Furthermore, there are theoretical problems with the model. Some of the cause–effect arguments rely on assumed shared schemas or cultural models. This premise has been strongly criticised in studies on cognitive anthropology (Holland & Quinn 1987; D’Andrade & Strauss 1992; Strauss & Quinn 1997). For example, the idea that religious involvement can be seen as a result of market functions assumes that there is willingness and a psychological capability to regard religion as a “consumable”, and as a matter of individual choice in the sense of comparing products and then selecting the one that best suits the individual. This may well be the unique product of historical and political events, and of the particular structure of the society in the USA where state intervention in religious affairs is minimal. Finally, it operates within a narrow and exclusively instrumental concept of rationality. As Beckford points out, individuals do not necessarily have the desire or the opportunity to make use of their capacity to calculate an efficient relation between means and ends, and human beings do not always optimise their individual utility, but pursue, instead, collective goods or altruistic ends (Beckford 2003, pp. 169–170).

Religious change models

Another view is that religion is not disappearing, but instead is changing form, and this change is making it invisible to traditional sociological tools and measurement instruments. For example, Thomas Luckmann (1967; 1990) argues that new religious movements and unchurched religiosity are “little transcendencies” outside the confines or control of religious organisations. From Luckmann’s position secularisation is actually just an erosion of the traditional organisational forms of religion. Religion survives as invisible or implicit religion, and takes new forms, as the “little transcendencies” become institutionalised (Luckmann 1990). David Martin (1969; 1978) also sees these non-

traditional and non-institutionalised forms of religiosity as important evidence against the secularisation of societies. He criticised Wilson's secularisation thesis because it was dependent on a particular definition of religion, it postulated a "Golden Age" of religion that was actually idealised after eleventh- to thirteenth-century Catholicism but other than that has never really existed, and, further, because "contemporary society remains deeply imbued with every type of superstition and metaphysic" (Martin 1969, p. 113). He sees secularisation as a contingent and possibly reversible product of particular historical forces, not as a universal and unilinear process tied irrevocably to modernisation (Martin 1978). Callum G. Brown (1992) also argues that the social significance of religion is relatively independent from modernisation. Although it can be sensitive to fundamental social and economic changes, it can also adapt to these new socio-economic contexts (Brown 1992, pp. 55–56).

Danièle Hervieu-Léger (1998; 2000), on the other hand, sees religion as a chain of memory that used to have a powerful influence over culture at a collective level, but that has fallen victim to the phenomenon of discontinuity of tradition that is typical in modern societies. Accordingly, the former virtually obligatory mode of believing, belonging, and practising has lost its grip on the majority of the population. Individuals are left exposed to the necessity to make their own sense of their lives and of the rapidly changing world in which they live. What is observed as secularisation is, then, a result of crises of collective ideals. According to Hervieu-Léger:

[r]eligion is in decline because social change wears down the collective ability to set up ideals, the crises of ideals loosen social bonds. However, what emerges from this twofold movement is not the end but the metamorphosis of religion (Hervieu-Léger 2000, p. 25).

Religion is no longer transferred as a complete package to younger generations. Instead it changes into something different, goes through a metamorphosis in which various combinations of its different aspects – communal, ethical, cultural, and emotional – are

established as individuals voluntarily adopt a religious identity (Hervieu-Léger 1998; Hervieu-Léger 2000, pp. 149–162).

One example of such metamorphosis is presented in the “spiritual revolution” model promoted especially by Paul Heelas. He argues, with Linda Woodhead (2005), that a shift in modern culture identified by Charles Taylor (1991) as a subjective turn is causing a shift also in the mode of religious belonging, from people being adherents to being clients. Normatively this means a change from living according to the values set by some external authority to living with one’s inner experience as the ultimate authority and with the quest of becoming the person one truly is (Heelas & Woodhead 2005, pp. 2–4). For Heelas and Woodhead, spiritual revolution means the downfall of religion. The position of authority makes the critical distinction between “life-as” religion and “subjective-life” spirituality. In their terms, religion “involves subordinating subjective life to the ‘higher’ authority of transcendent meaning, goodness and truth” and spirituality “invokes the sacred in the cultivation of unique subjective-life” (Heelas & Woodhead 2005, p. 5).

The metamorphosis of religion is about individuals realising – or being allowed to realise – their varying needs. After the metamorphosis no religious system of beliefs can be seen as a monolithic source of authority, system of orientation, or an ultimate and unique compensator for suffering. Nor will “religion” for the individual be a complete cultural identity package, but it can be one of the multitude of voluntarily accessed sources for the individual’s composite identity (Hall 1992), and a method for self-improvement and personal growth.

What is wrong with these models? Religious pluralism has existed before and it has been successfully explained away by viewing different religions as either different domains of interest and authority for different deities, heresies created by the devil or by God to tempt people, fallacies of primitive peoples, or alternative expressions of the same core truth. To

some extent these strategies are still in use at the individual level, when religious people come across those holding different beliefs. Naturally these strategies lead to different attitudes towards the 'Other' – hostile or accommodating – and if the other is a close friend or relative, these meetings can have dramatic consequences. Nevertheless, loss of plausibility of one belief system cannot be explained by its meeting with others. Nor is rationality or irrationality necessarily the issue; emotions play a more significant role than rationalist models grant it. For some people religion may be the most efficient and emotionally fulfilling choice to deal with some issues, but it is apparent that secular alternatives are increasingly gaining ground.

A more recent model sees the general level of the feeling of existential security as a significant factor that affects the likelihood of individuals being religious or not (Norris & Inglehart 2004, pp. 13–25). It is based on the hypothesis that the experience of growing up in less secure societies will heighten the importance of religious values, while conversely the experience of more secure conditions will lessen it. Contrary to the religious market hypothesis and Berger's classical secularisation model, Norris and Inglehart argue that the degree of religious pluralism in a society is far less important than people's need for security. They show considerable empirical evidence in support of this model. Populations of advanced industrial societies have been moving towards more secular orientations during the past fifty years with the exception of the USA. Norris and Inglehart suggest that this exception can be explained by a lower general feeling of existential security caused by greater socio-economic inequality in the USA (Norris & Inglehart 2004, pp. 106–110). In this model values are seen as justifications for an individual's needs, and it is the functionality of the worldview as a legitimating framework for the individual's values that matters.

I am not arguing that there is no secularisation, or that there is. What I am arguing here is that in the same way as security as a primary need may be associated with some

types of religiosity, other needs call for other types of worldviews, either religious or secular.

Contemporary Paganism

Ronald Hutton identifies four different ways in which pagans and paganism were talked about in Britain between the early nineteenth century and about 1940 (Hutton 1999, pp. 3–31). The first discourse is a colonialist one that sees paganism as the religion of primitive people in Africa and among other indigenous people. The second links pagans with pre-Christian Greece and Rome, and associates it with the fine arts, literature, and philosophy. In this discourse these traditions are seen as deficient to Christianity only in ethics and in the true revelation of God. The third discourse is also generally about non-Christian cultures, but rather than focusing on the arts of classical Greece and Rome it sees ancient and mythical cultures as sources of true and universal spiritual wisdom. In the nineteenth century various movements emerged – most prominently Theosophy – seeking this ancient wisdom from Indian and Egyptian traditions, as well as from Gnostic Christianity, Kabbalah, and tales of Mu, Atlantis, and Avalon. These were believed to contain traces of eternal spiritual knowledge that had been transmitted through time in different guises. According to Hutton, while this discourse pays great respect to paganism, it is not itself usually seen as pagan. The fourth discourse also associates the term with ancient Greece, Rome, and Egypt, but now these cultures are characterised as joyous, liberationist, life-affirming, and connected with both the natural world and with a human creative spirit. In this discourse Paganism has a positive quality, specifically as the antithesis to Puritanism. Hutton ties this discourse to Romantic authors such as Keats, Shelley, and Swinburne, and sees them as influences behind many late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century individuals who became central in the development of contemporary Paganism. This fourth discourse eventually became the language of the contemporary Pagans.

Hutton's work *The Triumph of the Moon* (1999) is a thorough analysis of the cultural soil within which the movement grew up. The history and development of contemporary Paganism is connected to the ethos described by Hutton as the third and fourth pagan discourses, and particularly the latter. Given the importance of "nature" and individualism, he could have considered the influence of even earlier currents in British and European cultures, such as those that produced Rousseau's *Social Contract* ([1762] 2005), Paine's *Rights of Men* ([1791] 1999), and specifically the emergence of individualism and the idea of individual freedom (e.g., Mill [1859] 1998). These currents can, however, be seen as the groundwork for the Age of the Enlightenment, and as such taken for granted as the context in which the precursors to contemporary Paganism emerged.

The intellectual roots of Paganism can be found in the Western esoteric tradition that combines material from, for example, Gnosticism, Hermeticism, Kabbalah, astrology, and alchemy. Organisations such as the Rosicrucians, the Freemasons, and the Ancient Druid Order, but particularly *fin de siècle* movements such as Theosophy, the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, and *Ordo Templi Orientis*, can be seen as predecessors of contemporary Paganism. The progress of this cultural trend was disrupted by the World Wars, but in the mid twentieth century new movements started to emerge. Noteworthy are the publications by Gerald Gardner (the latter under the pen name Scire) of *A Goddess Arrives* in 1939 (Gardner 1997) and *High Magic's Aid: Wonderful Tale of Medieval Witchcraft* in 1949 (Gardner 1999), because Gardner came to be known as the founder of Wicca. After the repeal in 1951 of the Witchcraft and Vagrancy Acts in Britain, Gardner started to advocate Witchcraft in the media, and the organisation of groups based on his and others' similar ideas became easier. The movement grew and branched, and was followed in 1964 by the founding by Ross Nichols of the Order of Bards, Ovates, and Druids, as a more Pagan way of being a Druid than the largely esoteric Orders that he left. Wicca formed early in the emergence of new religions, and it was transported to the USA where it developed further.

The movement also diversified, and other traditions came to be used as sources, and – in the context of the social upheavals of the 1960s in the USA – emancipatory and politicised variants formed. The number of publications on the subject increased rapidly, and – helped by better availability of information, particularly in the late 1990s through easier access to the internet – the movement became global. The core tenets remain largely the same as those identified by Hutton as the fourth discourse. These can be observed in the meanings practitioners now give for the term Pagan.

In this study the term Pagan with a capital P is used specifically in reference to these self-identifying Pagans. To a significant degree it is a consciously contrived classification that implies more coherence than actually exists. This is well presented in Graham Harvey's definition, which acknowledges the diversity, but points out that Paganism is

a diverse but cohesive array of religious activities and affiliations that can also be named 'nature-centred spiritualities' or 'nature religions'. Adherents name themselves 'Pagan' and/or its cognate 'Heathen', and some use further self-identifying labels such as Asatru, Druid, Goddess-Feminist, Shaman or Wiccan... [They] identify themselves with the ancestral (pre-Christian) religious traditions of Europe as re-created in the early to mid-twentieth century and in continuous evolution and construction since then (Harvey 2006, 84-5).

This heterogeneity of contemporary Paganism is related to its history of combining British, North-American, and European cultural and social influences, and later those of other cultures as well. Even with this heterogeneity, Paganism is distinct from other new religions that emerged at around the same time. It is not a movement focusing on or waiting for the coming of a New Age or for spiritual transcendence to a different place. Instead, according to Harvey, Paganism is re-creating ways of relating to the Earth and is "at home" on Earth (Harvey 1997, p. 1). This sets it apart from the collection of spiritual practices and movements that are generally labelled New Age. It has also followed a slightly different trajectory from the Western esoteric traditions of, for example, Aleister Crowley's Thelema or Anton LaVey's philosophical Satanism. Rather than focusing primarily on methods and techniques of personal growth the emphasis in Paganism is on

nature and the Earth, the relation of humans with these elements and on how different cultures have conceptualised these relations, and on finding the source of personal growth through that kind of understanding. There is, however, considerable overlap between Paganism and these other movements, and because Paganism is essentially an open belief system, many Pagans in fact follow a number of different esoteric and spiritual traditions.

The number of Pagans is difficult to estimate because there is no singular organisation with formal membership or even a group of such organisations. The majority of Pagans practise their religion in small groups or individually, only some are members of a Pagan organisation, and many refrain from publicly identifying themselves as Pagans. Analysis of the entries written in the “other religion” field in the 2001 UK census revealed that 42,792 individuals identified themselves as Pagan in the UK (Weller 2008, pp. 44–45). No such data is available for Ireland or Finland, but the Irish 2006 census (Central Statistics Office 2007) found 1,106 Pantheists, who may or may not be regarded as Pagan. In Finland the best estimates are based on the membership of registered Pagan organisations which amounts to fewer than 500 in total. It is reasonable to assume that the number of Pagans in each country is actually significantly higher than these figures indicate, but even so, contemporary Paganism is a relatively small religious movement.

Methodology

When it comes to competing knowledge claims, Religious Studies is probably as conflicted as academic disciplines can be. As a field of study it is varyingly located under Arts and Humanities, Social Sciences, Cultural Studies, or Theology, and each of these schools comes with different methodological conventions. Rather than reaping the benefit of multiple viewpoints to a common object of study, it seems that this plurality of starting points often places scholars in the middle of arguments about the possibilities and limitations of academic knowledge (e.g., Gothóni 2005). These arguments have been

called “paradigm wars” (Datta 1994; Tashakkori & Teddlie 1998, pp. 3–13) or, in a less belligerent way, “paradigm dialogue” (e.g., Guba 1990). Unfortunately, the arguments do not manifest themselves as a dialogue on many occasions.

The logic of enquiry

In Religious Studies, the rift is often torn between the two camps of “understanding” and “explaining” religion, as they have sometimes been labelled (for an example, see the discussion in Gothóni 2005). However, the actual realities of the two approaches do not warrant such a strict dichotomy. The case for war is derived from the fundamental question of the philosophy of science: what is the nature of reality and what can we know about it? While some say that there is a single reality, and we can gain true knowledge of it through systematic observation and analysis, others say that, for all practical purposes, there are multiple constructed realities, and knowledge is always subjective and context dependent.

At one extreme, the logical-positivist paradigm postulates a single and observable reality, which is independent and separable from the inquisitor. From that position, value-free knowledge and generalisations are possible through systematic observations, experiments, and inductive logic. In an attempt to discover empirical facts that can be expressed as universal covering laws, research based on logical positivism looks for constant links and connections between events (Bhaskar 1978; Steinmetz 1998). Few scientists today believe that this is ever entirely possible. Most natural scientists believe that they can progressively pin down the facts and get close enough to reality to, at least, solve practical problems, but, particularly in social sciences, logical positivism has been discredited (Tashakkori & Teddlie 1998, p. 7).

Karl Popper’s (1972) argument against logical positivism focused on its two weaknesses. First, observations need to be described, and those descriptions are dependent on language that is a product of previous knowledge and cognitive processing.

Researchers' minds can never be the blank slate that could process sensory input by rational reasoning only in order to generate theory-independent descriptions. Nor is natural language ever context free and exact. Popper's second point focused on the faulty logic of empirical verification as the bases for claims of truth. He noted that positive corroboration cannot ultimately negate the possibility of negative evidence also existing. It is therefore necessary to try to falsify scientific arguments rather than to prove them; a failure to reject a hypothesis increases its validity. According to Popper, this has implications for the logic of enquiry: while induction from observations and experiments can generate hypothesis, it is necessary to use deductive logic to test them. Though Popper's thesis has faced criticism as over-rationalising and even crippling to the scientific process (Feyerabend 1993; Lakatos 1970), his critical rationalism and his falsificationist thesis opened the way for a new paradigm.

According to this new post-positivist paradigm there is an underlying singular reality, but our understanding of it is constructed. All the knowledge we can achieve is based on facts that are necessarily theory laden; research is limited and influenced by the theories, models and the other tools researchers utilise (Tashakkori & Teddlie 1998, pp. 8–9). These limits are well known and acknowledged and the idea of fallibility of scientific knowledge is central. Researchers do not try to conclusively prove their hypothesis through accumulation of positive evidence. Instead they indicate a failure to reject it despite rigorous testing and looking for contradictory evidence. Research is, through this lens, “a process of making claims and then refining or abandoning some of them for other claims” (Creswell 2003, p. 7). It aims to develop relevant true statements, which can serve to explain some aspect of whatever is being studied or to describe causal relationships. These statements can include clauses and caveats, and they are left open for review and attempts to falsify them (Creswell 2003, pp. 6–8). Furthermore, the search for causality does not necessarily mean a search for a singular and universal causal mechanism. For example,

complex events can be determined by variable sets of causal factors rather than a single factor or constant set of factors, and similar events may be caused by different sets of causal mechanisms. These sets can also be unique and non-repeatable historical conjunctures, so that a single non-contextualised theory may not be able to explain an event observed in a different context (Steinmetz 1998; Bhaskar 1986; Ragin 1987).

Regardless of the turn from logical positivism to post-positivism as the paradigm of the day, the discussion on scientific methodology had been mostly cumulative and linear, within the realm of what Kuhn called normal science (Kuhn 1996). However, from the late 1950s onwards, more critical arguments against the essentialism of positivist epistemology started to gain support. According to these arguments, all knowledge is not only constructed, but does not necessarily reflect any external objective realities at all. Even the fundamental categories, classifications, and terms we use to organise and describe the world are non-objective, non-real artefacts of the societies we are born and raised into (Gergen 1994). These terms and categories are created, reified and sustained over time by human societies, and modified through the cultural contacts they make. They are passed on over generations through the process of socialisation as objective truths. These constructs do not exist on the grounds of their objective validity, but through social processes, interactions, and conventions (Berger & Luckmann 1967).

From the theory of the social construction of reality it was derived that we can never have access to a valid and universal truth about an underlying reality. The emphasis in methodology shifted from ontology to epistemology; the only world we can study is a semiotic world of meanings, represented in the signs and symbols people use to think and communicate. Knowledge is constructed rather than discovered, and there can be multiple “truths” about any object of study (Gergen 1999; Potter 1996). This conceptual relativism shifted the aim of the social science research programme from an explanation of causal mechanisms and processes to the understanding of contextual meanings (Creswell 2003,

pp. 8–9). This shift threatened to debunk the post-positivist project of scientific discovery, especially in humanistic and social sciences.

Nevertheless, in ignoring the natural reality which is independent of human action, constructivism is left open to criticism from a number of disciplines that are studying the processes of human category formation from a different starting point, such as evolutionary biology (Dawkins 1976; Dennett 1995; Dennett 2006), evolutionary psychology (Mithen 1996; Pinker 2002), cognitive anthropology (Atran 2002), and the cognitive study of religions (Whitehouse & McCauley 2005; McCauley & Lawson 2002; Pyysiäinen 2001; Pyysiäinen 2004). Contrary to the claims of social constructionism, these have found that there are structures in the human mind that have an evolutionary adaptive basis, corresponding to some of the categories we use to organise the world. Other studies have found evidence for universal aspects of reasoning that are based on the commonalities of our bodies and brains, as well as the environments in which we live (Lakoff & Johnson 1999, p. 5). When looking at the bigger picture drawn by these studies, it appears that not all the objects of study in the social sciences are purely human constructs: some have reality beyond the immediate context and some correspond with what can be seen as a universal human reality. Without some level of realism, constructivism is in danger of sliding into complete relativism with no objective criteria for validity or possibility for generalisation. Whether this is seen as a crucial problem or not is the question that makes the post-positivist and constructionist paradigms appear incompatible. One takes an objectivist approach to research with the aim for generality, universality, and context-independent criteria for validity, whereas the other has a more subjective and relativist relationship to research, with the principle of respecting the uniqueness of each case, and the goal of gaining an understanding of the context in its own terms (Morgan 2007).

The main argument of this incompatibility thesis is about the relative importance of either internal validity (internal to the research process) or external validity (or contextual

validity) of the study in question. The arguments for the former emphasise the importance of controlled research settings, so that results can be generalised and transferred to a wider population, or to a different context. The opposition sees the quality of their research dependent on the naturalness of their research setting, how well it takes into account the subjective reality of the participants of the study, and how valid the findings would appear to the participants (Tashakkori & Teddlie 1998, p. 4). However, there are also arguments for a middle way. A more pragmatic and instrumentalist attitude to research methodology is becoming more and more popular, particularly in social science research that focuses on complex processes and topics.

Pragmatism and the compatibility thesis

The main point of classical pragmatism is that researchers should be open to all possible theories and methods of research, as long as these advance the investigation towards truth. There can be many explanations of reality, and the better explanations are the ones that produce more anticipated outcomes. In other words, the research process should follow the dictatorship of the research question, not that of the method (Tashakkori & Teddlie 1998, pp. 20–22). At the end of the nineteenth century Charles Sanders Peirce (1931; 1940), William James ([1907] 1995), and John Dewey ([1948] 2004) in the USA, and Ferdinand Schiller ([1912] 1970) in the UK, started to express a more practical and process-oriented approach to research methodology. The epistemological pluralism embedded in their pragmatism can be seen as a third option between the objectivism of positivist approaches and the relativism of constructionist approaches (Bernstein 1983; Margolis 2006).

Popper regarded Peirce as one of the greatest philosophers of all time and William James credited him with the founding of pragmatism. He was certainly ahead of his time in the late 1860s when he wrote his criticism against Cartesian philosophy. In his later writings on pragmatism he called for a scientific attitude, a genuine desire to find out how

things are, and for the method of science, by which he meant the method of experience and reasoning. Peirce disregarded Descartes' method as a "sham of feigned doubts", and his idea of the human faculty of intuitive self-consciousness as an artifice (Haack 2004). Instead – in a very Darwinian way, as Susan Haack points out – he saw enquiry as continuous with animals' exploration of their environment. All human beliefs involve habits of action, and true doubt is the involuntary and unsettled state that results when experience does not agree with a "belief-habit" (Haack 2004). For Peirce, the most sophisticated human cognitive activity is based on the primitive process where organism strives to return to equilibrium: "a process beginning with doubt and ending when a new habit, a revised belief, is reached" (Haack 2004, p. 7). Accordingly, if you really want to learn the truth, you must acknowledge that you don't satisfactorily know already; the researcher must be "at all times ready to dump their whole cart-load of beliefs, the moment experience is against them" (Peirce 1931, p. 24).

In following this process, the various logics of enquiry can be seen as complementary. All research falls somewhere within the cycle of the research process. It can start from grounded facts and observations through inductive logic to abstract generalisations and theory formation. Or it can start from expectations and hypotheses, proceed to test those hypotheses through deductive reasoning, and then continue to generate a corrected hypothesis through inductive reasoning (Tashakkori & Teddlie 1998, pp. 24–25). The pragmatist approach to theory construction is neither induction nor deduction, but abduction, or "the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis" (Peirce 1940, pp. 150-156). The logic behind abduction is identifying surprises, issues of doubt, or anomalies in observations or theoretical models, and then constructing hypotheses that might explain these surprises (Shank 1998). Abduction follows the pattern of observing a result (the surprising thing), proposing a rule that might explain the result, and explicating how the rule might be applicable to the observation in this case (Stainton-Rogers 2006, pp.

86–87). I contend that a good example would be the surprisingly resilient or even increasing attraction of some types of religions while many traditional religions are losing ground. What are the possible – and the most probable – factors that might explain this event? My starting point is the current models of religious change, where the anomalous persistence of some forms of religiosity has been noticed which raises doubts about the validity of the models. From there I proceed to the formulation of a hypothesis. Following the logic of abduction I propose that the processes usually seen as the causes behind secularisation are not affecting religion directly, but through the intermediary of a general value change. For this hypothesis to hold, there should be a significant difference in value priorities between followers of these new religions and those of traditional religions, and this difference should correspond with the observations made by longitudinal studies on general value change. Also, the time of the emergence of these new religions should correspond with the observed or theorised occurrence of this value change. This is the objective of the first phase of this study where I use quantitative survey methods to explore the priorities of various religious groupings.

This approach does not result in an explanatory statement about cause and effect; rather, it offers an explication, or “an unfolding and uncovering of what is likely to be going on” (Stainton-Rogers 2006, p. 87). There may be causal relations, but we may not be able to completely pin them all down. In situations of high complexity, explicatory research is preferable. It treats the “residue of the unexplained” not as “an irritating ‘blip’ to be ironed out or ignored,” but as the focus of enquiry (Stainton-Rogers 2006, p. 85). Therefore, as further questions arise from the first phase these are used as starting points for the second phase. For example: to what extent can the general pattern of value change be used to explain religious change? What kinds of meanings is the general value change given in the different contexts of Ireland, the UK, and Finland? And, more abstractly, what implications do these meanings have for the values–religion connection?

Mixed-methods approach

All research methods have their particular weaknesses, strengths, and different biases. The first applications of the mixed-methods design, following the example of psychologists Campbell and Fiske (1959), were based on the idea that when testing the validity of scientific constructs, using multiple methods would give more reliable results. A multi-method approach would minimise the possibility that observed systematic variance is due to an artifactual link between a particular research method and a case response.

Alan Bryman (2007) investigated the difficulties that researchers using mixed methods might encounter. He interviewed 20 social scientists in the United Kingdom in 2004, who were selected on the basis of their published articles that combined quantitative and qualitative methods. He asked them about the problems they had encountered and the potential barriers they had noticed. It is significant that only one respondent mentioned the divide between different paradigms as a reason for any possible difficulties in the integration of methods. The main barriers that the participants reported can be grouped in three categories. First are technical difficulties that relate to the intrinsic aspects of quantitative and qualitative research and their constituent research methods. These include difficulties in the structuring of the research project, the paradigm divide, and the differing timeline requirements for the methods. In the second category are issues to do with the wider institutional context of the research. These include departmental prejudice and the traditions of the field of study, but also observations that research using different methods can be seen to have different audiences. This can lead to problems in publication if journals have narrow, established target audiences or conventions that emphasise one method rather than the other. These also compound into the problem of a lack of exemplars. In the third category were the personal preferences of the researcher and the skills required. These barriers could be overcome with sufficient planning. However, the increased time requirements, especially with sequential design, cannot be avoided.

Bryman calls for researchers embarking on a mixed-methods study to design it in a way that recognises in advance the implications of the different rhythm of quantitative and qualitative investigations. He noticed that while an increasing amount of research is done using multiple methods, in most cases there was no substantial integration of the methods. The key question is whether the end product is more than the sum of two individual studies conducted with different methods would be. Genuine integration requires recognition of the different methods in the analysis and interpretation of data as well as in the writing of the report, so that the quantitative and qualitative components are mutually illuminating. The idea of triangulation in order to seek convergence across qualitative and quantitative data is a powerful argument against the practice of using a single-method research design, but triangulation to test the consistency of findings is not the only reason to use multiple methods in the same research. There are other applications and different designs of mixed-method research, each with particular uses and advantages. Research procedures can be arranged so that different methods are applied at the same time, or the methods can follow each other in sequence, where two separate data collection phases follow each other.

In the explanatory design that I am employing, quantitative data is collected and analysed first. Qualitative findings assist in explaining and interpreting the findings of the quantitative study. The richness of detail from qualitative research complements the quantitative findings on trends (Creswell 2003, p. 215; Tashakkori & Teddlie 1998, pp. 46–47). This approach is useful in this case because the results of various independent studies on religious change – quantitative as well as qualitative – point to a need for a new theory, or at least a revision of the old theories of religious change. For example, the participants' views on the general value change, on prevalent values in the society, and on how much being a Pagan has influenced and changed their values, can be related to quantitative data on value priorities. The research design was subjected to the approval of the research ethics committee following the research guidelines of the Open University.

The application was sent to the Open University Human Participants and Materials Ethics Committee. The research project was approved with two recommendations for alterations to the invitation letters (decision HPMEC/07/#334/1).¹ These recommendations were implemented.

In the next chapter I present the theoretical background for a revised model of religious change. I see the links between the individual's needs, values, and justifications as fundamental in the process that leads to changes in people's worldview. These links involve cognitive as well as social processes, and for this reason the revised model needs to acknowledge sociological as well as psychological models. The social-contextual model proposed by Ronald Inglehart and others is an important step in this social psychological approach (Inglehart 1971; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Inglehart's theory of post-materialist value change is a needs-based model and it refers to psychological theories on the structure of human needs and values. I will argue further that, although basic human needs are central in prioritising some types of values over other types, the processes involved in moral justification play an important role in the motivation of certain value differences. Furthermore, the types of individuals' social interaction are central in the activation of these moral justification processes.

In Chapter 2 I describe the survey methods used in the value survey I conducted among Pagans in Ireland, the UK, and Finland, and in a separate survey I conducted among Open University students. I also describe the samples obtained by these surveys. In Chapter 3 I explore the value priorities of different groupings of the mainstream population obtained from the European Social Survey and the Pagans, looking into the relation of value differences between birth cohorts and the intergenerational value-change model. In Chapter 4 I focus on the different modes of interpersonal relations found among the Pagan and Open University student samples. I investigate the extent to which these groups see

¹ The letter of approval from the Open University Human Participants and Materials Ethics Committee, dated 13 August 2007, is included in Appendix A.

strong or weak ties and symmetric or asymmetric communication as the norm. I also explore linkages between these modes and individuals' value priorities. In Chapter 5 I relate the survey findings to responses obtained in a series of thematic interviews I conducted in Ireland, the UK, and Finland.

Finally, in Chapter 6, grounded on the findings of the previous chapters, I introduce a revised model of religious change suggesting a new way to look at religion, not as an object but as a quasi-object, a product of a functioning Actor-Network where not only the actors, but also the ways they are connected are important. Using the present study as an example, I describe why this view is better for exploring the causes and consequences of religious change; the whys and wherefores of the decline of traditional religious belonging and practice, and the emergence of new religions. I present this Actor-Network model of religion as a more realistic alternative to the conventional essentialist conceptualisations of religion.

1. Society, religion, and values

“Values are multifaceted standards that guide conduct in a variety of ways. They lead us to take particular positions on social issues, and predispose us to favour one particular political or religious ideology over another. They are standards employed to guide presentations of the self to others, and to evaluate and judge, to heap praise and fix blame on ourselves and others” (Rokeach 1973, p. 13).

For the theoretical background of a revised model of religious change, sociological models of value change need to be complemented with psychological models of the development of morality. These suggest a common human faculty that can cope with changes in individuals’ realities of existence and enable people to adapt their values and understanding of morality accordingly. Individuals’ own concrete experiences when they are growing up have a defining impact on their value priorities; values are not simply internalised as they are taught at home, in school, or by religious authorities.

Living in a pluralistic society with high levels of existential security facilitates the development of morality and values that transcend social conventions and traditions. Furthermore, because symmetric social interactions are more likely to encourage individuals to reflect on their own perspectives and to negotiate with alternative viewpoints, they are important in enabling the development of these post-conventional

systems and norms of co-operation. This has implications for religions and other frameworks that individuals employ for legitimating their views and values. It generates a demand for frameworks that support and legitimise the recognition of a plurality of life-worlds, egalitarian interpersonal relations, and post-conventional morality, because all these have high adaptive value for an individual living in a multicultural post-industrial – or – knowledge society. Simultaneously, it indicates a decreasing plausibility of religions that rely on inherited traditions, normative authority structures, and assumed similarity and shared values of the in-group.

1.1. The social context: external influences on values

In sociology, values are studied in the context of a group or a community. Individuals that constitute a community are expected to hold similar value priorities that connect people together, acting as a unifying and stabilising “flag” for the community (Brint 2001, pp. 8–9; Durkheim 2001, p. 154). Indeed, one of the classical definitions sees community as based not only on kinship, but on “unity of will”, *Gemeinschaft* (Tönnies 2002, p. 20).

These shared values influence social action and are used to justify these actions (Bauman & May 2001, p. 64).

The classical approaches

In the early studies, values were believed to be determined by either the economic realities of the community or its cultural traditions and religion. From the former position, broad political and economic forces were seen as the base that determines individuals’ social being, including their outlook and interests (Calhoun 2002, p. 34). Seen from the latter perspective, values emerge through cultural interpretations of social circumstances, such as religious explanations of good and ill fortune (Weber 1991). Regardless of what was seen as the principal determining factor, differences and variations in this factor were thought to cause predictable and consistent differences in people’s values.

Émile Durkheim's view of social values was a departure from the economical or cultural determinism of Marx and Weber. According to him, common values develop in the interactions between individuals. These shared values hold society together, becoming what Durkheim called society's collective conscience, defining the limitations and the building blocks of interactions between individuals who share the same collective reality (Durkheim 1997, pp. 38–41). Through the interactions, the collective conscience is organised and reified into abstractions, like religion and other normative institutions (Durkheim 2001, pp. 310–311). Durkheim observed that “rituals are ways of acting that are generated only within assembled groups and are meant to stimulate and sustain or recreate certain mental states in these groups” (Durkheim 2001, p. 11). In his model, religion does not provide or determine social values; instead it represents and maintains them (Durkheim 2001, pp. 154–159). While Durkheim's thesis was mainly concerned with simple and homogeneous societies, his view was that all societies need some form of ritualised or symbolic reaffirming of collective sentiments and feeling of unity (Durkheim 2001, pp. 160–162). However, this model has also been challenged.

In multicultural and multi-religious societies the subconscious and shared reference point is lost. Increasing differentiation of people's conditions of existence leads to plurality of value positions, which no single religion can easily represent (Beyer 1994, Ch. 3; Bruce 2002, Ch. 8). On the other hand, in societies where there is one major institutional religion, changes in social values can lead to increasing differences between the values promoted by that religion and the values held by people. This contrast between values of the lived reality and those of an ideal reality can subsequently lead to diminishing plausibility of the religion. Religious authorities, organisations, and institutions can react to these situations by diluting or updating the dogma in order to accommodate this plurality or the changing values. For example, John Shelby Spong, a former American Episcopalian bishop, calls for the rethinking of Christian dogma to accommodate modern realities of life and opposes a

literal interpretation of the Bible (Spong 2005). Or, these actors can turn to fundamentalism in order to protect the traditions and values they see as sacred (see the case studies in Beyer 1994, pp. 111–224). Either way, religions, or the principal actors in religious organisations, are reacting to changes in the social context. By doing this they acknowledge that religion has moved away from the Durkheimian ideal of being a taken-for-granted and instinctive part of collective being and communication. Religion has turned into something that needs to be defined, demarcated, and recognised (J.Z. Smith 2004, Ch. 8); it is something that is separate from the collective consciousness, or the collective consciousness has moved away from it. Whether religion fades into the background or is romanticised as something traditional that our grandparents did, is re-invented as a multitude of religious movements, turned into a war banner, or, is reacted against in the growing and more vocal atheist movement, the role of religion has changed.

In a society in which pluralism and tolerance are seen as cultural values, religion as a means for legitimating norms and behaviour can be accepted in principle and to some extent in practice, but in reality it is highly problematic. For example, in the UK in February 2008 the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, stated that the adoption of certain aspects of Sharia law in the UK “seems unavoidable”, saying that some of its citizens do not relate to the British legal system, and that adopting parts of Islamic Sharia law would help to maintain social cohesion. This position was quickly opposed by lawyers and politicians from all sides, by other religious authorities, and by the general public in discussion forums. The main opposing argument was not targeted against Islam, but against the need for, and the appropriateness of, a separate religiously legitimised law for a particular part of the population. It was argued that British law already acknowledges the rights of religious minorities and the law should be the same for everybody. This was also generally the view of Islamic leaders.

It appears that in post-industrial societies religion can be referred to as part of cultural history and in some cases as a description of society. For example, “Finland is a Lutheran country” can be understood as referring to its cultural history as well as to the fact that about 80% of its population are members of the Lutheran Church, but it is becoming difficult to interpret that as referring to widely accepted Lutheran values (Sundback 1988; Kääriäinen, et al. 2005, pp. 161–165). To describe Britain as a Christian country, or to claim that British values are essentially Christian values, would be even more problematic, and as a way to enhance national identity and feelings of belonging it would be considered inappropriate and dangerous (Rogers & Muir 2007, pp. 22–23, 43).

According to Bauman, late modern societies are in the middle of a difficult process of having to come to terms with the thought of “deregulation of human conduct” (Bauman 1993, pp. 33–34). After centuries of believing that human passions and spontaneous inclinations can have no good end, the thought of not having the support of depersonalised rules, aided by coercive powers, can be frightening (Bauman 1994, pp. 3–4). Bauman, however, is optimistic about the future. He says that “[w]hat we are learning, and learning the hard way, is that it is the personal morality that makes ethical negotiation and consensus possible, not the other way round” (Bauman 1993, p. 34). Far from being determined by culture, economic base, or religion, in Bauman’s conceptualisation of postmodern ethics values emerge as a complex and fluid pattern, contingent on a number of economic, cultural, contextual, and psychological variables. Individuals’ values are more flexible and dynamic than is appreciated by the classical models of society and religion.

Socio-economic context and the dynamics of value priorities

Can we blame the parents when their children turn up on the street with a knife in their hand, or are all just victims of circumstances? While the three major socialising agencies –

family, school, and peer groups – contribute to the process whereby a child grows up to be a part of the society, it is not just a matter of them instilling their values in the child. The consistency of the child's own firsthand experiences with what these socialising agents are projecting is a significant factor in what values they actually adopt (Rokeach 1973; Harris 1995; Pinker 2002, pp. 395–399; Inglehart & Welzel 2005, pp. 98–99). This view allows more autonomous agency for the child, but also draws attention to the significance of the environment in which they grow up.

Bauman sees values as a means for justifying and orienting actions towards desirable goals. He argues that values change as individuals' circumstances, goals, and needs change, and through ageing and interactions with other people (Bauman & May 2001, p. 64). According to Bauman, differences in socio-economic situations translate into differences in individuals' needs and therefore into differences in what they see as having highest value. He adopts Abraham Maslow's (1987) idea of a hierarchy of needs. Although Maslow's classification and ordering of the higher needs have not been validated with cross-cultural empirical evidence, the primacy of basic survival and security needs is valid. There is a fundamental distinction between the need for physiological sustenance and safety and the non-physiological needs such as those for esteem, self-expression, and aesthetic satisfaction. Both types of needs are equally real, but the basic physiological needs must be fulfilled before the non-physiological needs will be seen as important (Maslow 1987). When the basic needs are satisfied the subjective feeling of existential security increases and needs further up in the hierarchy emerge as desirable goals for the individual. In other words, this is a change in priorities. Bauman maintains, however, that this fluidity of values does not necessarily lead to egoism and the dissolution of morality. Individuals are competent in making moral judgements by themselves, without the aid of an external code or authority (Arendt 1958; Bauman 1993, pp. 21–36; Bauman 1994). The

processes involved in this are discussed further in the next section with psychological models on the development and nature of morality.

Ronald Inglehart's (1971; 1977; 1997) analysis of the process of value change in advanced industrial societies partly supports and partly disagrees with Bauman's hypothesis. Inglehart's research has found a connection between countries' economic growth, welfare, and social stability, and changes in the value priorities of the population. He found two kinds of value patterns. These are found in different ratios in different countries, depending on the socio-economic realities of the country. The first type prioritises the satisfaction of the basic material needs and the second emerges only after these needs are satisfied, emphasising the more abstract values in the Maslow model. Inglehart calls this emerging value pattern post-materialist, not because it is non-materialist or anti-materialist, but because it emerges only after the material needs are satisfied (Inglehart 1971). Inglehart agrees with Bauman in that values are not simply determined by culture or economic conditions, nor are they received from authorities, religious or otherwise. They emerge from individuals' rationalisations of their needs, shaped by the realities of their existence. This suggests that changes in value priorities and social and economic changes go together in a coherent and predictable pattern, where people adopt those values that fit their existential conditions (Inglehart & Welzel 2005, pp. 37–38). Furthermore, as the needs of the majority of populations change, these changes influence the mainstream of values, and the cultural norms of the society are transformed.

Inglehart and Welzel's study (2005) points to a generational lag in the effects of any socio-economic change on society's prevailing values. The generational lag is where Inglehart's findings depart from Bauman's model. Whereas Bauman sees values as fluid, changing as a response to changes in one's immediate situation, Inglehart and others argue that values are grounded in the pre-adult early socialisation, and that social norms, beliefs, and attitudes change relatively little after they have been internalised during childhood and

adolescence (Norris & Inglehart 2004, pp. 76–78; Inglehart & Welzel 2005, pp. 100–102). Their argument is grounded on a large international longitudinal dataset collected since the 1970s. Crockett and Voas (2006) found a similar cohort effect in people's religiosity. Together these studies suggest that the norms we follow and the values that motivate us reflect the prevailing values of our childhood, mediated by our unique experiences. Concrete childhood experiences are linked to the current realities of life at a particular time, and as these realities change, through social and economic development, following generations grow up internalising different norms. If the changes are slow, differences in values from one generation to the other are small, but with rapid changes generational differences can be significant (Inglehart & Welzel 2005, pp. 94–99).

The intergenerational value-change model is supported by a large volume of research by Inglehart and others, with empirical evidence from all cultural regions (e.g., Inglehart 1997; Norris & Inglehart 2004; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Taniguchi 2006). These show that societies with high levels of economic development have high levels of post-materialist values, and that societies with high rates of economic growth have relatively large differences between the values of younger and older generations. Furthermore, since the early 1970s, when the first value surveys were made, post-materialist values have increased at almost exactly the rate predicted by the intergenerational population replacement model (Inglehart 1997, p. 103). The post-war generation was the first where post-materialists outnumbered materialists, and as the younger generations replace the older ones, there is a period of transition where both value priorities are found in equal numbers (Inglehart & Welzel 2005, pp. 99–102).

Persisting cultural differences

The public's basic values throughout advanced industrial societies have been undergoing a gradual intergenerational shift, with economic and technological changes having a broadly

similar impact across all the societies studied (Inglehart 1997, p. 131; Norris & Inglehart 2004, pp. 55–62; Inglehart & Welzel 2005, pp. 113–114). This fuels the concern that distinct cultures are gradually losing their identities leading to the eventual homogenisation of cultures (Ritzer 1996; Tomlinson 1999, Ch. 3). There is, however, strong evidence that cultures are not so fragile. There are some deeply rooted differences in the ways in which people view the individual in relation to the community, which also influence the value patterns of the societies. For example, in comparing European and Indian societies, Louis Dumont (1970) observed two opposing “configurations of relation” between the individual and society. In the Asian case, emphasis is placed on the society as a whole, and the ideal status quo is derived from the organisation of the society with respect to its ends, not with respect to an individual’s personal ambitions. The main concern is to maintain social order, and each individual’s duty is to contribute to this. Values and criteria for justice are derived from this role of the individual as a means to further the larger goals of the society. Contrary to this is the European case, where the values are reversed. Individuals are viewed as independent, with society existing merely as a means to provide support and security for them (Dumont 1970, pp. 231–238; Dumont 1986, pp. 23–27).

Other scholars working in various fields have reached similar conclusions. Steven Lukes (1973) saw individualism as a particularly European ideological construct, aiming to promote freedom and equality. Anthropologists Florence Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodbeck (1961) posited three alternative ways in which societies can solve the “problem” of how individuals should relate to others: hierarchically (which they called “Lineal”), as equals (“Collateral”), or according to the individual’s merit. The cultural-differences principle of the Kluckhohn and Strodbeck model has also been influential in cross-cultural psychology, where, for example, Hazel Rose Markus and Shinobu Kitayama (1991) related major cultural differences to whether the individual is generally viewed as independent or interdependent. Harry Triandis (1995) classified these two cultural types as

individualistic and collectivistic. Social psychologist Richard Nisbett (2003) contrasts the ancient Greeks' abstract logic which has influenced European cultures with the holistic thinking of Taoist, Confucian, and Buddhist traditions. He reworks the independence – interdependence dichotomy into more analytical terms, seeing the Western emphasis on individual identity and agency contrasted with the Asian emphasis on group orientation and harmony.

There appears to be two major types of cultures: those that cultivate an independent view of the self, emphasising separateness, ego, internal attributes, uniqueness, and competition between individuals, and those that hold an interdependent image of self, stressing connectedness, social context, co-operation, responsibilities, and relationships (Markus & Kitayama 1991). The independent, or individualistic view of personhood is frequently seen as an exceptional case, attributed variously to abstract logic (Nisbett 2003), the rise of Protestantism (Weber 2002; Dumont 1986, pp. 23–59), Cartesian philosophy (Elias 1991), the ideological and political developments following the ideals of the Enlightenment (Hume 2000; Rousseau 2005; Paine 1999), division of labour (Durkheim 1997), or changes in economic systems (Adam Smith 1952; Marx 1995). These differences have also been seen as stages in a linear and evolutionary process (towards individualism), with every new stage making the previous obsolete or primitive (Polanyi 1944; Mauss 1954).

However, rather than viewing individualism as a uniquely Western and culturally bound phenomenon, or the destination of a one-way street, collectivism and individualism have also been linked with certain historical preconditions, such as the society's primary means of livelihood, availability of resources, and the presence of external threats. Differences in these preconditions dictate the options available for individuals and institutions, and influence the way the society is organised. Some conditions of existence and types of social organisation make collectivism more favourable, while others favour

individualism (Cody & Diamond 1979; Triandis 1995, pp. 81–105; Diamond 1997, Ch. 14). Furthermore, individualism and collectivism appear to be persistent and relatively slowly changing cultural traits, preserved in spite of socio-economic changes (Markus & Kitayama 1991; Triandis 1995, pp. 1–15; Greenfield 2000; Hofstede & Hofstede 2005, pp. 74–75; Inglehart & Welzel 2005, pp. 144–145). This means that cultural variation survives relatively fast socio-economic changes, and that the overall value change is a path-dependant parallel change rather than a process of “Westernisation”, where all societies and cultures converge at one point (Inglehart & Welzel 2005, pp. 48–76, 133–134). Rather than giving way to convergent values, cultural differences influence how changes from pre-industrial to industrial and then to post-industrial society are realised (see the case studies in Oliver James 2007). As such, they offer different repertoires for individuals to turn rationalisations of their needs and realities of existence into motivational values. This can be seen as contributing to cultural variations and plurality in how socio-economic change affects individuals’ value priorities.

Exposure to plurality of life-worlds

The increased reach and range of communication, interdependent global economy, international movement of labour, and relocation of the production of goods have created increasingly multicultural and multi-religious societies. This is well covered in the literature on globalisation (Featherstone 1991a; Robertson 1992; Waters 1995; Tomlinson 1999). When societies develop along parallel but not exactly the same or converging paths – as is suggested by the persistent cultural differences – the spectrum of different life-worlds in post-industrial societies becomes broader as more countries are integrated in the global network. Since societies are also increasingly intertwined, this plurality is becoming more visible in individuals’ everyday lives. Consequently it can no longer be assumed that people share the same values or that references to the same ethics codes are meaningful.

This brings about the challenge of pluralism, when the taken-for-granted traditions break down and “multiple options for beliefs, values, and lifestyles emerge” (Berger 2002, p. 16).

Jürgen Habermas postulates that while the increasing differentiation of life-worlds means that the individual can no longer appeal to the unquestionable validity of local conventions and historical norms (Habermas 1990, p. 109), each member of every human society possesses what he calls moral intuition. This intuition is deeper and more universal than anything culturally-bound moral philosophies have presented (Habermas 1990, pp. 199–211). Exposure to plurality promotes the growth of autonomous morality based on this innate ability. At the same time individuals’ dependence on interpersonal relationships and social ties becomes more discernible, because the social ties can no longer be taken for granted (Habermas 1990, p. 199; Habermas 1996, p. 106).

In other words, even if people have different cultural repertoires for rationalising their needs, they are still bound by what Habermas calls the “densely woven fabric of mutual recognition [...] of reciprocal exposedness and vulnerability” (Habermas 1990, p. 199). Michael Featherstone (1991b, p. 155) observes that one outcome of this dialectic is the loss of a sense of ‘The Other’ as alien and exotic. Cultural and religious plurality, which was previously seen as a threat to order and cohesion, has become a part of individuals’ reality of existence. When considering the mediating influence of personal experiences on the socialisation process, generations who grow up in such a pluralistic context are in a radically different position from those who grew up in homogeneous societies. It can be seen as a context where the ability to negotiate individual differences is emphasised and where values that justify such emphasis are more likely to emerge. Habermas (1990, pp. 103–109; 1996, pp. 106–118) refers to psychological models on the development of morality. What he sees as the requisite for negotiating value judgements in pluralistic settings is the transcendence of what developmental psychologists call

conventional morality. In the next section I turn to these psychological studies on values, linking them with the development of morality, and suggest ways in which cultural differences and the similarities based on evolutionary adaptive value of certain types of morality are realised and negotiated in this development.

1.2. Moral intuition, justification, and the use of cultural matter

The development of morality has been studied in developmental psychology since the early twentieth century. Jean Piaget ([1932] 1965) argued that morality is not a matter of culturally specific rules learned from parents or other authorities. These rules are seen by the child as rules that must be obeyed simply because they come from an authority.

Authentic morality develops through an internally directed cognitive process, where an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the inherent logic of social relations is constructed. For Piaget, true morality comes from norms of co-operation that are learned through interaction with one's peers (Moshman 2005, pp. 52–54).

The broadening of social horizons and evolution of morality

Whereas Piaget emphasised childhood, psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg (1981; 1984) proposed that the development of morality is a gradual process that continues through adolescence. He conducted a series of interviews in which children were presented with a series of moral dilemmas; they were then interviewed to determine the kind of reasoning that lay behind their judgements of each scenario. Based on this research Kohlberg formulated a theory of sequential and gradual moral development, where a person advances on a ladder of increasingly sophisticated levels of moral reasoning skills. He observed three distinct modes for making moral judgement: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional. Each of these is further split into two stages, representing first the realisation of a new way of moral reasoning and then the finding of

broader or external justification for it (Matsumoto & Juang 2004, p. 173; Crain 2005, Ch. 7; Moshman 2005, pp. 54–57).

Pre-conventional morality is simple compliance with rules to avoid punishment and gain rewards. At first it is based on the intuitive sense that bad actions get punished because they are wrong. The knowledge of what is right and wrong is held by authorities, and no further justification is needed. Later, when children become aware of other people's needs and wants, and realise that these are possibly in conflict with their own, they start to develop bargaining strategies. These early stages of morality are founded on unequal social interactions, but at the later stage the individual child starts to experiment with and find ways to circumnavigate the authority structures (Edwards 1981; Edwards 1982; Snarey 1985).

The introduction of rules and limits that are based on things that are not immediate to the situation and that are not concrete brings about an entirely new way of thinking and arguing about what is right and what is wrong. Conventional morality involves the integration of social values, norms, and the conventions of the social relations with which the child is growing up. Therefore it has a strong emphasis on tradition and conformity to rules that are defined by others' approval or by society's norms. At first, conventional morality is characterised by the need and obligation to live up to the expectations of significant others, and to fulfil one's various roles. Later, social conventions are understood and justified through a more abstract understanding of the social system. The development leading to this stage is tied to and facilitated by personal knowledge of the normative institutions central to the society and the experiences the individual has when coming into contact with these institutions (Krebs & Hesteren 1994; P.A. Miller, et al. 1996).

The change from pre-conventional to conventional morality is a quantum leap in the child's understanding of interpersonal relations, and represents a substantial and qualitative

change brought about by the broadening of their social horizons. Similarly, the development of post-conventional morality represents another broadening of horizons, when the conventions of one's own society or religion are seen in relation to other alternative norms, value systems, and conventions. At this stage moral reasoning is based upon the individual's own principles and conscience. Social systems are viewed as results of contracts that aim to benefit all. Rather than viewing moral issues from the perspective of a social system, the system is evaluated with regard to this aim to benefit all (Eckensberger 1994; J.G. Miller & Bersoff 1995). Increasing cultural pluralism and cross-cultural communication can be seen as conducive to the development of post-conventional morality, motivating the individual to construct norms and standards of behaviour that transcend any particular culture (Moshman 2005, p. 57).

The stages theory of moral development suggests that there is not just one kind of morality in operation, or a fixed and predefined template for it. Instead, moral reasoning emerges from our own thinking about the moral problems we come across in social interactions. In line with the sociological models of value change, tests have shown that rather than parental or teacher influence, social experiences are the main force in moral development. For instance, Whitbeck and Geckas (1988) found that attributions of values between parents and children were more strongly correlated than were actual values. In other words, children understand what kind of values their parents try to socialise them with, but the values that actually motivate their actions are different. In an experimental study by Cipriani, Giuliano, and Jeanne (2007), for example, a public goods game was used to determine how the values of parents and their children correlate. The game was about how many of their personal tokens individuals were willing to contribute as public goods for the group to which they belonged. They were randomly divided into groups and they did not know which groups they belonged to. The study found no correlation between parents' and children's behaviour, and concluded that family does not appear to be the

primary locus of value formation. However, children from larger families tended to contribute less. This supports the view that value formation is primarily the result of environmental factors, such as experience of scarcity because of competition for resources with a large number of siblings. These experiences promote moral development by stimulating our mental processes and motivating us to figure out more comprehensive positions for moral judgement. New stages reflect the broader viewpoints that we come up with when our old views are challenged in discussions and debates with others and in observing different ways of living (Crain 2005, p. 158).

Cultural differences and universals

Kohlberg's model and measurement instrument have been used and tested in numerous cross-cultural studies. The stages of moral reasoning appear to be related to comprehension of moral narratives and evaluation of examples of moral reasoning across cultures (Narvaez 1998; Rest, et al. 2000; Boom, et al. 2001). Cross-sectional studies, in which individuals of different ages are compared, have shown that individuals of all ages can be classified on the basis of Kohlberg's system and that, as predicted, higher stages are positively associated with age. Longitudinal studies, in which individuals are assessed several times over a period of years, have supported the claim that each stage is a prerequisite for the next so that progress occurs one stage at a time via predictable patterns of transition and consolidation (Kohlberg 1984; Walker 1989; Walker, et al. 2001). More recently Gertrud Nunner-Winkler's (2007) study on the development of moral motivation found support for age-related changes in morality, but also found gender differences that increased with age. There also appears to be some degree of variance in the age when individuals advance in the stages (Killen 1991; Turiel 1998; Nucci 2001; Turiel 2002).

One argument against the universality claim of Kohlberg's model is that because morality can only develop in social interactions, it is therefore relative to culture. Indeed,

findings from a number of cross-cultural studies suggest that while many aspects of Kohlberg's theory of morality are universal, there are also significant cultural variations (Snarey 1985; Boyes & Walker 1988). For example, Miller and Bersoff (1992) compared the responses to a moral judgement task by adult and child respondents in India and the United States. Much more than the Americans, the Indian participants considered that it is morally wrong not to help someone, whether or not the person in need was a relative or the situation life-threatening. In another study (Keller, et al. 1998), Chinese and Icelandic children were found to differ in a similar way. Chinese children emphasised altruism and relationships when reasoning about moral dilemmas, whereas Icelandic children emphasised contractual and self-interest considerations. Geographically these social responsibility values (Miller & Bersoff 1992) or moralities of community (Ma 1997; J.G. Miller 2001) correspond to the collectivist cultures discussed in the previous section.

Snarey (1985) reviewed 44 studies involving participants in 27 countries. He concluded that Kohlberg's first four stages (from pre-conventional to conventional) could be regarded as universal. However, individuals whose lives are focused within traditional cultures are less likely to construct moral understandings beyond stage three than are individuals living in societies with more complex governments, legal systems, and other such institutions. Others have reached similar conclusions (Ma 1988; Hau & Lew 1989; Ma & Cheung 1996). Miller argued that this is because the understanding of social structure implied in stages four and higher is relevant primarily in contexts where complex state or national governments are present. In her view this may partly explain the association found between higher levels of moral reasoning and the processes of modernisation (Miller 2001, p. 159). Other studies have shown that the theoretical higher stage models are defined to favour abstract reasoning in the way it is emphasised in Western education. For example, Gustavo Carlo, Silvia Koller and others (1996) examined pro-social moral reasoning in Brazilian and American adolescents and their actual pro-

social behaviours. They found that the patterns of age and gender differences and the relationship between pro-social moral reasoning and pro-social behaviour were similar in both samples. However, American adolescents scored higher on internalised moral reasoning, which corresponds to stage 4 in Kohlberg's model. The authors suggest that this may be caused by differences in the degree to which the educational systems stress the kind of reasoning skills that are necessary for the development of moral reasoning that goes beyond approval-orientation.

Even with these cultural variations, the types of moral reasoning involved in pre-conventional and conventional morality appear to be universal, and may have an evolutionary basis. The need to be able to make and maintain connections with other individuals has been suggested as the principal adaptive value of morality. Richard Joyce suggests that "the human mind bears the traces of a past in which reciprocity played a big role" (Joyce 2006, p. 141). These traces can be seen as structures that have evolved to uphold different systems of co-operation. The systems develop in stages that follow the development of social perspective-taking, through an increasing ability to grasp complex situational relations (Gibbs, et al. 2007). Games theory research on adaptive strategies of co-operation supports this idea. Humans appear to have certain innate dispositions that uphold the systems implicit in the first three stages of Kohlberg's sequence (Krebs 2000). These strategies evolve to serve real-life functions and solve real-life problems, such as survival, resource accumulation, reproduction, and the care of offspring (Krebs 1998; Krebs 2000). For example, in human and other primate groups the maintenance of a "good reputation" is essential for individuals. It increases their "fit" in the group, and therefore their chances for survival and procreation. Social practices such as gossip and grooming have been shown to be important in discouraging anti-social behaviour, promoting indirect reciprocity and improving group cohesion (Alexander 1987; Goodman & Ben-Ze'ev 1994; Dunbar 1996).

Findings from evolutionary psychology suggest that the development of conventional morality is fuelled by the natural instinct to increase one's survival chances by fitting into a group. On the other hand, studies have revealed cultural differences in the higher stages, and in some societies post-conventional morality is not made socially desirable or acceptable. Furthermore, Kohlberg's model is based on the hypothesis that the moral aspect of human nature comes from our ability to reason, and assumes that rational humans would prioritise the highest stage of moral development. John Gibbs (2006), however, criticised the rationalist model as being too rigid. He argued that moral judgement occurs in situations of social interaction, and there is in fact much overlap and stage mixture varying from situation to situation. The experimental studies by Dennis Krebs and his colleagues (Krebs, et al. 1991; Krebs 1998) support this argument. In real life people do not derive all their moral judgements from the structures that define the highest stage. Instead, moral reasoning is structurally flexible. Different types of moral rationalisation are used in different situations, suggesting that rather than a linear path of development, morality is more like an open-ended learning process, fuelled by individuals' experiences and social interactions. Previous levels are not transformed and displaced by new structures; instead people acquire an increasingly broad range of strategies to make moral judgements (Krebs 2000; Krebs & Denton 2005).

The social intuition model of morality

Kohlberg's rationalist model has recently been challenged by an intuitionist approach. Social psychologist Jonathan Haidt and others (Haidt 2001; Haidt & Joseph 2004; Haidt & Björklund 2008) have criticised Kohlberg's model for paying too little attention to human emotions. Their moral intuition approach is a shift in emphasis. Whereas in the rationalist approach moral judgement is seen as a process of reasoning based on innate or socially constructed moral knowledge, intuitionists say it is in "quick intuitions, gut feelings, and

moral emotions” (Haidt & Björklund 2008, p. 186). They argue for an approach that would separate moral intuition from what they see as post-hoc moral rationalisations. Therefore they make a clear distinction between moral judgement and moral justification. The premise of the social intuition model is that moral beliefs and motivations come from a small set of intuitions that have evolved in the human mind, which then enable and constrain the social construction of motivational values and virtues. Moral judgement is therefore a product of quick and automatic intuitions that then give rise to slow, conscious moral reasoning and moral justification.

Haidt and others have identified five topics that appear to be universal as concerns for moral intuition (Haidt & Joseph 2004; Haidt & Björklund 2008). Three of these are strongly evident across cultures: harm/care – a sensitivity to or dislike of signs of pain and suffering in others, particularly in the young and vulnerable; fairness/reciprocity – a set of emotional responses related to playing tit-for-tat, such as negative responses to those who fail to repay favours; and authority/respect – a set of concerns about navigating status hierarchies, for example, anger towards those who fail to display proper signs of deference and respect. They suggest that these three issues are good candidates for being the “taste buds” of the moral domain. The two slightly weaker candidates are concerns about purity/sanctity, which are related to the emotion of disgust, necessary for explaining why so many moral rules relate to food, sex, menstruation and the handling of corpses, and concerns about boundaries between in-group and out-group. Although sometimes dismissed as matters of social convention or as prejudice, these two topics are still widespread as topics of moral concern. These five topics are where, according to Haidt and Joseph (2004), human moral intuition usually triggers an emotional reaction, such as compassion, anger, respect, resentment, or disgust. The post-hoc moral reasoning done by an individual is usually devoted to finding reasons to justify an emotional reaction and to support the individual’s intuition. However – significantly for the present study – moral

reasons passed between people have a causal force, influencing individual reasoning. Therefore, moral discussion is a kind of distributed reasoning, and moral claims and justifications have important effects on individuals and societies. The intuitionist model underlines that moral judgement is best understood as a social process, not as a private act of cognition (Haidt & Björklund 2008, p. 181).

The social intuition model is grounded in the well-established idea that human cognition is based on two basic processes (Chaiken & Trope 1999; M.S. Wilson 2002; Greene, et al. 2004; Evans 2008). One is fast, automatic, and largely unconscious, and the other is slow, deliberate, and largely conscious (Vaisey 2009). Based on experimental studies using brain activity imaging technology while participants respond to moral dilemmas presented to them, neuropsychologist Joshua Greene and others have linked this dual-process model to the physiological properties of the human brain. According to these studies we have what Greene (2003) calls a Kant part of our brains as well as a Bentam/Mill part. One is located in the older part of the brain and deals with social emotions, social connections, and our feelings, particularly our social feelings and moral intuitions. The other is located in a later evolved part of the brain and does the utilitarian cost-benefit analysis. The former is fast and lights up first when the moral dilemma is presented, and the latter is slower, lighting up with conscious rationalisation of the dilemma (Greene, et al. 2001; Greene & Haidt 2002; Greene 2005; Greene & Paxton 2009). Haidt (2006, pp. 2–5) uses an old Buddhist metaphor of a rider on the back of an elephant for this “divided self”. The part of ourself that we know best is our consciousness, represented in the metaphor by the rider. It can talk, reason, and explain things, but for the most part, it is not in charge. The elephant – which stands for our automatic processes – is larger and stronger than the rider and is totally unencumbered by the need, or the ability, to justify itself. Driven by the simple mechanism of attraction and repulsion, the elephant goes where it wants.

However, while no match for the elephant in a direct struggle, the rider can train the elephant over time into going a different way. In addition to the two basic processes leading from intuition to judgement and from judgement to rationalisation, two other core processes are postulated in the social intuition model. These are the social part of the model (Haidt 2001). One is based on “social persuasion”, or an individual’s need to belong and fit in (e.g., Dunbar 1996), and the other on the acts of conscious verbal moral reasoning – called “reasoned persuasion”, or arguing for one side (e.g., Billig 1996) – these common processes are socially derived instructions for “the rider” on how and in what way to train the elephant. That training is the social learning process described by Kohlberg’s model as progressive broadening of the individual’s moral reasoning skills, but in the process model no hierarchy is suggested and moral intuition and rationalisation processes are always the fundamental part of moral judgement.

Furthermore, in addition to the four core processes, the social intuition model postulates two other processes that are activated on rare occasions (Haidt 2001). The reasoned judgement process is activated when people reason their way to a judgement by sheer force of logic, overriding their initial intuition. This process is mostly activated in situations where the intuition is weak and the cognitive processing power is high, or in philosophical attempts at purely logical moral systems. However, when these reasoned moral systems violate the individual’s moral intuition, the systems are usually rejected or resisted. In other words, the elephant takes over when the driver is asking it to do things that go against its nature. On the other hand, a private reflection process is triggered when, in the course of thinking about a situation, a person spontaneously activates a new intuition that contradicts the initial intuitive judgement, for example through role taking (Selman 1971). These two additional processes, particularly private moral reflection, can be seen as processes whereby the kind of moral judgement described as post-conventional occurs.

The social intuition model suggests that the persuasion and private reflection processes involved in moral reasoning may enable some alternative paths for judgement and reduce the constraints for the construction of values and virtues. The present study is focusing on the slower justification processes, particularly on how people use cultural meanings and frameworks of interpretation in these justifications. Most important for my thesis is the role of the private reflection process suggested by the model. It points to a rarely used capability of individuals to change the rules of moral reasoning independently of social persuasion processes. The rarity of this process may be linked to the prevalence of certain types of social interactions.

Developmental psychologist David Moshman and others argue that the degree to which children and adolescents have experienced symmetric and asymmetric social interaction translates into differences in how their morality develops (Moshman 1995; Moshman & Geil 1998; Walker, et al. 2000; Moshman 2005, pp. 70–75). Asymmetric social interactions involve individuals who differ in knowledge and power; in other words, authorities who transmit cultural and personal values to others. The one with lower status may learn what the one with higher status teaches, but without much impact on the rationalisations of either. These can be seen as conducive to conventional morality, but they discourage the activation of private reflection process, and therefore impede the development of post-conventional morality. On the other hand, symmetric social interactions involve people who are, and see themselves as, comparable in knowledge, authority, and power. Neither individual can impose his or her perspective on the other, and neither is inclined simply to accept the other's perspective as intrinsically superior to his or her own. With more asymmetric interactions, more culture-specific or traditional values are transmitted. Symmetric social interactions are more likely to encourage individuals to reflect on their own perspectives and to co-ordinate multiple viewpoints, enabling the development of post-conventional morality (Moshman 2005, pp. 45–46).

1.3. Values as connectors in social networks

The idea of shared values is often used to define a community and to imply a connection between individuals in that community. However, recent sociological and psychological studies on values and on the development of morality have provided us with new insights, and a new set of tools for understanding what influences people's values. The model of social values as externally and institutionally defined, and with an essence and reality of their own, becomes difficult to maintain (Beckford 2003, pp. 209–213). In the previous sections I argued that values are not transmitted through socialisation, or learned from religious narratives. Instead, they develop through concrete experiences and interactions guided by individuals' moral intuition, with perceived social norms as resources, and with social desirability as a regulating factor. The focus now shifts to social interaction, concrete relationships between individuals, and the innate human need to cultivate these relationships. Social network theories have followed this logic, and placed the individual in the centre of a network of connections.

The concreteness of relationships and the fluidity of networks

In his argument for reassembling the object of social scientific study, Bruno Latour (2005) suggests that there is no *sui generis* community that can be seen as the essential provider of structure or context for action. There are only interactions and associations between people (Latour 2005, pp. 173–190). Latour insists that it is not enough to just zoom to a different level of analysis. It is necessary to consciously abandon the assumption of pre-existing constructs, like culture, community, society, or “social context”, that often come with sociological accounts. We should observe how “actors” (individuals, institutions, and any other things that mediate communication) are connected by various connectors to other actors, and use these Actor-Networks as the basic unit of analysis (Latour 2005, pp. 213–218 and *passim*).

Like Latour, Mark Granovetter (1985) emphasises the importance of connections and networks. Coming from the background of economics, he criticises the under-socialised concept of human action used in economics, but also the over-socialised one he saw used in sociology. In Granovetter's view both stances see individuals as atomistic loci of decisions and actions. The former sees individuals as opportunistic utilitarians, only serving their self-interest. The latter postulates that individuals' actions are ultimately determined by customs, habits, and social norms. In the latter case the atomisation of the individual occurs when the internalisation of normative behavioural patterns supersedes the ongoing social relations as the influence on action (Granovetter 1985, pp. 482–487). Granovetter maintains that both concepts are wrong. Individuals do not behave or decide as atoms outside of any contacts, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular social niche they happen to occupy. People are, instead, embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations of varying intensity (Granovetter 1985, p. 487). In line with the models offered by Dunbar and others, Granovetter argues that self-interested action is conditioned by these systems of social relations, because the concrete relations are based on trust, reputation, and the discouragement of malfeasance (Granovetter 1985, pp. 488–493).

According to Granovetter, social relations are based on “strong ties” and “weak ties” (Granovetter 1983). In homogeneous communities everyone knows fairly well and with little effort why people behave in a certain way. In these communities, connections between individuals are based mostly on strong ties between groups of close friends and relatives. In other words, strong ties bind together people who are similar and well known to each other. In contrast, weak ties form between acquaintances and colleagues, for example in situations where people work or study together. Weak ties are not based on deep knowledge of the person, but rather on knowledge of the role they play. Therefore weak ties can more easily bridge differences between individuals. Granovetter's theory

implies that weak ties are of special value to individuals living in more complex societies. Not only are they far more likely to be bridges between groups, but they also lead to more complex role sets and foster the need for cognitive flexibility. However, weak ties take more effort to maintain. More reflection is needed in organising one's communication when there is potentially more difference between the individuals (Granovetter 1983, pp. 203–209).

Global networks of weak ties

The division of labour and globalisation have increased the importance of weak ties. Institutional differentiation, specialisation, and interdependence result in a wide variety of role-based relationships in which one knows only a small segment of the other's personality. People become surrounded by a multiplicity of life-worlds, different viewpoints, and ways to do things (Granovetter 1983, p. 203). This makes them more accustomed and open to bridging ties, connecting with people across the boundaries of groups. However, defining communities and assuming shared values becomes more difficult as the proportion of weak ties increases. The plausibility of “strategic essentialism” (Latour 2005, p. 33) that is used in defining and reifying boundaries between communities weakens as ties bridging those boundaries become the norm instead of a deviation. Following Gabriel Tarde's idea that society is the consequence of associations, not their cause (in Latour 2005, pp. 238–239), it can be argued that the shift to more emphasis on bridging ties has broader consequences. The institutions that have been formed to codify values into norms in a homogeneous setting cease to function when there is a change in the way people are connected. The old ways are not meaningful to all parties any more.

Weak ties enable individuals to connect in a variety of ways to form new kinds of associations that stretch the term “community”. In his study on connections between

people from different ethnic groups in Israel, Yuval Kalish (2008) found that certain kinds of individuals are significantly better at making these kinds of bridging connections. While some people see closed networks and coherent social identity as important criteria for “us versus them” distinctions, others have a strong notion of the uniqueness of their and others’ worldview, and allow differences in the networks (Burt, et al. 1998; Burt 2001). Kalish and Robins (2006) also found that a high degree of weak ties in open networks indicates a more group-oriented focus, where the social world is seen through group membership, and weak ties are used to connect with other groups and different social circles. Central to the present study, changes in the nature of connections point to the question of the decline of normative religions and emergence of new types of religions and worldviews. This kind of collectively oriented individualism has been identified in studies of new religious movements, and contemporary Paganism appears to fit into this description.

Summary and theoretical framework

In order to describe the theoretical background upon which my thesis is based, I have combined sociological and psychological value theories and models for conceptualising differences in interpersonal relations. In the first section, drawing on research by Ronald Inglehart, Zygmunt Bauman and others, I concluded that individual’s own concrete experiences when growing up influence their value priorities. As a consequence, social and economic changes result in intergenerational value differences. Also, as cultural and religious plurality has become a part of people’s reality of existence, their primary socialisation is mediated by different realities of existence compared to people who grew up in homogeneous societies.

Cultural and religious diversity can be seen as a context in which the importance of the ability to negotiate individual differences is emphasised and where values that justify such an emphasis are more likely to emerge. This view was supported in the second

section, where I concluded that the development of morality that transcends social conventions and traditions is facilitated by such pluralistic settings. Based on findings from evolutionary psychology, I argued that this development is a result of a natural human disposition to develop systems of co-operation. Furthermore, symmetric social interactions are important in enabling the development of these post-conventional systems and norms of co-operation. This would suggest that an increasing emphasis on egalitarian social relations correlates with value change by which openness to change and freedom of self-expression is emphasised over the stability and security brought by familiar and traditional social conventions. This view is supported by Inglehart and Welzel, who found that rising self-expression values are linked to rising emphasis on democracy and equality (Inglehart & Welzel 2005, Chs 11 and 12).

In the last section I argued that, particularly in pluralistic societies, weak ties between individuals become more important. They can bridge differences between individuals and groups, and enable symmetric interactions across cultural, religious, and social boundaries. This, however, has implications for the idea of shared values and conventional morality promoted by the normative institutions that emerged in more homogeneous settings. The old norms and narratives can no longer be assumed to be meaningful to everybody with whom one is connected. Inglehart and Welzel link this move from strong binding ties to bridging ties with the shift from security to self-expression values (Inglehart & Welzel 2005, pp. 293–295). I argue that these changes in social values and in the way individuals' social networks form prompt the emergence of new kinds of worldviews that can act as legitimating frameworks for these new values and modes of interaction.

Most new religions are so small that they can be considered statistically as marginal fringe movements, and therefore their social influence is insignificant. Be that as it may, when

looking at new religions as indicators of greater and more general changes, their emergence, existence, and continuing multiplication has great significance. I do not claim that new religions point to an “ongoing birth of religiosity”, as suggested by, for example, Lorne L. Dawson (2004, pp. 68–98), or that they run counter to secularisation. Nor do I see new religions necessarily as a source of evidence for changing *religious* sentiments, or as *agents* of social and cultural changes. Instead, I posit that new religions, including contemporary Paganism, are expressions of the adaptation of worldviews on an individual level to the changing needs that emerge as a result of the substantial social and economic changes that the advanced post-industrial societies have experienced.

2. The Pagan survey

The purpose of the survey was to collect data on value priorities and modes of social interaction from adults (18 year or older), who are living in Ireland, the United Kingdom, or Finland, and who identify themselves as Pagans. This group represents the new religions that have emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century, roughly around the time when – according to the intergenerational value-change model – the prevalence of post-materialist values started to increase. The Pagan survey ran in three phases over eight months from September 2007 to April 2008.

As a control group, data was also collected from a random sample of Open University undergraduate students, acting as a proxy for the mainstream population. Open University undergraduate studies are based on distance learning courses, and they attract people from different ages and social groups. Some students study for a full degree, while others only take courses on subjects in which they have a specific interest. A relatively large contingent of international students also study with the Open University so, with the caveat that these are people who are interested in seeking higher education, the Open University sample can be seen as a reasonably representative cross-section of the

mainstream population in the three countries I have chosen for this study. Permission for the student survey was granted by the Student Research Project Panel on 15 June 2007 (decision SRPP 2007/049), and it ran from July to August 2007.

2.1. Theoretical background of the survey instruments

Two psychological value instruments were included in the questionnaire. Value priorities were measured with a 21-item value questionnaire designed by Shalom Schwartz (2001), which is based on the model of basic human values developed by Schwartz and his colleagues (1992). Modes of social interaction were explored using an instrument designed by Harry Triandis and others to measure egalitarian and hierarchical variants of individualistic and collectivistic modes of interpersonal relations (Singelis, et al. 1995; Triandis 1995; Triandis & Gelfand 1998).

Basic human values

In social sciences values are generally viewed as deeply rooted, abstract motivations that guide, justify or explain an individual's attitudes, norms, opinions and actions (e.g., Halman & de Moor 1994; Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992). In practice, however, and particularly in survey studies, values are frequently confused with attitudes (Halman & de Moor 1994, p. 22), and measured with sets of attitude questions in specific domains of life such as religion, morality, politics or work. As a result most empirical value studies provide less integrated and more piecemeal understandings of socially meaningful issues (Schwartz 2001).

Social psychologist Milton Rokeach argued, based on experimental and survey research, that there are only a limited and definable number of values that respond to the needs of human nature (1968; 1973). These act as the internal reference points that all people use to formulate attitudes and opinions. He classified these into two types: terminal values reflect desirable goals and instrumental values reflect the means to achieve these

goals. He argued that the universality of the relational arrangement of values that is based upon their relative importance to the individual is highly significant. By measuring the relative ranking of the different values it would be possible to predict a wide variety of patterns of human behaviour, including political affiliation and religious belief.

Rokeach's relational value model was further developed and tested by psychologist Shalom Schwartz (1992; 1994). According to Schwartz the main features of the basic values derived from an array of research can be summarised in six points:

1. Values are beliefs, cognitive structures that are closely linked to affect. When values are activated, either by being threatened or by being expressed, they become infused with feeling.
2. Values refer to desirable goals. For example, social equality, fairness and helpfulness are all values.
3. Values transcend specific actions and situations. This feature of values distinguishes them from narrower concepts like norms and attitudes, concepts that usually refer to specific actions, objects, or situations.
4. Values serve as standards or criteria. That is, values guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people, and events.
5. Values are ordered by importance relative to one another. The ordered set of values forms a system of value priorities.
6. The relative importance of the set of relevant values guides action. Any attitude or behaviour typically has implications for multiple values. For example, attending church might express and promote Tradition, Conformity, Security, and Benevolence values for a person, but at the expense of Hedonism, Self-direction and Stimulation values. Consequently, it is the tradeoffs among the competing values that are implicated simultaneously in the attitude or behaviour that guides them. Each value contributes to action as a function both of its relevance to the action – and hence the likelihood of its activation – and of its importance to the actor. (Schwartz 2001, p. 262.)

Schwartz reasoned that the basic values likely to be found in all cultures are those that represent universal requirements of human existence, such as biological needs, requisites for co-ordinated social interaction, and demands of group functioning. After analysing reports of value studies from various countries around the world he found that – as the theoretical model suggested – the values identified in these can be grouped under a limited number of definable types of values that are based on universal human requirements. He then developed a value inventory and questionnaire that can be used to measure

Table 1

The ten value types

Self-Direction	Independent thought and action; choosing, creating, exploring.
Stimulation	Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.
Hedonism	Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself.
Security	Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self.
Conformity	Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms.
Tradition	Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self.
Benevolence	Preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact (the 'in-group').
Universalism	Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature.
Achievement	Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards.
Power	Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources.

Source: Schwartz 1994.

individuals' emphasis on a set of value items that represent the value types. He co-ordinated an international value study with a total of 40 samples from 20 countries, with sample sizes varying from 185 to 542 (Schwartz 1992). Based on the findings of that study, Schwartz proposed a model with ten interrelated value types. These are listed in Table 1, each defined in terms of its central goal. Initially he had postulated an eleventh value type, which was labelled "spirituality" or "the goal of finding meaning in life", but he found that it does not commonly seem to be recognised as an independent value type. Items measuring spirituality were in most cases mixed in with items that principally measure some other value types, such as tradition, security, or conformity. Evidence for a distinct motivational value type of "spirituality" was found only in 8 samples out of the 40. Therefore this value type was dropped from the final model.

The ten value types cover the distinct content categories found in earlier value theories, in value questionnaires from different cultures, and in religious and philosophical discussions of values. Schwartz (1992; 1994) and Schwartz and Bilsky (1990) detail the derivations of the ten basic values. For example, the Conformity value was derived from

the prerequisites of interaction and of group survival. For interaction to proceed smoothly and for groups to maintain themselves, individuals must restrain impulses and inhibit actions that might hurt others. The Self-direction value was derived from organismic needs for mastery and from the interaction requirements of autonomy and independence. Multidimensional analyses of the relations among the single value items within 210 samples from 67 countries provide replications that support the discrimination of the postulated ten basic values (Schwartz 2001). Confirmatory factor analyses of data from 23 countries yield similar results (Schwartz & Boehnke 2004).

Another assumption in Schwartz's theoretical model was that the values must be seen in relation to other values. For this reason, he proposed a value structure that is organised according to the relationships between these values. In other words, each value type is compatible, to varying degrees, with some of the other value types, and directly opposite to others. The rationale for this is that when individuals pursue something they see as being of highest priority in their life, these pursuits have psychological, practical, and social consequences. These consequences mean that the pursuits can conflict or be congruent with the pursuit of other things on a very concrete and practical level to the individual. For example, the pursuit of personal power may be in conflict with the pursuit of enhancing the welfare of others. On the other hand, seeking personal power may be congruent with the pursuit of achieving success in one's profession (Schwartz 2001, p. 268).

According to this model, there is a continuum from reconcilable to irreconcilable principles that a person can hold, which can be graphically represented as a curve or a circular pattern. When the correlations among the ten value types were analysed (Schwartz 1992) it was found that, as postulated, they form a circular pattern, based upon the minimum distance between each other (see Fig. 1). This finding supports the hypothesis of degrees of compatibility between values from reconcilable to irreconcilable. Those on the




Fig. 1. Model of relative positions of the ten motivational value types. Adapted from Schwartz 1992.

opposite sides are farthest apart in people's associations, and those next to each other are closest. The study also revealed two major dimensions – or higher-order types – of basic human values. One dimension ranges from values that emphasise the conservation of the status quo (Tradition, Conformity, and Security) to values that emphasise openness to change (Self-direction, Stimulation, and Hedonism). The other dimension is a measure between altruism and egoism, where one pole marks emphasis on self-transcendence (Benevolence and Universalism) and the other marks emphasis on self-enhancement (Power, Achievement, and partially also Hedonism). The value types on the opposite poles of these two dimensions have strong negative correlations.

The structural and relational regularity means that it is possible to study the distinctive value patterns of different groups and cultures, and explore possible

connections between value differences and various social, cultural, and environmental factors (e.g., Ramos 2006). The predictive validity of the value constructs in the human values model has been demonstrated in a range of studies, from the study of religions (Huisman & Schwartz 1992; Schwartz & Huisman 1995; Roccas & Schwartz 1997; Roccas, et al. 2002; Roccas 2005; Cukur, et al. 2004; Fontaine, et al. 2005; Costa & Goodwin 2006), to psychology (de Groot & Steg 2007; Feather 1995; M.S. Wilson 2005), political studies (Barnea & Schwartz 1998; Caprara, et al. 2006), international management (Egri & Ralston 2004; Ralston, et al. 2005), and marketing (Grunert & Juhl 1995; Steenkamp, et al. 1999). The 21-item Portrait-Values Questionnaire used in the present study was developed by Schwartz and others (Schwartz & Bardi 2001; Schwartz, et al. 2001) as a shorter and more accessible tool for value inventory (for a test of concurrent validity, see Lindeman & Verkasalo 2005). The statements are written in the third person because some people have difficulties in making first-person evaluations, but find it easier comparing themselves to others. According to Schwartz the reason for this is that comparison of others to self is a more common social activity than self-reflection (Schwartz 2001, p. 299). In everyday life, few people spend time thinking about what is and is not important to them, but people constantly assess others and compare them to themselves. This is a consequence of the evolution of efficient ways to make distinctions between in-group and out-group individuals for survival purposes.

Schwartz's value survey has been used in studies exploring how individuals' general level of religiosity affects their value priorities. In general, the conclusion of these studies has been that religiosity is positively associated with Conservation values and to a lesser extent with Benevolence, and negatively associated with Openness to change values. However, only two of the 12 studies reviewed by Saroglou and others (2004) had Muslim respondents and three had Jewish respondents. The previous studies have not

systematically compared differences in value priorities across a wider panel of religious traditions, let alone new and emerging religions.

The relation between the basic human values and Inglehart's materialism–post-materialism concept has been studied by Marc Wilson (2005). He collected data on a student sample ($n = 161$) using a questionnaire that included both the Inglehart materialism–post-materialism scale and the Schwartz value inventory. He found that post-materialism is negatively associated with Conservation (particularly Security) and Self-enhancement, and positively associated with Self-transcendence (particularly Universalism) and Self-direction. Wilson's study demonstrates a link between the individual level constructs used in Schwartz's model with Inglehart's culture level constructs, but it suffers from using only a student sample.

Modes of interpersonal relations

In the previous chapter I proposed that 1) the way people see themselves in relation to others, and 2) whether they experience more symmetric or asymmetric interactions with others have a significant effect on their values. Two cultural types have been suggested in previous literature: individualistic and collectivistic. These can be seen at the individual level as psychological traits whereby people come to prefer – or see as normal – certain kinds of modes of interpersonal relations. On a cultural level these can be seen as cultural syndromes. This line of enquiry has been popular in the field of cross-cultural psychology, where various methods of identifying these traits have been developed.

The dual concept of Individualism–Collectivism was first defined in cross-cultural psychology by Geert Hofstede (1980). He called these culture-specific mental programs. Harry Triandis saw them as cultural syndromes, or “pattern[s] characterised by shared beliefs, attitudes, norms, roles, and values that are organised around a theme and that can be found in certain geographic regions during a particular historic period” (Triandis 1995,

p. 43). Underlying individualism is the assumption that one could belong to any number of changing, emerging, and dynamic groups, any of which may be useful to the self at one time or another and almost none of which is mandatory. A collectivist perspective is that the self is a component of the in-group rather than an independent entity and that these in-groups are fixed by some quality that is normally beyond the individual's control (Oyserman 1993, p. 1007). A later meta-analysis of the Individualism–Collectivism research revealed that while there is some evidence of cultural syndromes influencing the individual's preferences, there is also significant intra-cultural variance (Oyserman, et al. 2002).

Voronov and Singer (2002) argued against the use of Individualism–Collectivism as a strict dichotomy. They argued that individualism and collectivism are not stable psychological traits, but, rather, patterns of behaviour that are based upon various ecological and cultural-contextual factors. Although these factors result in seemingly predictable and stable behaviours that have been interpreted as collectivistic or individualistic syndromes, the behavioural patterns are more dynamic and context sensitive than psychological traits would be. Therefore they are context sensitive, variable, and mutable when these factors change. In other words, rather than viewing the constructs as rigid classifications, they are here thought of as variations in emphasis on the different schemes people can employ when they focus attention on aspects of self as related to others.

Various sets of constructs have been suggested as sub-scales or types of Individualism–Collectivism. For example, Brewer and Chen (2007) postulated that there are two types of collectivism. Both types focus on in-group rather than out-group, but mean different things by an in-group. Similar to the distinctions between weak and strong ties, “relational collectivism” is based upon personal relations whereas “group collectivism” is based upon categorical group memberships. Realo and others (1997)

Table 2

The horizontal and vertical dimensions of individualism and collectivism

Horizontal individualism includes the conception of an autonomous individual and emphasis of equality. It allows individuals to do their own thing without the restraints provided by in-groups, but it may lead to social isolation, in which individuals do their own thing but no one approves of what they do.
Vertical individualism includes the conception of an autonomous individual, and acceptance of inequality. With its emphasis on competition, it is likely to result in creativity and high effort, but may result in extreme stress, especially after failures in competition.
Horizontal collectivism includes perceiving the self as a part of the collective, but seeing all members of the collective as the same; thus stressing equality. It is likely to lead to much social support and sociability, but could absorb much of the individual's energy in social relationships, thus decreasing productivity.
Vertical collectivism includes perceiving the self as a part (or an aspect) of a collective and accepting inequality within the collective. It provides protection and security and reduces the need for personal decisions, which some people find anxiety provoking.

Source: Triandis & Gelfand 1998.

argued that collectivism can focus on different kinds of social relations, such as family, peers or society, making it a more target specific construct. In a later study Realo and others (2002) found three individualism components: autonomy, mature self-responsibility, and uniqueness.

Most relevant for the distinction between symmetric and asymmetric social interactions is the distinction between horizontal and vertical Individualism–Collectivism where the horizontal pole tends to view people as essentially equal and the vertical pole sees hierarchy structures as natural and necessary (Singelis, et al. 1995; Triandis 1995; Triandis & Gelfand 1998). The Triandis (1995) instrument for measuring these four constructs was selected for the questionnaire. The instrument explores the extent to which individuals see themselves as parts of a collective, emphasise their connectedness to other members, and are motivated by its norms and the duties imposed by it, and to what extent people are primarily motivated by their own preferences, needs, rights, and the contracts they have established with others, independent of any determined community.

Furthermore, it asks whether individuals are seen as essentially the same and equal, or are people differentiated by some quality and seen as unequal. Table 2 gives brief descriptions of the four theoretical constructs of horizontal and vertical Individualism–Collectivism. In

the theoretical model, the four constructs are posited to form two dimensions, but this has not been supported by empirical findings. The inter-correlations between the scales suggest that the constructs do not always align according to the two dimension model (Li & Aksoy 2007). The actual components of interpersonal relations and their position in relation to each other can therefore be different from the theoretical model, and this needs to be tested before proceeding with analysis.

The Individualism–Collectivism instrument is used to draw inference as to whether the individual sees strong ties or weak ties as the norm and whether they see symmetric or asymmetric communication as natural, or preferable. I posit that the patterns of preference measured by the instrument are different modalities of interpersonal relations, and while individuals can have different repertoires of these modes, each activated in different contexts, in a survey set-up the respondent's ideal – or idealised – mode will be recorded. This signifies their view on how relations to others should be construed.

2.2. Survey procedures

The survey form was designed to be self-administered, and it included a covering letter with information about the project and a statement for informed consent, in line with the Open University Ethics Committee guidelines. The survey instrument was tested on a small pilot group ($n = 12$) of Open University postgraduate students in a quantitative methods course in the spring of 2007. This prompted clarification of potential issues, such as what is meant by the “in-group”. These clarifications were added to the introduction and letter that accompanied the Pagan survey. Return envelopes were obtained from the Open University Survey Office. The Survey Office also provided the printing, scanning, and handling of the paper survey.

Opportunity sampling was used because there is no reliable information available on the size or demographic characteristics of the Pagan population. Neither is there any

method to achieve a truly representative random sample of Pagans in any of the surveyed countries. Different survey formats (paper and electronic) and different distribution locations and strategies were used to improve the representativeness of the sample (de Vaus 2002, pp. 89–90; Tashakkori & Teddlie 1998, p. 73). The target number of cases was 400, to achieve a sampling error no higher than 5% at 95% confidence level, assuming representativeness of the sample and high heterogeneity of the population (de Vaus 2002, pp. 80–82).

Data collection methods

The locations for the initial survey distribution were selected on the basis of previous research on Paganism in the three countries. A location with the largest potential Pagan community in each country was selected. A secondary smaller location was selected from a different region in each country, based upon its significance to Pagans in that country. The locations selected were Dublin and Cork in Ireland, London and Avebury in England, and Helsinki and Turku in Finland.

The survey was distributed in three phases. In the first phase, paper questionnaires were handed out at Pagan meetings in the areas of study. Visits were organised to Pagan meetings in each location, with the exception of Cork, to introduce the research project, and to hand out the questionnaire to interested individuals. Meetings were selected on the basis of information gathered from Pagan magazines, web pages, and mailing lists. Before entering the meetings, the organisers were asked for permission. In Cork the questionnaires were distributed in meetings of local Pagans by a key informant introduced to me by a colleague who had undertaken research in the area. Reception of the survey was good, and people were generally interested in survey research on Paganism. In the second phase paper questionnaires were delivered by mail either via key informants or directly to respondents. Key informants were asked to forward survey invitations to closed members-

only mailing lists. A number of forms and return envelopes were sent to these key informants, and the forms were then delivered by them to the interested individuals. People also approached me directly via e-mail for the questionnaire. A total of 399 paper questionnaires, 299 in English and 100 in Finnish, were delivered.² In the last phase an electronic version of the survey was set up using a commercial web survey company.³ English and Finnish versions of the electronic survey were created that were identical with the paper version. A set of links to the survey was generated with an identification code that made it possible to identify which link was followed to the survey. The links were then posted to various Pagan mailing lists, with the covering letter and the introduction to the survey. Lists where membership was moderated and limited to Pagans were chosen, based upon the descriptions provided for the lists, to represent a wide range of geographical areas and different audiences.

Questionnaire design

The first page of the survey form has a short description of the research project and instructions on how to fill in the form. The questionnaire has three parts and a total of 63 items, followed by an open question for comments.⁴

Demographic and grouping items

The first part of the questionnaire included demographic items, such as the respondent's age, gender, country and region of residence, and their level of education. Six options were given for indicating level of education: no official qualifications, basic education, secondary education, lower academic or vocational degree, degree or postgraduate

² 114 in Ireland, 186 in the UK, and 99 in Finland. One Finnish form was sent to Ireland and two English forms were sent to Finland.

³ This company was selected because of my previous experience using it, the high value for money, and the quality of the design and administration tools they offer (www.surveymonkey.com).

⁴ Invitation letter for the Pagan survey and the questionnaire form are included in Appendix B and C respectively.

qualification, and a higher academic degree. The options were designed to be abstracted from country-specific terminology and to be roughly equivalent in the countries studied.

Twelve different spiritual or religious paths, traditions and practices were listed, and the respondent was asked to indicate which of them best describes the one they follow. Some of these have been mentioned as Pagan paths in the literature and by Pagans during participant observation (Wicca or Witchcraft, Druidic, Heathen, Shamanic, Eco-Pagan, Pagan, Reconstructionist); some are mentioned occasionally (Goddess Spirituality); and some are usually not mentioned as Pagan paths (Esoteric, Thelema, Satanist, New Age), but are considered religious or spiritual movements, practices or philosophies parallel to, but separate from contemporary Paganism. The list was not designed to be complete, but rather to include only the major branches and borderline traditions. The option “none of the above” and a “further description” box were also included. Respondents were asked to pick only one of the options.

The four remaining questions in the first part asked about the size of the individual’s religious network (“How many other Pagans do you know personally?”), frequency of participation in public religious rituals and of performing private rituals, and participation in other more informal meetings with Pagans.

The Individualism–Collectivism questionnaire

The instrument used in part B of the questionnaire is a 32-item version which Triandis (1995, pp. 205–206) suggested for use in measuring horizontal and vertical aspects of Individualism–Collectivism. The items in the scale are of varying intensity in order to capture differences in the level of emphasis. For example, items measuring Vertical Collectivism include item B29 “I hate to disagree with others in my group” and item B7 “I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group”. Hating to disagree is easier

than sacrificing self-interest for the group, with the latter anticipated only in cultures with high social desirability for conformity. Similarly, for example:

Horizontal Collectivism:

Item B22, "To me, pleasure is spending time with others."

Item B20, "If a co-worker gets a prize I would feel proud."

Vertical Individualism:

Item B10, "It is important to me that I do my job better than others."

Item B26, "Without competition it is not possible to have a good society."

Item B4, "Winning is everything."

Horizontal Individualism:

Item B25, "I like my privacy."

Item B15, "I enjoy being unique and different from others in many ways."

A five-point Likert scale was used, labelled from "definitely agree" to "definitely disagree".

Human values inventory

The final part of the questionnaire (part C) measures value emphasis based upon Schwartz's model of motivational human values. The items are in the form of character portraits of individuals, each expressing different value emphasis. Respondents were asked to indicate how much alike or unlike they are to the person described. For example, preference for Universalism value type is indicated by affinity with the following:

Item C3, "They think it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. They believe everyone should have equal opportunities in life."

Self-direction, Conformity, and Tradition are indicated by (respectively):

Item C11, "It is important to them to make their own decisions about what they do. They like to be free and not depend on others."

Item C16, "It is important to them always to behave properly. They want to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong."

Item C9, “Tradition is important to them. They try to follow the customs handed down by their religion or their family.”

For this instrument, a six-point Likert scale from “the person is very much like you” to “the person is not like you at all” was used, forcing a choice between stances.

Translation procedure

The 21-item Portrait-Values questionnaire was originally available in English and Finnish,⁵ but the Individualism–Collectivism instrument needed to be translated from English to Finnish for the survey. In order to make sure that the meaning of the questionnaire items was maintained in the translation, Brislin (1980) recommended using a procedure that involves multiple translators and a back-translation to the original language to check for conceptual equivalence. This is particularly important in a survey set-up where comparative data is collected from samples from multiple-language groups.

I followed the protocol used by the MAPI Institute (2004) in the translation of the items. This involved three translators, two of them were native Finnish speakers, both fluent in English (non-professional translators), and one was a professional translator who was a native English speaker and fluent in Finnish (University of Helsinki Language Centre). The original English instrument was first translated into Finnish independently by the two Finnish translators. The resulting translations were then consolidated into a consensus translation by the translators. Equivalence of concepts and fluency of language were preferred over verbatim translation. In one case a Finnish proverb was used (item 6, “What happens to me is my own doing” to “*Olen oman onneni seppä*”) instead of the translated item. The consensus translation was then sent to a third translator, who translated the items back to English. The original text and the back-translation were then compared to identify any anomalies. Some of the items were re-translated in a slightly modified form after discussion between all three translators.

⁵ The Finnish version was kindly made available to me by Dr. Markku Verkasalo, docent at the Department of Psychology, University of Helsinki.

The Finnish translation was sent to a panel of five Finns – varying in age, gender, and background – for cognitive validation. None of them were Pagans or otherwise involved in my research. For each item, they were asked if they found the sentence hard to understand, what they thought the sentence meant, and whether it could be better formulated. Based upon their comments, four items were completely re-written, and nine others were modified. The use of the term *ryhmä* (group) generated most of the comments. It had been used in order to uncover whether the respondent is a member of an active in-group, but the term was considered too ambiguous. However, the ambiguity is also present in the original English version. The other item that was hard to understand was “I like sharing things with my neighbours” (“*Jaan mielelläni pieniä asioita naapurieni kanssa*”). The ambiguity in the Finnish translation is between concrete things and thoughts or ideas. However, since the same ambiguity can be seen in the original English version, the phrase was left unchanged. The covering letter and the instructions in the questionnaire were written in English and Finnish. The versions were then proof-read and compared for consistency.

2.3. Participants

The data was prepared for analysis following the guidelines of DiLalla and Dollinger (2006). Responses were scanned for obvious invalid cases where responses were made in straight lines or “Christmas trees” in the questionnaire form. These cases were removed, as well as cases where demographic data was missing or more than two items in the psychometric instruments were missing. After this, outliers were analysed, but because high heterogeneity is anticipated, they were assumed to represent relevant but under-sampled groups in the population (Hair, et al. 2009, p. 519) and they were not removed from the sample.

Table 3

The Pagan sample

		UK		Ireland		Finland		n	%
		n	%	n	%	n	%		
Gender	Female	208	59	21	64	50	74	279	62
	Male	142	41	12	36	18	27	172	38
Birth cohort	Born after 1977	54	15	4	12	42	62	100	22
	Born 1958 to 1977	209	60	24	73	23	34	256	57
	Born before 1958	87	25	5	15	3	4	95	21
Education	No official	8	2	1	3	0	0	9	2
	Basic	3	1	0	0	6	9	9	2
	Secondary	55	16	2	6	29	43	86	19
	First degree ^a	155	44	14	42	15	22	184	41
	Second degree ^b	107	31	16	49	15	22	138	31
	Higher degree ^c	22	6	0	0	3	4	25	6
Total		350	100	33	100	68	100	451	100

^a e.g., BA or vocational diploma in the UK, first degree or diploma in Ireland, and FK or AMK in Finland.

^b e.g., MA.

^c e.g., PhD.

The Pagan survey

The paper and pencil survey produced 112 responses, with 76 of the 299 English and 36 of the 100 Finnish forms returned. The electronic survey was completed by 85% of the people who started filling in the form, and produced 370 complete English and 46 Finnish responses. The total number of responses from the paper and electronic surveys was 528. Of these 43 were from Ireland, 401 from the UK, and 84 from Finland.⁶ The Pagan path was indicated by 513 respondents. People who indicated their primary religious or spiritual path as esoteric, Satanist, New Age, Christian, atheist, or Buddhist were excluded.⁷ After excluding the 30 responses who stated paths that, for the purposes of this study, were defined as non-Pagan, and forms with invalid or incomplete data, the total number of valid responses was 451. The descriptive statistics of the Pagan sample are shown in Table 3.

⁶ Two of the English paper forms were returned by residents of Finland.

⁷ The excluded religious self-identifications were Esoteric (5), Thelema (4), Satanist (8), New Age (7), Christian (2), Buddhist (1), and Atheist (3).

Even though it is not possible to differentiate between age, cohort, and period effects with a sample that is collected in one period of time, generations within that sample can be used to represent individuals born in the different periods of Inglehart's value-change timeline. For this purpose, the sample was divided into broad birth cohorts. The oldest cohort, born before 1958, have grown up when, according to Inglehart and Welzel (2005, pp. 99–107), the vast majority of living individuals emphasised materialist values. The median cohort, born between 1958 and 1977, grew up during the transition period from mostly materialists to mostly post-materialists. The youngest cohort has grown up at a time when people they interact with are more likely to embrace post-materialist values. In the Pagan sample 21% were born before 1958, 57% from 1958 to 1977, and 22% after 1977. The Finnish sample is by far the youngest (62% born after 1977), and the UK sample the oldest (25% born before 1958). Nearly two-thirds of the respondents (62%) were women, reflecting the estimated gender ratio observed during fieldwork in various Pagan meetings and gatherings in the countries studied. This gender imbalance was most pronounced in Finland, where 74% of respondents were women, whereas in the UK the figure was 59%. The Pagans are also relatively highly educated, with 41% holding BA or equivalent degrees, 31% MA, and 6% PhD. The Finnish sample is least educated, reflecting the large proportion of young respondents.

The valid cases were arranged into subgroups, based upon the Pagan path they are following. These are shown in Table 4. Five of these subgroups are well-established major branches of Paganism, or otherwise common self-descriptions: Wicca or Witchcraft, Druidic, Shamanic, Heathen, and Pagan. In addition to these, three compound groups were created. These collect various self-identifications based upon common themes found in the descriptions and definitions the respondents had given. A group labelled "Nature" includes paths and path descriptions that emphasise nature, ecology, the earth, animism, and pantheism. A group labelled "Reconstruction" includes reconstructions of different

Table 4

The Pagan paths represented in the sample

	UK		Ireland		Finland		n	%
	n	%	n	%	n	%		
Wicca or Witchcraft	80	23	10	30	21	31	111	25
Druidic	32	9	6	18	1	2	39	9
Shamanic	17	5	1	3	5	7	23	5
Heathen	29	8	0	0	5	7	34	8
Pagan	87	25	4	12	14	21	105	23
Nature ^a	24	7	6	18	7	10	37	8
Reconstruction ^b	47	13	3	9	10	15	60	13
Goddess focus ^c	11	3	0	0	1	2	12	3
Other	23	7	3	9	4	6	30	7
Total	350	100	33	100	68	100	451	100

^a With descriptions including eco-pagan, pantheist, animist, or emphasis on nature, ecology or the environment.

traditions based upon various cultures and mythologies that do not fit under, or distance themselves from, the five established branches, such as Brythonic, Celtic, Finnish, and Egyptian traditions, Mithraism, and people who self-identify simply as polytheists. The third group was labelled “Goddess focus” and it includes, for example, Goddess spirituality, Reclaiming Wicca, and those who emphasise various goddesses in their path description.

The Open University student survey

A survey of Open University students was organised with the help of the Survey Office, and in collaboration with the Institute of Education Technology (IET). The student sample acts as a proxy for determining the value structure and the distribution of Individualism and Collectivism. The data from the survey remains the property of the Open University Survey Office, and can be used in further studies by the IET, linking the findings with learning outcomes. The Open University student survey ran from 15 July to 21 August 2007, just before the start of the Pagan survey.

Table 5

Comparing the Pagan and Open University student survey participants

		Pagans		Open University stu- dents	
		n	%	n	%
Gender	Female	279	62	88	68
	Male	172	38	42	32
Birth cohort	Born after 1977	100	22	31	24
	Born 1958 to 1977	256	57	72	55
	Born before 1958	95	21	27	21
Total		451	100	130	100

A random sample of 500 UK-based students on an undergraduate level course in 2007 was selected by the Survey Office. Printed survey questionnaires, with a covering letter and a return envelope, were sent to the participants by the Survey Office. No incentive for responding to the survey was given. The students were invited to take part in a survey of differences in Individualism, Collectivism, and value priorities among the Open University student population, and they were told that it was part of a research project to examine the distribution of different value priorities among the general population of the UK. A follow-up letter was sent to the participants who had not responded after three weeks. The questionnaire form included only the Individualism–Collectivism scale and the Portrait-Values questionnaire, as described above. Demographic information was added to the responses by the survey office. For data protection and privacy reasons I was only allowed to know the gender and age of the participants. Full demographic data is held by the IET. A total of 130 responses for the Open University student survey was received. Missing values were replaced with a series mean in cases where the majority of items were completed. Table 5 shows that the Pagan and Open University student samples are identical in their gender and birth-cohort distributions. The age range of Open University students was from 17 to 64 with a mean of 39.7 (SD = 12.7), and 68% of respondents were women. Men were older (mean = 43.3, SD = 13.92) than

women (mean = 38, SD = 11.7). When split into three birth cohorts, 20.8% were born before 1958, 55.4% from 1958 to 1977, and 23.8% after 1977.

In the following chapter I report findings based on the human values instrument, comparing Pagans with different groups of Christians, a group of people who are religious but who do not belong to – or identify with – any particular religion or denomination, and a group of non-religious people.

3. Religious belonging and values

A panel of three countries – Ireland, the UK, and Finland – is used to compare the value priorities of groups representing old and new religions and different positions on religion. In addition to the Pagan sample described in the previous chapter, I construct five other groupings based on an individual's religious belonging, participation, and self-reported level of religiosity. These data were obtained from the third round of the European Social Survey (Jowell & Central Co-ordinating Team 2008). The same groupings are constructed for each of the three countries. The countries are compared to see if a different religious history and cultural background has an effect on values.

Based on Wilson's study (2005), a high emphasis on Universalism and Openness to change values and low emphasis on Security are expected as an indication of post-materialist priorities. Pagans are expected to emphasise post-materialist values more, indicating that Paganism provides a supporting and legitimating framework for individuals who have that kind of value priorities. While the effects of ageing on people's values must be considered as an alternative explanation to the higher emphasis on security in the older cohorts and higher openness to change in the younger, the longitudinal studies of Inglehart

and others indicate that this is at least partially caused by socio-economic changes on the birth cohort. To corroborate the theory of monotonic intergenerational value change, it is expected that in all countries and all groups, the younger cohorts attribute progressively greater importance to post-materialist priorities, such as Self-direction, and less importance to materialist priorities, such as Security (P.B. Smith & Schwartz 1997, p. 91).

3.1. Data from the European Social Survey

The European Social Survey (ESS) aims to map long-term attitudinal and behavioural changes in Europe's social, political and moral climate, and to measure and interpret changes over time in people's values. The survey has been run on alternate years since 2001. Data collection for the third round was completed by the end of 2007. The ESS is funded by The European Commission, The European Science Foundation, and national academic funding bodies, and the datasets are made available for academic research purposes (Jowell & Central Co-ordinating Team 2009).

Data collection in the ESS is based on hour-long face-to-face interviews. A core questionnaire, supplementary questionnaire, and two or more different rotating modules are used for each round, selected from suggestions sent by multinational teams of researchers. Fieldwork and sampling for the third round was conducted by national statistics agencies⁸ following the guidelines laid out by a central co-ordinating team. The objective of the sampling procedure was full coverage of the residential population in each country, with a target sample size of 1,500, selected by strict random probability methods, making the survey representative of all persons aged 15 and over, with no upper age limit. In the Republic of Ireland sampling was based on the selection of addresses from GeoDirectory, in the UK it was based on the selection of addresses from Postcode Address Files, and in Finland it was based on the selection of individuals from the population

⁸ For round 3 the agencies were: Economic and Social Research Institute (Ireland), British Market Research Bureau, BMRB (the UK), and Statistics Finland.

register. The original English questionnaire was translated from an annotated source questionnaire to ensure that the translation conveys the same meaning in each language. In Finland the questionnaire was administered in either Finnish or Swedish depending on the first language of the interviewee. In Ireland and the UK the questionnaire was administered in English. The data used in this study is from the third round of ESS, completed in 2006 or 2007 in the three panel countries.⁹ Response rates were 56.8% for Ireland, 54.6% for the UK, and 64.4% for Finland. The Schwartz values instrument was part of the supplementary questionnaire, which was administered as part of the face-to-face interview in the UK and as a self-completed questionnaire in Ireland and Finland (Jowell & Central Co-ordinating Team 2008).

Country samples

To make the respondents' age range compatible with the Pagan sample, I included all cases who were at least 18 years old and who had fully completed the human values inventory, and divided these into the same three birth cohorts as the Pagans. The demographic information and sample sizes for each country are shown in Table 6 on page 99.

Because the educational systems in the countries are different, the ESS data includes a field for level of education that is meant to be a combination of the different national classifications. However, there are differences in how the question was fielded in each country, and as a result the combined classification is not entirely comparable between the countries. For example, in Finland the ESS category "Upper secondary" includes vocational education, whereas in Ireland and the UK these have their own separate category ("Post-secondary, non-tertiary"), which is not used in Finland. In the UK and Finland the ESS classification "First stage of tertiary" includes Bachelor's and Master's degrees, but in Ireland this includes only the first degree. Furthermore, Finland and the UK

⁹ Fieldwork was completed in Finland before December 2006, in the UK in January 2007, and in Ireland in June 2007.

use the highest category specifically for doctorate level degrees (including licentiate in Finland), but in Ireland all postgraduate and higher degrees are included in this category.

In order to create comparable categories, I re-coded the level of education as a sequence from “no official degree” to “higher academic degree”. The differences were consolidated by re-coding the level of education based on the ESS level of education classification and years of full-time education for each case. People who have passed GCSE in the UK, intermediate certificate in Ireland, and second stage of primary school in Finland are considered to have basic education. Those with A-levels or NVQ3 in the UK, leaving certificate in Ireland, and matriculation examination or vocational school diploma in Finland are counted as having secondary education. Cases that have been coded as “Post-secondary, non-tertiary” or as “First stage of tertiary” with up to 16 years of education were re-coded as first degree, and over 16 years as second degree. Second degree also includes cases in Ireland with ESS coding “Second stage of tertiary” and up to 21 years of education. After the re-coding the UK sample has the largest proportion of people with only basic education and Finland has the lowest (26%). However, in the UK and Ireland more people have first degrees than in Finland. While this also reflects the differences in the educational systems, and the re-coding method does not guarantee exact coding of particular degrees and qualifications, it produces a roughly comparable estimate of the level of education in terms of the approximate scope of the highest qualification achieved plus years of study.

According to national census data for the Republic of Ireland for 2006 (Central Statistics Office 2007), 86.8% of Irish are Catholic, 4.4% have no religion, and 3% belong to the Church of Ireland or Protestant denominations. In the ESS data for the Republic of Ireland, of the people who answered the questions about religion, 75.4% were Catholic, 19.1% do not belong to any religion, and 3.9% are other Christians (including the Church of Ireland, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, and other Christian denominations). The

difference from the census statistics is considerable in the case of those who do not belong. This may reflect the differences in the formulation of the question. In the ESS, personal association with a religion or denomination was questioned rather than official membership. The question was “Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?”. In the census, the question was simply “what is your religion?”, with options for Roman Catholic, Church of Ireland, Presbyterian, Methodist, Islam, other religion, and no religion.

The Office for National Statistics (Office for National Statistics, 2004) reports that 71.6% of the UK population said that their religion was Christian, 2.7% are Muslim, and 15.5% have no religion. In the ESS data 22.2% are Protestant, 8.9% are Catholic, 13.6% stated other Christian denomination (adding up to 44.8% Christian), and 51.6% do not belong to any religion or denomination. As in the Irish case the difference may be explained by the different ways of formulating the question. In the census form the question was “what is your religion?”, with options for none, Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Sikh, and any other religion.

According to the Finnish Population Register (Valjus 2007), in 2006 82.4% of the Finnish population were Lutheran, about 1.1% were other Christians (mostly Eastern Orthodox), and 15.3% were not members of any registered religious association. In the ESS data 59.6% are Protestant, 1.5% are other Christian, and 38.4% do not belong to any religion. The Statistics Finland figures are based on data from Population Information System, which contains constantly updated information on individuals. This records official membership of a registered religious organisation rather than the individual’s sense of belonging. As with the Irish and the UK samples, differences in percentage shares can be explained by a different methodology and formulation of the question.

Method of classification into groups

Because Christianity is the majority religion in all three countries, it was chosen in this study to represent traditional mainstream religions. My assumption was that Christians are not a homogeneous group, but there are different subgroups with different value priorities. One obvious method to divide Christians into subgroups would be to use denomination as a grouping variable. However, this is problematic because there are no representative data for the major denominations (Catholic, Lutheran, Anglican) in each of the countries compared in this study. Furthermore, previous research has suggested that religiosity and religious participation are more significant factors in people's value priorities than denomination (Schwartz & Huismans 1995; Cukur, et al. 2004; Roccas 2005; Fontaine, et al. 2005). For this purpose, three Christian groups were created based on four religious variables indicating belonging, religiosity, and religious activities. The groups are intended to represent different extremes of the possible combinations of these variables.

Table 6 shows the demographic statistics and division in the groups per country.

The relevant questions about belonging and religiosity in the ESS survey are "Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?".

According to the ESS interviewer's instructions the emphasis is on personal association rather than official membership and "Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?", with a 0 to 10 scale from not at all religious to very religious. The questions about religious activity focused on frequency of collective and private rituals, and were "Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays?" and "Apart from when you are at religious services, how often, if at all, do you pray?". A seven-point scale from everyday to never was used for the frequency items.

Table 6

The European Social Survey sample demographics by country

Variable		UK		Ireland		Finland		n	%
		n	%	n	%	n	%		
Gender	Female	1015	54	488	55	496	52	1999	54
	Male	865	46	399	45	467	49	1731	46
Birth cohort	Youngest	291	16	175	20	166	17	632	17
	Median	694	37	367	41	311	32	1372	37
	Oldest	895	48	345	39	486	51	1726	46
Education	No official	0	0	44	5	26	3	70	2
	Basic	879	47	285	32	242	25	1406	38
	Secondary ^a	218	12	199	22	370	38	787	21
	First degree ^b	437	23	259	29	145	15	841	23
	Second degree ^c	321	17	79	9	154	16	554	15
	Higher degree ^d	25	1	21	2	26	3	72	2
Group	Non-religious	373	20	70	8	65	7	508	14
	Non-belonging	747	40	180	20	344	36	1271	34
	Cultural Christians	244	13	114	13	166	17	524	14
	Passive Christian	244	13	73	8	288	30	605	16
	Active Christian	272	15	450	51	100	10	822	22
Total		1880	100	887	100	963	100	3730	100

Note: n = 3730. These are not representative samples of the countries. While the ESS data is representative by design, for the present study 85 non-Christians and 621 Christians were excluded by the grouping procedure, and 91 cases were excluded because of missing data.

^a e.g., A-levels or NVQ3 in the UK, leaving certificate in Ireland, and matriculation examination or vocational school diploma in Finland.

^b e.g., BA or NVQ4/5 in the UK, first degree or vocational diploma in Ireland, and FK or AMK in Finland.

^c e.g., MA.

^d e.g., PhD.

The religiosity index was used to divide those who say that they belong to one of the Christian denominations into a moderate religiosity group or a high religiosity group. The midpoint of the 0 to 10 scale is five, and it was used in this study as the average religiosity point. Participation at least once a month was considered regular participation. Those who see themselves as moderately religious (1 to 5 on the self-reported religiosity index) and neither attend religious services nor pray regularly (monthly or more frequently) were included in the group labelled cultural Christians. The highly religious group was divided into active Christians who attend religious services and pray regularly, and passive

Christians who do not attend services regularly. The resulting three Christian groups are therefore 1) “cultural Christians” who see themselves as only moderately religious and neither pray nor participate in religious activities regularly, 2) “passive Christians” who see themselves as highly religious, but do not participate in religious activities regularly, and 3) “active Christians” who see themselves as highly religious and pray and participate in religious activities regularly. In addition to the Christian groups, two other groups were established from the ESS data. The first are people who say that they are not at all religious. The second are those who say that they do not belong to any religion, but are at least minimally religious, with self-reported religiosity of 1 or higher. This group can be seen as those who “believe without belonging”, to use Grace Davie’s phrase (Davie 2000, p. 3).

As is obvious by the grouping procedure, the aim was not to obtain nationally representative groupings – the procedure excludes some individuals – but rather the groups are used to gauge what effect participation in religious activities has on values. The excluded group are those Christians who do not see themselves as very religious but attend and pray regularly. This group is mainly from Ireland and in the analysis did not differ significantly from the other Christian groups. The justification for dropping this group was the lack of sufficient sample in the other countries and the need to keep the definition of the groups such that religious identification and participation remain as separate defining factors between the groups. In other words, the groups compared are intentionally maximising differences in these factors.

Groups based on religious self-identification

When comparing the country samples in the ESS data, 51% of the Irish sample are highly religious and active Christians, whereas in the other countries the largest group is the non-belonging.

Table 7

Groups based on religious self-identification

	Pagan		Non-religious		Non-belonging		Cultural Christians		Passive Christians		Active Christians			
Variable	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<i>Gender</i>														
Female	279	62	217	43	634	50	222	42	398	66	528	64	1999	54
Male	172	38	291	57	637	50	302	58	207	34	294	36	1731	46
<i>Birth cohort</i>														
Youngest	100	22	114	22	268	21	226	18	76	13	81	10	632	17
Median	256	57	225	44	515	41	205	39	189	31	238	29	1372	37
Oldest	95	21	169	33	488	38	93	43	340	56	503	61	1726	46
<i>Education</i>														
No official	9	2	3	1	15	1	3	1	13	2	36	4	70	2
Basic	9	2	178	35	475	37	208	40	230	38	315	38	1406	38
Secondary	86	19	97	19	300	24	129	25	128	21	133	16	787	21
First	184	41	134	26	264	21	118	23	132	22	193	24	841	23
Second	138	31	84	17	189	15	62	12	90	15	129	16	554	15
Higher	25	6	12	2	28	2	4	1	12	2	16	2	72	2
Total	451	100	508	100	1271	100	524	100	605	100	822	100	4181	100

Note: n = 4181.

About 20% of the UK sample, but only 8% of the Irish and 7% of the Finnish samples are non-religious. The mean religiosity index is 4 for the non-belonging group, 3 for cultural Christians, 7 for passive Christians, and 8 for active Christians.

When the five groups are added to the data from the Pagan survey, the total number of valid cases is 4,181, shown in Table 7. The proportion of women is higher in the Pagan and the more religious Christian groups, whereas the non-belonging group is equally divided, and there are slightly more men in the cultural Christian and non-religious groups. The Pagans have higher levels of education, with 78% holding a degree, while the other groups are at nearly equal levels with each other. The Pagan and the non-religious groups are the youngest, and the more religious and active groups are progressively older. Mean

ages for groups are 43.8 for the non-religious, 45.5 for non-belonging, 47.9 for cultural Christians, 53.2 for passive Christians, and 55.4 for active Christians.¹⁰

3.2. Validating the theoretical value model

The internal consistency of the values scales was determined for combined Christian, Pagan, non-belonging, and non-religious groups with Cronbach's coefficient alpha statistic. Furthermore, the theoretical model that postulates the relations of the different human value types – shown in Figure 1 in Chapter 2 – was tested using a protocol recommended by Schwartz in the proposal document for implementing the values instrument for the ESS (Schwartz 2001).

Scores for each value type construct were computed as a means of the items measuring that type. Indices for the higher-order value types were computed according to instructions by Schwartz (Schwartz 2001, pp. 288), whereby Self-transcendence is measured by the mean of the Benevolence and Universalism items, Self-enhancement by the mean of Power and Achievement items, Conservation by the mean of Tradition, Conformity, and Security items, and Openness to change by the mean of Self-direction, Stimulation, and Hedonism items. Because individuals use response scales differently (for example some avoid extremes while others may avoid the medium points), the responses need to be controlled for this scale-use effect (Grimm & Church 1999). Schwartz (1992) explored different methods for achieving this. His recommendation was that each individual score is centred on the mean response of that individual to all items. This was achieved in this study by subtracting the total mean response score of individuals from the computed value-type scores. These centred scores were used in the analysis procedures.

¹⁰ Exact age was not asked in the Pagan survey for privacy reasons.

Table 8

Values of Cronbach's coefficient alpha for the value types per group

Value type construct		Christian	Non-belonging	Non-religious	Pagan
Higher-order types	Openness to change	0.74	0.74	0.75	0.62
	Conservation	0.73	0.67	0.70	0.62
	Self-transcendence	0.71	0.68	0.64	0.60
	Self-enhancement	0.73	0.75	0.72	0.76
Value types	Self-direction	0.38	0.36	0.32	0.42
	Stimulation	0.64	0.64	0.71	0.63
	Hedonism	0.69	0.73	0.65	0.72
	Tradition	0.39	0.24	0.17	0.15
	Conformity	0.61	0.59	0.67	0.58
	Security	0.52	0.49	0.58	0.48
	Benevolence	0.60	0.57	0.52	0.51
	Universalism	0.57	0.54	0.58	0.42
	Achievement	0.72	0.75	0.76	0.76
	Power	0.41	0.45	0.40	0.52

Reliability of the scales

Cronbach's coefficient alpha statistic indicated that reliability was adequate for all the groups for the higher-order value types, but low for the individual value types, and particularly weak for the Tradition value type. Table 8 lists the coefficient alpha statistics for the constructs.

Low alpha reliability for the individual value types is expected because the items measuring the ten value types were selected to cover different conceptual components of each value type, rather than to measure a singular concept redundantly, as is the usual case in survey instruments (Schwartz 2001, p. 277). For example, the Universalism value type is a composite of items measuring care for nature, understanding of diversity, and concern for social issues. The scale for Tradition, which is a combination of humility and the importance of religious or family traditions, has particularly low alpha for the non-religious, the non-belonging, and the Pagan groups, possibly reflecting the ambivalence of the scale for them. They may interpret the term religion used in one of the items as

referring to the institutionalised form of religion from which they are distancing themselves, but may still have high regard for family and for cultural traditions and customs. Also, the association of the humility component with tradition may vary greatly in these groups. Nevertheless, Schwartz justified the Tradition value type as a broad measure of submission of self to external forces in the wider reality (2001, p. 303).

Overall, the alpha statistics are at the same level as those reported by Ramos (2006, p. 42) for the ESS round 1 data, and by Schwartz (2001, p. 311) for a pilot sample ($n = 444$) in his proposal document.

Testing the relational value structure

To test the validity of the model of distinct and relational value types, the value structure was plotted on a two-dimensional space for each of the groups separately using the SPSS Proxscal multidimensional scaling procedure, with the non-centred raw scores of the 21 value items. The group mean of these non-centred scores and standard deviation for each item are shown in Appendix F. Figures 2 and 3 show the value space structures for the Christian and Pagan groups, with the dimensions representing the rotated two dimensions of Schwartz's value model. A four-step validation process was followed (Schwartz 2001, pp. 286–289).

The first step is to see if the space can be partitioned into distinct regions of value items that serve either individual or collective interests, and to intermediate values that form a boundary between these regions. For Christians (Fig. 2) there is a clear gap between values that serve individual interests (Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, and Self-direction) and those that serve collective interests (Benevolence, Tradition, and Conformity). As postulated, this gap delineates two distinct regions. However, the values that should form regions between these two (Security and Universalism) are mixed within the collective region. Security items are mixed with Tradition, and Universalism items are




Fig. 2. Value structure for the Christian groups. Obtained from multidimensional scaling procedure (SPSS Proxscal) using Euclidean distances, dispersion accounted for = 0.9377, normalised raw stress = 0.0623, Tucker's coefficient of congruence = 0.9684. Normalised raw stress measures the misfit of the data, while the dispersion accounted for and Tucker's coefficient of congruence measure the fit. Lower-stress measures (to a minimum of 0) and higher-fit measures (to a maximum of 1) indicate better solutions.

mixed with Benevolence. The same pattern was found for the non-believing and non-religious groups. In other words, the division to values promoting collective or individual interests is clear, but the intermediate values are associated with collective interests. For the Pagan group (Fig. 3) the division is between Tradition, Conformity, and Security – the Conservation values – and the other values rather than between collective and individual interest values. The second step in the validation process is partitioning the common space into four distinct regions of value items representing the four higher-order value types. This was possible for each sample, with all 21 items contained within the correct theorised region. This means that the higher-order value types have the same relational value content for each sample, and they can be used as a basis for comparison. In Figures 2 and 3 these regions are indicated by thick lines.




Fig. 3. Value structure for the Pagan group. Obtained from multidimensional scaling procedure (SPSS Proxscal) using Euclidean distances, dispersion accounted for = 0.9525, normalised raw stress = 0.0475, Tucker's coefficient of congruence = 0.9760. Normalised raw stress measures the misfit of the data, while the dispersion accounted for and Tucker's coefficient of congruence measure the fit. Lower-stress measures (to a minimum of 0) and higher-fit measures (to a maximum of 1) indicate better solutions.

In the third step, the regions for the ten value types were mapped by drawing connecting lines between the individual value items for each value type. The connected items should form discrete value-type regions without the lines of two different value types crossing. In the Christian sample six such value-type regions were found with the remaining intermixed with theoretically adjacent value types. According to Schwartz's criterion, this is the minimum requirement for passing this step. In the Pagan sample all ten regions were found. In the non-believing group Hedonism and Stimulation are close together but not crossing, and in the non-religious group Tradition and Conformity are close together but not crossing. In other words, the values are in the predicted relative positions to each other, and all samples support the model of discriminant and independent value types, but only Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, and Self-direction appeared consistently as distinct regions.

The fourth criterion set by Schwartz is the similarity of the ordering of the regions for the ten value types compared to the order predicted in the model. Schwartz suggested a point-count method for determining if the structure differs significantly from a random arrangement. Points or half-points are added for each change that would be required for the structure to match the ideal model, and the total point-count must be under 5. The Pagan and non-religious value structure requires three points' worth of changes while the non-believing and Christian structures require 3.5 and 4 points respectively. All samples pass this final criterion. Furthermore, all the required changes were within the same higher-order value type, so the four constructs match the theorised model adequately.

Finally, the dimensionality of the higher-order value types was tested using the Pearson correlation. As predicted by the model, the higher-order types form two negatively correlated pairs. Conservation and Openness to change define one bipolar dimension ($p < .001$, $r = -0.76$ for Christians, $r = -0.74$ for non-believing, $r = -0.69$ for Pagan, $r = -0.77$ for non-religious), and Self-transcendence and Self-enhancement define the other ($p < .001$, $r = -0.60$ for Christians, $r = -0.56$ for non-believing, $r = -0.61$ for Pagan, $r = -0.57$ for non-religious).

All in all, the samples used in this study reproduce the model of distinct and relational value types, where some values are compatible with each other while others are in conflict. For the Christian groups all ten values cannot be measured, but the four higher-order value types have the same composition and relations for all six groups. These will be used in the following analysis, with references to the ten value types where necessary.

3.3. Covariates

The descriptive statistics indicate differences between the groups in gender ratio and in the level of education. These must be considered as possible covariates in the test model.

Education is a relatively consistent indicator of value differences. More educated people

have been found to emphasise Openness to change over Conservation and Self-direction over Conformity (Smith & Schwartz 1997, p. 91), and therefore education needs to be controlled for if the level of education is significantly different in the groups. Gender differences are a more complicated and contested issue. According to Prince-Gibson and Schwartz (1998), there are cross-culturally consistent gender differences whereby women tend to emphasise Security and Benevolence values and men tend to emphasise Self-direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, Power, and Achievement values. Similar differences have been reported by other studies (Beutel & Marini 1995; Di Dio & Saragovi 1996; Lyons, et al. 2005). It has been argued that these masculine and feminine value orientations emerge as a result of the different socialisation of boys and girls (Rokeach 1973; Feather 1987; Struch, et al. 2002). However, the size of these differences appears to vary between countries and cultures (Bond 1988), and some studies have found the actual gender differences in values to be small (Schwartz, et al. 2001; Feather 2004). On the other hand, Lyons and others (Lyons, et al. 2005) found that there are significant interaction effects of gender and generation on some values and unanticipated gender differences in others, which, however, may be particular to the sample they used. These findings suggest that stereotypical gender differences may or may not be found in any given sample, and for contingency they should be taken into account.

Observed country, cohort, or group effects may be confounded if there are significant differences related to these grouping variables in the level of education or in gender ratio. Pearson chi-square tests indicated significant differences between groups in level of education, $X^2(25, N = 4181) = 362.20, p < .001$, and gender ratio, $X^2(5, N = 4181) = 142.81, p < .001$. There are also significant differences in level of education between countries, $X^2(15, N = 4181) = 430.43, p < .001$, and between birth cohorts, $X^2(10, N = 4181) = 541.51, p < .001$. Gender and level of education are therefore also included in the test model.

Religious activity as a factor in the Pagan group

Participating in collective rituals only on special days or less often was the definition for the passive Christian group. Two-thirds of the Pagans say that they participate in collective rituals only on special days, less often, or never, so they are slightly more active than passive Christians but less so than active Christians in this regard.¹¹ About two-thirds of passive Christians and three-quarters of Pagans do private rituals once a month or more frequently. In this respect Pagans are also slightly more active than passive Christians. Furthermore, in addition to these explicitly religious activities, Pagans also go on average at least once a month to meetings with people who share the same or a similar religious or spiritual path. Over a third of Pagans go to these meetings once a week or more often. The regularity of these not ostensibly religious meetings may have an important community-building function, and may be a factor in individuals' values. However, a preliminary multivariate analysis for the Pagan group with these three participation variables (collective rituals, private rituals, and meetings) as independent factors and the four higher-order value types as dependent variables indicated no significant effects on values. The Pagan group is therefore retained as a whole with no need to control for religious activity. Because the three Christian groups were created based on religious activity, these factors can be ignored in the following tests. The effects of religious participation will be observed as differences between the Christian groups.

3.4. Results

To explore the main and interaction effects of country, birth cohort, and group, a between-subjects multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was conducted using the SPSS general linear model procedure. The value types were entered as the set of dependent

¹¹ What should also be considered here is that special days on which passive Christians go to church may be twice a year, Christmas and Easter, but for Pagans this might mean the eight festivals of the year, or possibly just the spring equinox and summer solstice.

variables, group, birth cohort, and country as independent variables, and level of education and gender as covariates. This model allows testing for interactions between the independent variables as well as the main effects of these variables while controlling for the effect of gender and education. In other words it is possible to determine whether value priorities differ significantly between groups, cohorts and countries, and whether birth cohort, the particular cultural and social context of the country, or both, moderate the effect of religious grouping on values in such a way that the pattern of group differences varies significantly.

The omnibus F-test revealed that there were no significant interaction effects between the three independent variables. In other words, when controlling for gender and level of education, the general patterns of value difference between groups and birth cohorts are the same in all the countries compared in this study, and the differences between groups are the same for all cohorts. There were significant main effects for all three factors. Birth cohort ($F = 26.11, p < .001$) and group ($F = 20.78, p < .001$) are stronger factors than country ($F = 5.01, p < .001$). The covariates also had a significant effect on values. Gender was associated with Self-transcendence and Self-enhancement values, as suggested by previous studies. Women emphasise Security, Universalism and Benevolence and men emphasise Stimulation, Achievement and Power. When the groups were analysed separately these differences were similar for all except the Pagans, where no gender differences in values were found. Level of education was also associated with values in the way suggested by previous studies. The more educated emphasise Openness to change values more and the less educated emphasise Conservation values more. These differences appear to be consistent among the groups, with some exceptions. In the Pagan group, contrary to the other groups, Tradition is emphasised more by the more educated, there is no difference in Self-direction or Stimulation, and Hedonism is negatively associated with education. In other words, Pagans with low education place a significantly higher emphasis




Fig. 4. Value change per cohort in the three countries, ESS data. Openness to change index was created by subtracting Conservation scores from Openness to change scores and Self-transcendence index was created by subtracting Self-enhancement from Self-transcendence.

on Hedonism than Pagans with higher levels of education. In the Christian groups, Power is positively associated with education, possibly indicating the motive for achieving higher education. Also, the highest-educated Christians emphasise Universalism over Benevolence, suggesting that more education broadens one's perspective and encourages a more egalitarian view of others.

Country

Univariate tests revealed significant country differences in the ESS sample but not in the Pagan sample. When controlling for religious grouping, birth cohort, gender, and education, there were significant differences in the ESS data between the countries in Self-enhancement ($F = 17.07$; $df = 2, 4125$; $p < .001$) and Self-transcendence ($F = 10.78$; $df = 2, 4125$; $p < .001$) value types. According to the Newman-Keuls test, UK and Ireland formed a homogeneous subset and Finland was significantly different from them in both value types. Figure 4 shows that the mainstream populations of the three countries follow parallel paths of cohort-to-cohort increase in Openness to change and decline in Self-

transcendence. The oldest cohorts are in the top left corner and the youngest in the bottom right corner. In the Conservation to Openness to change dimension the differences between the countries seen in Figure 4 are explained by differences in the distribution of people into the religious groupings used in this study. UK has the largest segment of non-religious people, and although Finland and Ireland both have a large proportion of religious people, Ireland has more active Christians than Finland. This means that when the differences in the religious groups are taken into account, the three countries differ only in the value dimension that contrasts personal success, power and status with caring for the welfare of others and tolerance and equality, and the difference is between Finland on one side and Ireland and the UK on the other.

Birth cohort

When looking at all the groups together, birth cohort is a significant factor in all four higher-order value types. Nearly equal effects were found on Openness to change ($F = 49.71$; $df = 2, 4125$; $p < .001$), Conservation ($F = 54.90$; $df = 2, 4125$; $p < .001$), Self-transcendence ($F = 43.95$; $df = 2, 4125$; $p < .001$), and Self-enhancement ($F = 48.52$; $df = 2, 4125$; $p < .001$) values. The scores for the higher-order value types by cohort for each group are listed in Table 9. To find cohorts that are not significantly different in values ($p > .05$), a post-hoc test using the Newman-Keuls technique was conducted for each group separately. The cohorts that are not different from each other in a value type are indicated in Table 9 with the same letter in parenthesis. The cohort differences were, with a few exceptions, uniform for all the ESS groups. The Pagan group was an exception with no significant cohort differences in the higher-order value types. The only significant difference for the Pagan group was in Self-direction, where the oldest cohort obtained a significantly higher score than the two younger cohorts. The other exceptions were the two highly religious Christian groups and to a lesser extent the non-belonging group. In these groups the

Table 9

Mean scores for higher-order value types per birth cohort

Group	Value type	Born after 1977	Born 1958 to 1977	Born before 1958
Pagan	Openness to change	0.46 (a)	0.45 (a)	0.52 (a)
	Conservation	-0.82 (a)	-0.77 (a)	-0.86 (a)
	Self-transcendence	1.02 (a)	1.05 (a)	1.05 (a)
	Self-enhancement	-0.76 (a)	-0.87 (a)	-0.88 (a)
Non-religious	Openness to change	0.33 (a)	0.12 (b)	-0.21 (c)
	Conservation	-0.56 (a)	-0.26 (b)	0.06 (c)
	Self-transcendence	0.49 (a)	0.73 (b)	0.88 (c)
	Self-enhancement	-0.26 (a)	-0.70 (b)	-0.89 (c)
Non-belonging	Openness to change	0.27 (a)	-0.04 (b)	-0.28 (c)
	Conservation	-0.38 (a)	-0.06 (b)	0.24 (c)
	Self-transcendence	0.48 (a)	0.72 (b)	0.76 (b)
	Self-enhancement	-0.41 (a)	-0.74 (b)	-0.89 (c)
Cultural Christians	Openness to change	0.16 (a)	-0.06 (b)	-0.34 (c)
	Conservation	-0.27 (a)	-0.01 (b)	0.36 (c)
	Self-transcendence	0.41 (a)	0.55 (b)	0.75 (c)
	Self-enhancement	-0.32 (a)	-0.58 (b)	-0.96 (c)
Passive Christians	Openness to change	0.16 (a)	-0.18 (b)	-0.39 (c)
	Conservation	-0.15 (a)	0.08 (b)	0.43 (c)
	Self-transcendence	0.50 (a)	0.74 (b)	0.80 (b)
	Self-enhancement	-0.63 (a)	-0.77 (a)	-1.06 (b)
Active Christians	Openness to change	-0.05 (a)	-0.40 (b)	-0.51 (b)
	Conservation	0.01 (a)	0.28 (b)	0.53 (c)
	Self-transcendence	0.60 (a)	0.76 (b)	0.83 (b)
	Self-enhancement	-0.66 (a)	-0.75 (a)	-1.07 (b)

Note: For each value type (row), cohorts marked with the same letter are not significantly different according to Newman-Keuls post-hoc test ($p > .05$).

emphasis on Self-enhancement values increases between the oldest and the median cohort, and Self-transcendence decreases between the median and the youngest cohort. In the relational model these value types are negatively correlated, but there appears to be a generational delay by which first the older cohort emphasises Self-enhancement more, but only in the following cohort Self-transcendence starts to decline. The delayed decline of the altruistic value pattern may be a remnant of the values the median cohort learned from the older generation, while the reality of their existence was already dominated by increased competition, which encouraged the adoption of Self-enhancement values. This




Fig. 5. Value change per cohort. The spikes converge at the cohort mean points.

may indicate that for a highly religious individual, altruistic Self-transcendence values are not tied to the individual's life experiences so much as are the egoistic Self-enhancement values. Instead they are connected to the examples of authority figures and a need to conform and follow such examples. This explanation is supported by higher Conservation values than for the other groups.

Figure 5 shows the cohorts connected with centroid spikes. The Pagan group remains at nearly the same position from cohort to cohort, but the other groups move towards increasing Openness to change and decreasing Self-transcendence. With the exception of the Pagans, the oldest cohort in each group emphasises more Conservation values than Openness to change values. This changes so that the youngest cohort in each group, with the exception of active Christians, emphasises Openness to change values more. These two cohorts are clearly distinct from each other, with no overlap in the values. The change is monotonic, so that the median cohort always falls between the young and the old in each of the ten value types. Furthermore, the groups maintain their relative positions rather than becoming more similar.

These findings are in line with the intergenerational value-change model but, keeping in mind that it is impossible to separate ageing effects, the findings may also be explained by older generations being generally more security oriented and the young more interested in Power and Achievement. Nevertheless, previous studies suggest that this is at least partially caused by social-contextual changes. According to Inglehart's timeline, the oldest cohort grew up in a society in which people had predominantly materialist priorities whereas the youngest grew up in a period when people already had predominately post-materialist priorities. Also, the distance between the youngest and the median cohort is larger than the distance between the median and the oldest cohort, indicating an increasing pace of value change. The value patterns suggested by Inglehart's theory for these cohorts map into theoretically congruent value types in the Schwartz model, and the cohort differences in these value types are what the theory predicted.

Religious belonging

Univariate tests indicate that group differences are significant in all four higher-order value types, but the differences are larger in Openness to change ($F = 36.76$; $df = 5, 4125$; $p < .001$) and Conservation ($F = 63.72$; $df = 5, 4125$; $p < .001$) than in Self-transcendence ($F = 18.46$; $df = 5, 4125$; $p < .001$) and Self-enhancement ($F = 8.76$; $df = 5, 4125$; $p < .001$). This means that there is considerable difference between the groups in the dimension linked to the post-materialist value change. This may indicate that the groups have differential responses to the social-contextual changes, or that the value change only affects some of the groups. However, as is illustrated in Figure 6, the five groups from the ESS data move on near parallel trajectories from cohort to cohort, but at a slightly different pace. In order to find subsets of groups that are not significantly different in values ($p > .05$), Newman-Keuls post-hoc test was conducted for each cohort separately. The scores for the higher-




Fig. 6. Cohort-to-cohort value change per religious group.

order value types by group for each cohort and the homogeneous subsets are shown in Table 10.

There is significant cohort-to-cohort change in all groups, and the groups are not converging. This supports the proposition that the value change is universal and that it is not creating homogeneity of values. Earlier differences between the groups still remain. The univariate tests and the Newman-Keuls post-hoc test both indicate that the group differences are more noticeable in the Conservation–Openness to change dimension. The Pagan group appears to be an example of a particular value emphasis, distinct from the other groups, but matching Inglehart’s post-materialist value pattern. The other groups are approaching Pagans on the Openness to change dimension but moving away from them on the other dimension. In other words, they are not following the trajectory that would mean increasing Universalism with increasing Openness to change, suggested by Wilson’s student sample (2005). Instead, the mainstream groups follow a trajectory of increasing egoism values with increasing Openness to change. In the

Table 10

Mean scores for higher-order value types per group

Cohort	Value	PA	NR	NB	CC	PC	AC
Born after 1977	OTC	0.46 (a)	0.33 (a, b)	0.27 (b)	0.16 (b)	0.16 (b)	-0.05 (c)
	CON	-0.82 (a)	-0.56 (b)	-0.38 (c)	-0.27 (c, d)	-0.15 (d)	0.01 (d)
	STR	1.02 (a)	0.49 (b)	0.48 (b)	0.41 (b)	0.50 (b)	0.60 (b)
	SEN	-0.76 (a)	-0.26 (b)	-0.41 (b)	-0.32 (b)	-0.63 (a)	-0.66 (a)
Born 1958 to 1977	OTC	0.45 (a)	0.12 (b)	-0.04 (c)	-0.06 (c)	-0.18 (d)	-0.40 (d)
	CON	-0.77 (a)	-0.26 (b)	-0.06 (c)	-0.01 (c, d)	0.08 (d)	0.28 (c)
	STR	1.05 (a)	0.73 (b)	0.72 (b)	0.55 (c)	0.74 (b)	0.76 (b)
	SEN	-0.87 (a)	-0.70 (b, c)	-0.74 (a, b)	-0.58 (c)	-0.77 (a, b)	-0.75 (a)
Born before 1958	OTC	0.52 (a)	-0.21 (b)	-0.28 (b, c)	-0.34 (c)	-0.39 (c)	-0.51 (d)
	CON	-0.86 (a)	0.06 (b)	0.24 (c)	0.36 (d)	0.43 (d, e)	0.53 (c)
	STR	1.05 (a)	0.88 (b)	0.76 (b)	0.75 (b)	0.80 (b)	0.83 (b)
	SEN	-0.88 (a)	-0.89 (a)	-0.89 (a)	-0.96 (a, b)	-1.06 (b)	-1.07 (b)

Note: For each value type (row), groups marked with the same letter are not significantly different according to Newman-Keuls *post-hoc* test ($p > .05$). Value type abbreviations: OTC = Openness to change, CON = Conservation, STR = Self-transcendence, SEN = Self-enhancement. Group abbreviations: PA = Pagan, NR = non-religious, NB = non-belonging, CC = cultural Christians, PC = passive Christians, AC = active Christians.

youngest cohort the active and passive Christian groups are higher on the Self-transcendence index than the other mainstream groups because they obtained lower scores for Self-enhancement than the others. Their scores on Self-transcendence are not significantly different from the other mainstream groups.

The Openness to change–Conservation dimension

In Openness to change and in Conservation values Pagans are the polar opposite of active Christians. This dimension is also a good example of the parallel rather than converging value change. This is illustrated in Figures 7 and 8. Mean scores for the value types in this dimension are listed in Table 11 on page 119. All mainstream groups follow parallel trajectories of change and, overall, the differences between Pagans and the other groups are becoming smaller. Christian religious identity, self-reported religiosity, and participation in religious activities all appear to be factors that are related to a higher emphasis on Conservation values and lower emphasis on Openness to change.




Fig. 7. Openness to change values for the three birth cohorts for each group.




Fig. 8. Conservation values for the three birth cohorts for each group.

Active Christians are separated from the other groups, and this is more noticeable in the younger cohorts, where they are in a significantly different subset of their own in both value types, as was indicated in Table 10. Regular participation in Christian rituals appears to be linked to a higher emphasis on Tradition and to lower Self-direction. Active Christians are distinct from passive Christians in these value types. Regular religious practice may be a way to subordinate self to the service of authority figures and to the ways dictated by past generations. Conformity, on the other hand, is linked with strong

Table 11

Mean scores for Openness to change and Conservation values

Group	Value type	Born after 1977	Born 1958 to 1977	Born before 1958
Pagan	Self-Direction	0.89	1.10	1.36
	Stimulation	0.22	0.12	0.32
	Hedonism	0.26	0.12	-0.12
	Tradition	-0.48	-0.24	-0.36
	Conformity	-1.61	-1.57	-1.62
	Security	-0.39	-0.50	-0.60
Non-religious	Self-Direction	0.61	0.66	0.62
	Stimulation	0.04	-0.24	-0.76
	Hedonism	0.33	-0.06	-0.49
	Tradition	-0.89	-0.47	-0.20
	Conformity	-0.95	-0.57	-0.08
	Security	0.15	0.25	0.47
Non-belonging	Self-Direction	0.48	0.42	0.48
	Stimulation	0.04	-0.37	-0.74
	Hedonism	0.31	-0.19	-0.58
	Tradition	-0.53	-0.20	0.06
	Conformity	-0.66	-0.37	0.08
	Security	0.06	0.39	0.57
Cultural Christians	Self-Direction	0.31	0.44	0.40
	Stimulation	0.04	-0.42	-0.91
	Hedonism	0.14	-0.19	-0.52
	Tradition	-0.41	-0.13	0.2
	Conformity	-0.61	-0.27	0.23
	Security	0.21	0.36	0.65
Passive Christians	Self-Direction	0.43	0.34	0.43
	Stimulation	-0.14	-0.63	-0.91
	Hedonism	0.17	-0.24	-0.68
	Tradition	-0.28	-0.06	0.34
	Conformity	-0.40	-0.14	0.26
	Security	0.21	0.44	0.70
Active Christians	Self-Direction	0.21	0.24	0.36
	Stimulation	-0.20	-0.65	-1.05
	Hedonism	-0.14	-0.79	-0.83
	Tradition	0.21	0.42	0.66
	Conformity	-0.37	-0.02	0.27
	Security	0.18	0.44	0.66

traditional religious identity, where the two highly religious Christian groups are distinct from the cultural Christians. A higher level of self-reported religiosity means a higher level of Conformity. This may indicate that a strong traditional religious identity is linked to social expectations and norms of behaviour, and this also suggests that

identifying self as Christian acts as a statement or a confirmation of belonging to a certain group. Traditional religion may be a meaningful device for these people to separate “us” – who conform and do things and believe in this particular way – from “them” – who do not – and this may become more important for some segments of the population in multicultural and multi-religious societies (Robertson 1992, pp. 102–105).

The Pagan group is clearly characterised by high Openness to change, particularly Self-direction, and low Conservation, particularly Security. The post-materialist value pattern was similarly described in Wilson’s study. However, there is also a gradual cohort-to-cohort decline in the Pagan group in the emphasis on Self-direction. This can be interpreted to indicate that the older cohort experienced a lack of freedom and opportunities for Self-direction, and that for the younger cohorts this lack has not been such an issue, lowering the motivational importance of that type of values. Also, while Pagans are most opposed to Conformity, they place a similar emphasis on Tradition to that of the other groups. It appears that the lower importance of conformity to social norms differentiates Pagans from Christians rather than lack of respect for traditions.

All in all, regular participation in religious activities in the framework of a traditional religion appears to have a slight moderating effect on intergenerational value change. It may be that active participation increases the transfer of conservative values from generation to generation, and that immersion in the religious context in this way prohibits value change in the younger generations, making it socially undesirable. People who see themselves as highly religious and participate in religious rituals regularly see a conservative value pattern as a virtue, and consequently they make a focused effort to live accordingly, and to promote such values. Active participation can be seen as a personal investment that then creates incentives to maintain the same high level of emphasis on Conservation values (Kelley 1986; Tamney 2002). This strategy appears to have worked to some extent in preventing the value change; the overall difference between the oldest and




Fig. 9. Self-transcendence values for the three birth cohorts for each group.




Fig. 10. Self-enhancement values for the three birth cohorts for each group.

the median cohort of active Christians is small. But even so, the youngest move away from the median cohort, creating a generational value difference also in this group.

The altruism-egoism dimension

The group differences are smaller in Self-transcendence and Self-enhancement, or altruism and egoism, as was already indicated by the univariate tests. According to the post-hoc tests in Table 10, the groups form into two or three partially overlapping subsets of groups.

This is illustrated in Figures 9 and 10. Pagans are clearly distinct from the rest, with

significantly higher scores in Self-transcendence. In the oldest cohort, the highly religious Christian groups have the lowest scores on Self-enhancement and this separates them from the other groups. In the median cohort three overlapping subsets of groups are found. Interestingly, the cultural Christians – people who see themselves as Christians, but not very religious – have clearly the lowest altruism scores and the highest egoism scores. This is the group where people retain their religious identity, possibly as an in-group indicator, but this does not influence their behaviour or beliefs. This suggests a religious orientation similar to Allport and Ross's extrinsic religiosity (Allport 1966), which uses religion as a means to an end; in other words, for individual purposes, but not as a value orientation for life. In the youngest cohort a clear and strong religious identity – traditional or new – is associated with low egoism. The two highly religious Christian groups and the Pagans form a subset with particularly low Self-enhancement, but in Self-transcendence only Pagans obtain distinctively high scores.

Table 12 shows the mean scores for the individual value types in this dimension. The cohort-to-cohort differences for the five ESS groups are mostly due to an increasing emphasis on Achievement and decreasing Universalism. Religious identity and participation moderate to some extent the increasing emphasis on Power. However, traditional religious identity makes no difference in the emphasis on Benevolence, where all groups obtained near equal scores. Furthermore, all traditionally religious groups emphasise the in-group focused Benevolence more than Universalism. There is a monotonic decline for these groups in both Universalism and Benevolence, but the decline is more significant in Universalism. This is in contrast to the Pagan group, where Universalism is emphasised more than Benevolence and there is only a slight decline in Universalism and a slight increase in Benevolence.

Traditional religious identity or religious activity is not significantly associated with altruism, however, but is associated with placing more importance on the in-group. This, in

Table 12

Mean scores for Self-transcendence and Self-enhancement values

Group	Value type	Born after 1977	Born 1958 to 1977	Born before 1958
Pagan	Benevolence	0.89	0.82	0.76
	Universalism	1.15	1.27	1.34
	Achievement	-0.23	-0.38	-0.40
	Power	-1.29	-1.37	-1.36
Non-religious	Benevolence	0.67	0.74	0.82
	Universalism	0.37	0.72	0.93
	Achievement	0.19	-0.35	-0.67
	Power	-0.71	-1.04	-1.10
Non-belonging	Benevolence	0.61	0.74	0.75
	Universalism	0.34	0.71	0.77
	Achievement	-0.03	-0.42	-0.71
	Power	-0.78	-1.06	-1.08
Cultural Christians	Benevolence	0.54	0.59	0.77
	Universalism	0.28	0.53	0.74
	Achievement	0.08	-0.30	-0.85
	Power	-0.72	-0.86	-1.08
Passive Christians	Benevolence	0.68	0.80	0.84
	Universalism	0.38	0.70	0.77
	Achievement	-0.18	-0.49	-0.83
	Power	-1.07	-1.05	-1.30
Active Christians	Benevolence	0.72	0.80	0.88
	Universalism	0.47	0.71	0.79
	Achievement	-0.29	-0.46	-0.90
	Power	-1.02	-1.04	-1.24

addition to a high emphasis on Conservation values, supports the view that Christianity legitimises the kind of value patterns that are necessary for the coherence and stability of a community with mechanisms set in place whereby boundaries separating the out-group are actively defined. These mechanisms may be problematic in multicultural contexts, where the set in-group–out-group differentiation may not be relevant any more. In contrast, Pagans place a high importance on understanding, appreciation and tolerance of differences and care for the welfare of all people and for nature, indicating a better fit for such multicultural contexts.

Discussion

The aim of this chapter was to explore the effects of three variables on people's values: the country people live in, their birth cohort, and their religiosity. All three factors have significant effects on values.

Country differences were small

When the group differences were taken into account, there were no country differences in the Conservation to Openness to change dimension. However, in the other value dimension Finnish samples have the lowest Self-enhancement and highest Self-transcendence scores, whereas the UK and Irish samples are at the same level. This difference may be explained by socio-cultural rather than socio-economical differences. A strong popular sense of the importance of social equality has been growing in Finland since the late nineteenth century. An ethos of social and economical equality was achieved through a series of successful and relatively early social reform campaigns, culminating in Finland being the first nation to adopt universal suffrage, in 1906, and first to elect women as members of parliament in 1907. International statistics show that this has been an effective strategy. According to the UNDP Human Development Report (Watkins & United Nations Development Programme 2007, Table 15), the Gini index, which is a measurement of a nation's income inequality, was in 2005 26.9 for Finland, 34.3 for the Republic of Ireland, and 36 for the UK. A lower index score means a more equal distribution of wealth and income. The Gender empowerment measure in the same report ranks Finland at number three of the 93 countries studied. Ireland and the UK are at 19 and 14 respectively (Watkins & United Nations Development Programme 2007, Table 29). These indicators place Finland higher on both equality measures, and the UK and Ireland at nearly the same level.

In Finland a significantly higher altruism score was achieved through political choices and the nurturing of the ideology of welfare and egalitarianism over a long period of time. It may be that associating openness to change with altruism – like in the Pagan group and in Wilson's sample of students – rather than with egoism requires an ethos of egalitarianism, which may require conscious effort or some guiding ideology to achieve. In other words, in Inglehart and Welzel's sequence of improving the socio-economic context leading to post-materialist value change and then to a democratic turn, the final step might not be the course taken without some sort of collective ethos as a supporting framework.

Cohort differences in the mainstream groups support Inglehart's thesis

The intergenerational value change is predicted to cause growing differences between cohorts, and this is supported by the findings. Nevertheless, Pagans appear to be distinct from the other groups with no cohort-to-cohort value differences. Young Pagans have the same priorities as the oldest Pagans. As Inglehart and Welzel point out, the value-change model is not deterministic, but probabilistic (2005, p. 20). Changes in the social and economic context increase the likelihood that individuals will develop post-materialistic priorities. In practice this means a gradual increase in the proportion of people with post-materialist priorities, and to begin with these individuals are few and their values are in stark contrast with the majority population. The emergence of Paganism can be seen as a result of these individuals finding each other in the search for meaningful frameworks to legitimise their values. The youngest Pagans appreciate the same values as their elders, because the older Pagans were among the first to develop new kinds of priorities in the face of changing realities of existence. Pagans' values remain the same from cohort to cohort because they have high adaptive value in pluralistic post-industrial societies, and there is no pressure for change.

Traditional religiosity has only a limited effect on values

Regular participation in religious activities is associated with Tradition for the Christians and Conformity is linked with strong traditional religious identity. As anticipated, for people who identify with traditional religion, religious belonging means conforming to social norms and participation means following the inherited traditions. Also, religious identity and regular practice moderate to some extent an increasing emphasis on egoism, but religious identity makes no difference in the emphasis on altruism. For the Pagan group, both altruistic value types stay at a high level of emphasis, but for the others they are in decline. These findings suggest that traditional religions are strong normative frameworks that successfully legitimise values that motivate Conservation, even in the younger cohorts, but they are not particularly successful in legitimating altruistic values. Consequently the values the traditional religions legitimise support the perception of homogeneity of the in-group and therefore they may be problematic in pluralistic social contexts. At a cultural level, an increasing emphasis on power and achievement reflects the advent of more competitive societies, and Wilson's student sample and the Pagans represent an alternative value pattern to the norm. Traditional religions are not able to offer a framework that would encourage the combination of openness to change with higher altruism, such as the social welfare ethos of Finland.

To sum up: the decline in the altruistic value pattern in the mainstream groups may be a result of a lack of the kinds of frameworks that would 1) support the development of such value pattern, and 2) be salient for the younger generations. Paganism appears to do just that, combining low Conservation and high Openness to change with altruism instead of egoism. The value differences between Pagans and the other groups may be due to differences in the way these people perceive self in relation to others. It can be argued that high Universalism is linked to a more interconnected view of personhood, whereas

Achievement is about improving self; a more competitive and individualistic view. In the next chapter I explore the two paths the intergenerational value change can take, associating values with different modalities of social interaction.

4. Modes of interpersonal relations¹²

The social network model suggests that in a heterogeneous social context the significance of weak ties increases because these are better able to bridge differences between individuals. The way people see themselves in relation to others – for example, as independent individuals or as interdependent parts of a collective – can be seen as indicating differences in how they emphasise weak and strong ties. Furthermore, an individual's repertoire of moral reasoning has been linked to whether they see symmetric or asymmetric interactions as the norm. Symmetric social interactions are more likely to involve a private reflection process and genuine co-ordination of viewpoints, and as such they are more likely to encourage the formation of more universalistic ideals (Moshman 2005, p. 70).

I posit that a framework that supports the development and maintenance of symmetric social interactions and the propagation of difference-bridging weak ties is closely connected to post-materialist values, and, therefore, this type of modality of

¹² Part of this chapter was published in: Lassander, Mika, 2009, 'Modern Paganism as a legitimating framework for post-materialist values', *Pomegranate: The International Journal of Pagan Studies*, 11(1), pp. 74-96.

interpersonal relations has a higher adaptive value in contemporary multicultural societies. However, it looks as though two different types of post-materialist values emerge with the youngest cohort. Pagans were found to associate Openness to change with universalistic altruism whereas the other groups associate it with an increasing emphasis on personal achievement. In this chapter I focus on one possible cause for this difference. I use the horizontal and vertical Individualism–Collectivism structure to draw inference as to whether people see strong collectivistic ties or weak individualistic ties as the norm, and whether they see symmetric or asymmetric interpersonal relations as the norm. As a comparison to the Pagans, the Open University student sample is used as a proxy for the mainstream population. The group mean scores and standard deviation for each item are found in Appendix G.

4.1. Testing the Individualism–Collectivism model

Previous studies have found that when the actual inter-correlations between the scales are explored, the two-dimensional horizontal and vertical Individualism–Collectivism model is not an accurate description of relations between the constructs (Li & Aksoy 2007).

Furthermore, different studies have found different sub-scales for both individualism and collectivism. For this reason I expect variance from the theoretical model both in the composition of sub-scales and in the dimensionality of the scales. The consequence of this position is that rather than generalising to universals in order to look for quantitative differences between the groups, the different factors found in data are treated as specific to that particular group. Comparison is therefore primarily done in terms of qualitative differences in the composition and dimensionality of the sub-scales.

To achieve this I conducted principal component analysis and multidimensional scale analysis on the responses to the Individualism–Collectivism items for each group separately. Principal component analysis (PCA) attempts to extract maximum variance

from a dataset. The first component found by PCA is the combination of variables that most clearly separate the respondents. In other words, the combination of variables that produces the highest variance scores in the particular dataset. Each succeeding component accounts for as much of the remaining variability as possible (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007, p. 635). It is desirable to have as few components as possible to best clarify the differences, but enough so as not to hide any meaningful subgroups. The optimal number of components to be extracted by the PCA was determined by comparing the *eigenvalues* of the correlation matrix with those produced by parallel analysis of 1,000 random correlation matrices. For this purpose, a SPSS program written by O'Connor (2000) was used. The extracted components were then rotated using a direct oblimin procedure. An oblique rotation method was selected because correlations between the components were expected. The parallel analysis implied six components for the Pagan, explaining a total of 44% of variance, and five components for the Open University student sample, explaining a total of 42.2% of variance. The loadings of the items were evaluated based upon a criterion of salience of $\pm .30$, and the items were assigned to components based upon their highest loading. The component loadings of the 32 items are found in Appendix H and scree plots are found in Appendix I.

Components for the Pagan group

For the Pagan group the first component (explaining 12.1% of variance) is about being connected with other people: for example, enjoying spending time and co-operating with others, and feeling that happiness, success and the well-being of others is important. This component is therefore labelled "Interconnectedness". The second component (explaining 10.5% of variance) is concerned with the importance of external measures of personal achievement, such as winning awards or working in competitive situations, and it is labelled "Competitiveness". The third component (explaining 7.3% of variance) is mainly

concerned with being a unique individual so it is labelled “Uniqueness”. The fourth component (explaining 5.2% of variance) combined accepting differences in personal achievement with a willingness to share things with neighbours and to help relatives. This is labelled “Accept differences and sharing”. The fifth component (explaining 4.6% of variance) is mainly concerned with the duties one has to one’s in-group and it is labelled “In-group duty”. The sixth component (explaining 4.3% of variance) contains only three items, each of them concerning independence of the individual, and it is labelled “Independence”.

Compared to the theoretical constructs proposed by Triandis and others, components 2, 3, and 6 correspond to the individualism construct and components 1, 4, and 5 to the collectivism construct. However, the horizontal individualism sub-scale is divided between two components, and while the two collectivism sub-scales are reproduced, some of the collectivism items load into a third component where three vertical individualism items also have high, but negative, loadings. Furthermore, collectivism item 17 (“Children should feel honoured if their parents receive a distinguished award”) has highest loading in the same component as items originally belonging to the vertical individualism sub-scale.

Components for Open University students

For Open University students the first component (explaining 12.5% of variance) is concerned with a broad sense of the importance of collective roles and the duties that come with them. This component is labelled ‘Collective roles and duty’. The second component (explaining 10% of variance) is nearly identical to the Pagan ‘Competitiveness’ component, and the third component (explaining 8.1% of variance) is identical to the Pagan ‘Uniqueness’ component. The fourth component (explaining 5.8% of variance) is mainly concerned with subordination of self in consideration of others, but also with importance of harmony and pleasure of spending time with others. This implies that the

self-subordination is not based upon feelings of duty, but on emotional needs, for example the need for security, belonging and acceptance. This component is labelled ‘Consider others’. The fifth component (explaining 5.7% of variance) is mainly concerned with individuals’ dependence on others and it is labelled ‘Interdependence’.

Component 2 corresponds to the vertical individualism construct and component 3 to the horizontal individualism construct. Components 1, 4, and 5 correspond to the collectivism construct. However, two vertical individualism and two horizontal individualism items had higher negative loadings on collectivism components, and item 1 (“I prefer to be direct and forthright when I talk to people”) loads to collectivism. The collectivism construct was divided into three components that do not correspond entirely to either the horizontal or the vertical sub-scales. The five-components model for Open University students was different from both the original model and the one obtained for the Pagan sample. For both groups the first component is a collectivism component, but whereas for Pagans this combines items that are concerned with collaboration and interconnectedness, for Open University students the items were about collective roles and duty. These are the themes that are the most divisive in the groups.

Next, the relations between the components are examined to find possibly overlapping components. If the number of extracted components is appropriate, the components should be independent from each other, and they can be used to form component-based scales, which can be represented as dimensions in a multidimensional model.

Scale correlations and description

The correlations between the components are shown in Table 13. The first and the fifth component for Pagans and the first and fourth component for Open University students showed a weak positive inter-correlation, but the other components were essentially

Table 13

Component inter-correlations

Component	Pagans						Open University students				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5
1	1.00	.07	.13	.10	.19	-.01	1.00	-.01	.06	.19	.08
2		1.00	.05	-.09	.11	.12		1.00	.04	.03	-.08
3			1.00	.05	-.00	.06			1.00	-.07	-.01
4				1.00	.00	-.01				1.00	.04
5					1.00	-.08					1.00
6						1.00					

Table 14

Descriptive statistics for component-based scales

	Number of items	Mean	Standard deviation	Coefficient alpha
<i>Pagans</i>				
Interconnectedness	6	3.69	0.61	0.67
Competitiveness	7	2.44	0.75	0.74
Uniqueness	5	4.36	0.46	0.61
Accept differences and sharing	4	3.87	0.67	0.57
In-group duty	7	2.55	0.59	0.59
Independence	3	3.73	0.68	0.42
<i>Open University students</i>				
Collective roles and duty	10	2.80	0.78	0.71
Competitiveness	6	4.11	0.57	0.76
Uniqueness	5	3.69	0.53	0.59
Consider others	6	3.16	0.68	0.64
Interdependence	5	3.34	0.63	0.47

Note. All scores are on a scale from 1 (definitely disagree) to 5 (definitely agree).

independent of each other. Individuals in both groups were assigned scores on component-based scales defined as the means of their scores on the items in each of the components.

Items that had negative component loading were reverse scored (Klein 1994, p. 39).

Descriptive statistics for the scales are shown in Table 14. According to Cronbach’s coefficient alpha statistic, reliability of some of the scales is low. This can indicate problems with internal consistency, but some of the scales also suffer from a small number of items. However, except for the Pagan’s Independence scale and the Open University students’ Interdependence scale the scores are consistent with reliability scores reported in




Fig. 11. Dimensionality of the scales. Dimension 1 is the Equality–Inequality dimension and dimension 2 is the Individualism–Collectivism dimension.

other studies for the four original scales and other alternative scales (e.g., Realo, et al. 2002; Cukur, et al. 2004; Green, et al. 2005; Farias & Lalljee 2008).

Dimensionality of the scales

I used SPSS Proxscal as a multidimensional scaling method to visualise the relations of the modes of interpersonal relations. The Proxscal procedure creates a matrix of similarity and dissimilarity distances between the modes in a multidimensional space. It then uses multiple correspondence analysis to assign the distances to a position in a two-dimensional space. Figure 11 shows the results of this procedure for the two groups. For Pagans the modes arrange into two rows of three components that are similar on dimension 2, and that are separated into three distinct pairs on dimension 1. For Open University students, the components form a triangular pattern with Uniqueness, Interdependence, and Competitiveness as the corners. For both groups, dimension 1 corresponds to the horizontal versus vertical constructs of the original model, or the Equality–Inequality dimension. The modes range from a position where individual differences are not viewed as essential to a position where achievement or role-based hierarchies are seen as natural.

Dimension 2 corresponds to the Individualism–Collectivism dimension, or the independent–interdependent distinction suggested by Markus and Kitayama (Markus & Kitayama 1991). It indicates the extent to which the mode focuses on the individual or on their relations with others.

While the principal component analysis revealed that there are differences in how the two groups associate the attitude items, multidimensional scaling revealed that the components plot into two-dimensional matrices with comparable dimensions for both groups. The finding that the modes are independent from each other, but still arrange along two dimensions that are conceptually similar for both groups indicates that there is an empirical basis for the original four-construct model. This makes it easier to compare the differences between the groups. In the Pagan group, there is relatively little variance in the Individualism–Collectivism dimension, indicating that for Pagans individualism and collectivism is not a divisive issue. The Open University group, on the other hand, followed the theoretical model more closely, with a clear division on both dimensions.

Both groups are relatively loosely defined. One is based upon self-identification with a fairly openly organised new religious movement that in previous studies has been found to be highly heterogeneous. The other is based upon participation in Open University undergraduate courses, which are distance learning courses that attract individuals from different backgrounds and from various countries. It is therefore reasonable to assume that there are natural subgroupings within each group. Before proceeding with the analysis, I tested the two samples to see if they could be divided into significantly different subgroupings based upon the scales.

4.2. Exploring subgroupings within the samples

The high individual variability of modes and styles of interaction was observed by Green, Deschamps and Páez (2005). They found that even though there may be a prevalent type in

a particular cultural context or country, there is also significant individual variance in the salience and priority of the different modes in all the cases they observed. In their study the cases represented entire countries, whereas I studied cross-national groupings spanning largely similar Western countries. I expected both groupings to be heterogeneous, and that the division into subgroups would not necessarily match the different modes found for the groups. For this reason I carried out hierarchical cluster analysis to find subgroups based upon different combinations of the modes.

The method of complete linkage clustering (also known as the ‘furthest-neighbour’ method) was chosen because it generates similar results across different measures of similarity and dissimilarity and reduces the difficulties involved in combining several scales into single proximity measure (Richardson 2007; Everitt 1993, p. 71). While the furthest-neighbour method is sensitive to outliers, the outliers were originally retained because they were assumed to represent relevant but under-sampled groups in the population (Hair, et al. 2009, p. 519). Similarity between any pair of individuals was determined using the Pearson correlation coefficient measure. This measure was chosen to create clusters based upon the similarity of the pattern of emphasis on the different modes rather than similarity of the weight of emphasis on the scales. In other words, the clusters are based upon similarity of the relations between the different modes.

The differences in similarity coefficients between successive stages in the agglomeration schedule were used to determine the number of clusters (Hair, et al. 2009, pp. 513–515). For the Open University student sample changes between consecutive coefficients were generally small until five clusters were combined into four. This suggests that a five-cluster solution is noticeably better. However, two of the clusters were small entropy clusters (Cluster 3 with 2 cases and Cluster 5 with 5 cases), and they were removed (Hair, et al. 2009, p. 538). For Pagans, the procedure also suggested five clusters. One cluster had only one member and it was removed. A multivariate analysis of variance

Table 15

Mean scale scores of Open University students and Pagans in clusters

	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4		
	(n = 322)	(n = 52)	(n = 33)	(n = 43)	F (3,446)	
<i>Pagans</i>						
Competitiveness	2.27 (a)	2.57 (b)	2.43 (a, b)	3.58 (c)	53.17	***
Accept differences	4.03 (a)	4.01 (a)	3.17 (b)	3.14 (b)	46.33	***
Uniqueness	4.33 (a, b)	4.40 (a, c)	4.45 (b, d)	4.52 (c, d)	2.63	*
Interconnectedness	3.73 (a, b)	3.81 (a, c)	3.66 (b, c)	3.21 (d)	10.76	***
In-group duty	2.47 (a)	2.73 (b)	3.19 (c)	2.48 (a, b)	19.12	***
Independence	3.89 (a)	2.70 (b)	3.39 (c)	4.02 (a)	77.28	***
<i>Open University students</i>	(n = 28)	(n = 40)	(n = 55)		F (2,120)	
Competitiveness	2.58 (a)	2.20 (b)	3.20 (c)		31.77	***
Uniqueness	4.17 (a, b)	3.89 (a)	4.33 (b)		8.58	***
Collective roles and duty	3.70 (a, b)	3.88 (a)	3.62 (b)		3.17	*
Consider others	3.65 (a)	3.32 (a)	2.78 (b)		22.82	***
Interdependence	3.15 (a)	3.89 (b)	3.00 (a)		40.34	***

Note. Scale scores range from 1 to 5. Pairs of mean scores on the same row with the same letter are not significantly different according to *post hoc* tests using the Games-Howell technique. Other pairs on the same scale are significantly different from each other. F is a measure of variance of the mean scale scores across the clusters. The significance of F is indicated by asterisks: * indicates significance at $p < .05$ level and *** at $p < .001$ level.

confirmed that significantly different scores were obtained by Pagans in the four clusters ($F = 36.367$; $df = 18, 1329$; $p < .001$) and Open University students in the three clusters ($F = 21.67$; $df = 10, 234$; $p < .001$).¹³ Univariate analysis confirmed that the differences are significant on each scale, and the clusters are therefore subgroups with distinct patterns of modes of interpersonal relations. Post-hoc pair-wise multiple comparisons were used to identify significant differences between clusters. These are indicated in Table 15.

Most Pagans are in Cluster 1 ($n = 322$), which combines high scores on the egalitarian modes with low scores on the two inequality modes. They emphasise Uniqueness, Accepting differences, Independence and Interconnectedness, and they have the lowest mean scores on Competitiveness and In-group duty. The three minority clusters

¹³ Homogeneity tests revealed significant heterogeneity of variance between clusters for both groups (Box's M, $p = .006$ for Open University students, $p = .00002$ for Pagans). Pillai's trace was reported because it is considered more robust when assumption of homogeneity is violated (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007, p. 269). Since variances of these samples were not homogeneous and cluster sizes were different, the pair-wise multiple comparison test used was the Games-Howell test, because it does not assume homogeneity of variances and is not sensitive to unequal group sizes (Myers & Well, 2003, pp. 251–255).

are considerably smaller and about equally sized. There are two main subgroups of Open University students with different modes of interpersonal relations, one individualistic and the other collectivistic. The larger of these is Cluster 3 ($n = 55$). It has high scores on the two modes on the individualism side and low scores on the three modes on the collectivism side. Cluster 2 ($n = 40$) is nearly as large, but has the opposite emphasis pattern.

A chi-square test revealed no significant differences between the clusters in their gender or birth cohort distribution for either group, and there were no significant differences between the Pagan clusters in level of education, country, or division into particular Pagan paths. Nevertheless, Open University Cluster 3 and Pagan Cluster 3 are slightly older than the others; Pagan Clusters 2 and 4 have more men than expected, and Cluster 2 has more people who indicated their path as Wicca, Druid or Pagan; Cluster 4 has more Heathen and less Wicca than expected.

Discriminant analysis

To identify the particular scales, or combinations of scales that differentiate among the clusters, a profile analysis of the clusters was carried out using multiple discriminant analysis. Since homogeneity of variance cannot be assumed and group sizes are unequal, multiple discriminant function analysis was carried out using the SPSS separate-groups covariance matrix option. Tabachnick and Fidell recommend validating the function solution with a separate holdout sample when using this option; therefore 40% of both groups were reserved for the validation process (2007, p. 383). The remaining analysis sample sizes are still sufficient for both groups, and the cluster sizes are also sufficient. The OU Cluster 1 is smallest with only 18 cases in the analysis sample. The discriminant function solutions achieved a high degree of classification accuracy, and this was validated by the holdout sample. For Pagans, 92.3% of analysis sample cases and 85.9% of

Table 16

Rotated standardised discriminant function coefficients

<i>Pagans</i>	Function 1	Function 2	Function 3
Independence	1.07	-0.14	-0.01
Competitiveness	-0.20	0.92	0.11
Interconnectedness	0.10	-0.50	0.30
Accept differences and sharing	-0.11	0.04	0.80
In-group duty	-0.39	-0.36	-0.78
Uniqueness	-0.28	0.18	-0.30
<i>Open University students</i>			
Interdependence	-0.89	-0.15	
Competitiveness	0.59	-0.45	
Uniqueness	0.43	-0.20	
Consider others	0.09	1.03	
Collective roles and duty	0.03	-0.17	

Note. Coefficients greater than .40, in absolute magnitude are shown in bold.

validation sample cases were correctly classified. For Open University students, 88.0% of analysis sample cases and 85.4% of validation sample cases were correctly classified.

Three discriminant functions for Pagans and two for Open University students were significant. The discriminant functions were subjected to varimax rotation. Table 16 shows the rotated standardised function coefficients. For the Pagans, Uniqueness mode did not load strongly to any function (all Pagan clusters obtained similar high mean scores in it), therefore it is not useful in determining the cluster membership among Pagans. Similarly, in the student group the Collective roles and duty mode did not load to any function and it is not useful for discriminating between clusters. As was observed, the six components found for the Pagan group are mainly separated on the Equality–Inequality dimension. The functions also differentiate along this dimension. The first two functions are related to individualism, putting emphasis on either Independence or Competitiveness. The third Pagan function juxtaposes the two extreme components on the collectivist side, with positive loading on the Accepting differences mode and negative loading on the In-group duty mode. For Open University students, the first discriminant function showed positive

Table 17

Centroids of clusters on the discriminant functions

Function	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4
<i>Pagans</i>	(n = 322)	(n = 52)	(n = 33)	(n = 43)
1 (independent)	0.50 (a)	-2.16 (b)	-0.94 (c)	0.26 (a)
2 (competitive + not interconnected)	-0.33 (a)	0.45 (b)	-0.40 (a)	2.12 (c)
3 (accepts differences + no in-group duty)	0.34 (a)	0.10 (a)	-2.10 (b)	-1.19 (c)
<i>Open University students</i>	(n = 28)	(n = 40)	(n = 55)	
1 (competitive, unique + not interdependent)	0.37 (a)	-1.66 (b)	1.27 (c)	
2 (considers others + not competitive)	1.05 (a)	0.43 (a)	-1.01 (b)	

Note. Pairs of mean scores on the same row with the same letter are not significantly different according to *post hoc* tests using the Games-Howell technique.

loadings on Competitiveness and Uniqueness and negative loading on Interdependence, and the second function showed positive loading on Consider others and negative loading on Competitiveness. These functions reproduce the theorised model of Individualism–Collectivism, but without a clear distinction between the horizontal and vertical aspects of those types. This suggests that the clusters found in the Open University student groups reproduce some of the differences postulated in the Triandis and others’ Individualism–Collectivism model.

Cluster profiles

The clusters defined by the discriminant functions were then profiled based on differences on the functions. The significance of differences between pairs of clusters was tested using the Games-Howell post-hoc test. Results of this test are shown in Table 17 with the centroids of the cluster on each function. Pagan Cluster 1 obtained the highest mean scores on the first and third functions and lowest score on the second function. On the individual scales (see Table 15 above on page 137) this cluster obtained a high mean score on Interconnectedness and the lowest scores on In-group duty and Competitiveness. In other words, they have a strong feeling of connection to others, but this is not based upon in-group relations, and they dislike hierarchy structures whether these are based upon in-

group role or status, or on personal achievement. This cluster is labelled “The independent egalitarians” and it includes three-quarters (72%) of Pagans.

The three other Pagan clusters are minority subgroups, different from each other, but with something in common with the majority cluster. These similarities are seen in Table 17. Clusters 1 and 4 are similarly independent, Clusters 1 and 3 are similarly non-competitive and interconnected (both have a negative mean score on the second function), and Clusters 1 and 2 are similarly tolerant of differences and averse to in-group duty. Cluster 2 are “The interconnected” Pagans. They obtained the highest mean score for Interconnectedness and lowest for Independence. Cluster 3, “The in-group focused”, obtained the highest score for In-group duty and the lowest for Accepting differences and Competitiveness. Cluster 4, “The independent competitors”, is the most distinct of the Pagan clusters. They obtained the highest mean score for Competitiveness and lowest scores for Interconnectedness, Accepting differences and In-group duty. In other words, they emphasise the individual’s independence and see hierarchies based upon personal achievement – but not those based upon social roles – as natural.

The Open University student clusters are clearly defined by the first discriminant function. The second function only differentiates between Cluster 3 and the other two. Cluster 1 obtained the highest mean score for the second function, and a high score for uniqueness, and was labelled “The considerate individualists”. Cluster 2, “The Interdependent”, obtained the lowest score for the first function and a high score for the second function. This subgroup placed a higher emphasis on role-based hierarchies than any other cluster and the lowest score for competitiveness. Compared to the other two Open University clusters, Cluster 3, or “The competitive individualists”, obtained the highest mean score for the first function, and lowest for the second function. They are close, but not equal to the fourth Pagan cluster in their emphasis on competition and uniqueness, which are the only two scales that are comparable in content for the two

groups. This indicates that the “Independent competitors” in the Pagan group are really an extreme case in this regard.

Overall, the Pagan group appears more homogeneous at first. There was one majority cluster and the minority clusters were linked to this one with some shared modes.

However, the minority clusters were also clearly distinct from each other, more so than the Open University student clusters, indicating an overall high tolerance of difference.

Furthermore, the majority of Pagans put high emphasis on equality – which can be seen to indicate the naturalisation of symmetric social interactions – and a very low emphasis on in-group related modes, indicating the view that weak ties rather than strong ties are the norm. Some Open University students (Cluster 3) naturalise asymmetric social interactions more than others, and some (Clusters 1 and 2) view strong ties as a norm more than the others.

In the final section of this chapter I explore the connection between values and the way people relate to each other. I link the results that I have discussed in this chapter to findings from Chapters 3.

4.3. Linking the modes of interpersonal relations to values

The human values model discussed in the previous chapter and the Individualism–Collectivism model discussed here are conceptually related. For example, Kagitçibasi (1997, pp. 14–16) links the Conservation–Openness to change dimension with the normative aspects of Individualism–Collectivism. Collectivism is seen to imply a traditional and conservative worldview. Schwartz (1994), on the other hand, sees Self-transcendence to Self-enhancement as parallel to a cultural level dimension that ranges from egalitarian commitment and harmony with nature to hierarchy and mastery, similar to the horizontal to vertical dimension of Individualism–Collectivism suggested by Singelis, Triandis and colleagues (Singelis, et al. 1995). The purpose of this section is to look for

Table 18

Mean scores on the higher-order values of Open University student and Pagan clusters

	Pagan 1	Pagan 2	Pagan 3	Pagan 4	Ou 1	Ou 2	Ou 3
	(n = 322)	(n = 52)	(n = 33)	(n = 43)	(n = 28)	(n = 40)	(n = 55)
OTC	0.50 (b)	0.32 (b)	0.31 (b)	0.50 (b)	-0.09 (a)	-0.11 (a)	0.19 (b)
CON	-0.82 (c)	-0.69 (b, c)	-0.60 (b, c)	-0.92 (c)	-0.09 (a)	-0.17 (a)	-0.48 (b)
STR	1.19 (a)	1.05 (a, b)	0.87 (a, b)	0.53 (c)	0.89 (a, b)	1.01 (a, b)	0.75 (b, c)
SEN	-1.00 (a)	-0.76 (a, b)	-0.65 (a, b)	-0.04 (c)	-0.85 (a, b)	-0.86 (a, b)	-0.52 (b)

Note. Subsets of mean scores on the same row indicated with the same letter are homogeneous according to *post hoc* tests using the Newman-Keuls technique. OTC = Openness to change, CON = Conservation, STR = Self-transcendence, and SEN = Self-enhancement.

common associations between the value types and the modes of interpersonal relations. For example, is there a connection between the Self-transcendence–Self-enhancement dimension and the Equality–Inequality dimension as suggested by Schwartz, and between collectivistic modes and conservation as suggested by Kagitçibasi?

Value differences between clusters

In the Schwartz model the individual-interest value types (Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, and Self-direction) are split between two higher-order value types; individualism can mean openness to change and it can mean egoism. The relational value model does not suggest any closer association between Openness to change and Self-enhancement – the “individualist” higher-order value types – than between Openness to change and Self-transcendence. Nevertheless, when looking at the value change patterns of the mainstream groups, the five individual-interest value types appear to be interlinked, whereas for the Pagan group this does not seem to be the case. I propose that this difference is caused by a different modality of interpersonal relations. Therefore, significant and predictable value differences between the clusters are expected.

First, in order to explore the value differences, the seven clusters were compared using multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA). Cluster, birth cohort, and gender were entered as independent variables and the higher-order value types as dependent




Fig. 12. Relative positions of the Open University student and Pagan clusters on the two value indices.

variables. Gender and birth cohort were not significant factors independently, nor were there any interaction effects between the variables. The results are shown in Table 18.

According to multivariate analysis, individuals in the seven clusters obtained significantly different scores in the higher-order value types ($F = 244.51$; $df = 4, 563$; $p < .001$). Univariate tests showed significant and comparable differences in each value type (F from 12.58 to 14.11; $df = 6, 566$; $p < .001$). Differences among the clusters were further explored using the Newman-Keuls technique. Homogeneous subsets are indicated in Table 18. The two student clusters with less competitive and more interconnected views form a distinct subset with no significant differences in any value type, and they are the most conservative clusters. The third student cluster – the competitive individualists – is clearly distinct, with significantly higher Openness to the change index and lower Self-transcendence index. All Pagan clusters have high Openness to the change index with no significant differences on that value dimension, but differences in Self-transcendence index are significant. Pagan Cluster 1 – the independent egalitarians – is separate from others

with the highest Self-transcendence index, and Cluster 4 – the independent competitors – is clearly separate from the others with the lowest Self-transcendence index.

Figure 12 shows the positions of the clusters on the two-dimensional value space. The altruism–egoism dimension of values is associated with the Equality–Inequality but not with the Individualism–Collectivism. Competition and hierarchy means higher Self-enhancement and equality means higher Self-transcendence. The two alternative trajectories of post-materialist values are therefore connected to differential views individuals have on egalitarianism and personal competition.

Discussion

Rather than confirming polarities between, for example, individualism and collectivism, the findings support a more flexible model of modes of interpersonal relations. The inter-correlations of the scales were weak for both groups, and based on that it can be argued that what has been seen as individualism and collectivism are not mutually exclusive psychological traits, but consist of different patterns of emphasis on various modes of interpersonal relations. A more egalitarian pattern is connected with individualistic–altruistic values and a more competitive pattern is connected with individualistic–egoistic values.

One way to explain the dominance of the egalitarian mode in the Pagan group is to see their modes of social interaction as adaptations to particular socio-contextual needs. In previous studies Paganism has been reported to be highly heterogeneous (Hardman & Harvey 1996; Harvey 1997; Sutcliffe & Bowman 2000; Clifton & Harvey 2003). This was also apparent in the responses to the Pagan survey where there was a wide range of different self-identifications. For this reason, high heterogeneity was expected in the ways these individuals see themselves in relation to others. However, when modes of social interaction were mapped, the Pagan group appeared more homogeneous. Instead of the

expected large number of heterogeneous clusters, one majority cluster and three minority clusters were found. The minority clusters were distinct from each other, but were related to the majority cluster, each in a different way. Nevertheless, the belief in uniqueness of self and others cuts across all Pagan clusters, and the majority sees equality and tolerance of differences as highly important.

Based on this finding I suggest that the particular contextual demands that come from the heterogeneity of contemporary Paganism have created incentives for the development and cultivation of the egalitarian modalities found to be prevalent in the Pagan group. It has been necessary for the individuals to learn to accommodate many traditions and cosmologies, and not to impose personal views and values on others. Therefore the high tolerance of differences can be partly attributed to the plurality of expressions of personal religious or spiritual paths or worldviews, and on a rather weak or undefined collective identity. Consequently, most Pagans operate with a symmetric view of social interactions, where, “people see themselves as comparable in knowledge, authority, and power, and where no individual can impose their perspective on the other, and neither is inclined simply to accept the other’s perspective as intrinsically superior to their own” (Moshman 2005, pp. 45–46).

The adaptive value and benefits of this kind of reflexivity come to the fore as a consequence of the socio-economic changes that post-industrial societies have experienced during the last half century. As a new religious movement that attracts people with post-materialist values and an egalitarian ethos, contemporary Paganism appears to have an adaptive advantage over traditional religions in otherwise secularised and increasingly multicultural societies. In the next chapter, based on participant observation and a series of interviews, I try to find if and how some aspects of Pagan worldview are actualised to promote an egalitarian perception of others. I reflect on the inferences made in this and the previous chapter with Pagans’ views on personhood, social and cultural changes, and with

the way they see Paganism in relation to the mainstream religion and the wider community.

5. Pagans out of the woodwork

One of the participants talked about Pagans coming out of the woodwork when he was describing the situation in the late 1980s. Comparing Pagans to insects suddenly crawling above the floorboards was probably not his intention. Instead, it was a metaphor for unexpectedly finding something where it was thought that there was nothing to find, such as, for example, young people – men as well as women – becoming more interested in spirituality, gods, and different religious traditions.

In the previous chapter I concluded that Paganism has operated as a framework that has encouraged the development of modalities of interpersonal relations that can better transcend individual differences. A high emphasis on post-materialist values with an emphasis on Universalism rather than Achievement is associated with these more egalitarian modalities. The question raised now is how this actually works. Are there some aspects of the Pagan worldview that are actualised to promote an egalitarian perception of others in the face of diversity?

I conducted participant observation in several Pagan meetings and gatherings in Helsinki, Turku, London, Avebury, and Dublin. The purpose of the participant observation

was to guide the development of the interview script, get to know the significant Pagan organisations and individuals, and to introduce myself and the study to the participants. I also wanted to learn how individual Pagans operate in a communal or a collective situation and how interpersonal relations are negotiated in these events, and this insight is used and reflected upon in the analysis of the interviews. Some of these events were in places that are significant for Pagans – such as sites where there are neolithic or other pre-historical remains and places that are associated with mythical or historical events – and some were venues where Pagans organise their regular meetings, which have no intrinsic importance to them. These were usually the common room of a pub or a hired meeting hall for larger gatherings. The largest of these were the three Witchfest gatherings (2005, 2006, 2007), attracting nearly a thousand participants each year, three calendar rituals in London (Spring Equinox, Lammas, and Yule 2007) attracting between 50 and 100 participants in each event, and a Pagan ritual in Avebury during a lunar eclipse in February 2007. Other events I followed were the Helsinki Pagan Pride in June 2006, the Glastonbury Goddess conference procession in August 2007, and summer solstices in Stonehenge (2008) and Avebury (2009). I also travelled with Pagans to sites that are significant to them in Ireland (Tara) and England (Stonehenge, Avebury, West Kennet Long Barrow, Silbury Hill, Wayland's Smithy, The Uffington White Horse, and Glastonbury Tor).

Because I am formulating a theory about the factors contributing to the emergence of new religions that is based on people's priorities it is essential to hear the how they themselves formulate these priorities, to what they refer in these formulations, and how they legitimise them. More specifically, how the egalitarian mode of interpersonal relations is expressed. For this purpose the voices of Pagans in these various venues and contexts are heard and discussed in this chapter.

5.1. Interview and analysis methods

I interviewed seventeen Pagans in twelve interview sessions and three e-mail interviews.

The interviews focused on three main topics: 1) the relationship of individual and community, or how the individual is seen in relation to others, and the kind of changes the participants have observed in these communities and in society in general; 2) what participants see as the central values, or the most important things, in life for them; and 3) how Paganism is seen in relation to mainstream religions, and what is seen as attractive in Paganism.¹⁴ The interviews were analysed in order to find out how Pagans rationalise their value priorities: for example, how individual freedom and responsibility are motivated as a basis of morality, what kinds of legitimisations are offered for the values they hold, and to what extent these can be seen as examples of a private moral reflection process and post-conventional morality.

The participants for the interviews were purposefully chosen from among Pagans who have been involved in Paganism for a long time and who are active and central figures in their respective communities. Seven participants were from Ireland (Rick, James, Joanna, Godwin, Fred, Beth, and Peter), five from England (Danielle, Gary, George, Kenneth, and John), three from Finland (Maija, Tomi, and Fergus) and two from Scotland (Frida and Leah).¹⁵ The participants were approached either directly during a meeting or via someone I had met at one of the meetings. People who have been involved in the Pagan movement for a long time were chosen in order to gain insight into the relations of the Pagans and the Pagan movement to society, and into the changes in these relationships over the years. Therefore the participants represent more senior people in the movement rather than the whole movement. The youngest participant was in her late twenties and the oldest was in her late sixties.

¹⁴ The informed consent form and list of topics used as a guide in the interviews are included in Appendices D and E respectively.

¹⁵ The names of all participants have been changed.

Before starting the interviews the participants were asked to read the project description and informed consent terms, and to sign the consent form. No incentives were offered for participating in the study. Three interviews were conducted via e-mail because the participants were either not able or not willing to meet for a face-to-face interview. In these cases the project description and informed consent agreement were sent beforehand and participants were asked to reply to that message as a sign of consent. Two of the sessions were paired interviews¹⁶ and the others were individual interviews. Apart from the three e-mail interviews and the three Finnish interviews, all interviews were recorded. Six hours and 20 minutes of interviews was recorded.

The interviews were indexed from tape to mark the different discussion topics and the indexed sections of interviews were transcribed. The e-mail responses were appended to the transcribed text as a whole. This amounted to 12,000 words of text. The text was then coded using an open-source software package called TAMS Analyzer. This package was selected because it was available free, and it was developed as a simple and flexible tool for qualitative data analysis, with functionality that was fitting to the requirements of my study.¹⁷ In an initial coding phase, lines of text or text segments were tagged with descriptive codes that indicate what is being discussed. These codes were then arranged into a system of hierarchical codes or code-trees, such as for example “self expression > performance > fun” or “self expression > spiritual”. The text was then re-coded using these codes. The individual codes were then assigned to code-sets, based on the discussion context in which they appeared. A code may therefore belong to more than one code-set. These code-sets were then defined as separate discussion themes. The software package was then used to calculate the most frequently used codes. Co-coding frequencies were

¹⁶Joanna and Godwin in Ireland and Frida and Leah in Scotland.

¹⁷ TAMS Analyzer was developed by Matthew Weinstein and distributed under the GPL licence (<http://tamsys.sourceforge.net/>).




Fig. 13. Themes emerging from the interviews. Connected themes are indicated with connecting lines and labelled according to the shared codes. Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of coding instances for each theme.

also computed to find connections between the codes and themes, and to determine which codes appear with the broadest range of other codes.

Themes emerging from the interviews

There were 76 individual codes. Five general themes were found in the interviews based on the code-sets. Most coding instances were in discussions about important things (110), followed by beliefs and worldview (82), interpersonal relations and personhood (80), opportunities and needs (53), and threats (24). These themes and the connections between them are illustrated in Figure 13 and they will be discussed in detail in the following subsections.

Most frequently used code-trees were “Nature” (32 uses), “Community” (23), “Individual freedom and choice” (23), “Personal experience” (21), “Personal development/knowledge” (19), and “Values and morals” (17). Co-coding associations were used to indicate the most central issues – in other words the issues that are most densely connected to other issues. The most central issue in the interviews was nature

which was co-coded with other codes 42 times, including codes from all code-sets except threats. Other central issues were individual freedom and choice (25), values and morals (25), contrast to religion (16), community (14), and respecting others (12). Coding revealed overlaps that indicate issues relevant to more than one theme. For example, caring for nature connects contextual needs and opportunities to important things. Pagans hold the view that the general population should realise that the environment must be respected, and they see this as an opportunity for Pagans to contribute to the wider community as activists or by example. Furthermore, the emphasis on nature is legitimised by the belief that everything is connected, that humans are just a part of nature rather than its stewards, and therefore, in order to avoid negative consequences for ourselves, we must live in harmony with nature. In this way real-life values and morals are connected to the three discussion themes, as shown in the figure.

5.2. Important things

When asked about Pagan values, the first answer usually was that there are no such things, Paganism does not impose values upon anyone. The participants also frequently moderated any value statements by saying that whatever they say is only their personal view on the matter, which suggests that the idea of shared values goes against Pagan values. Similar views have been found in previous studies (Clifton 1996, p. 271). However, there are certain things that are important to all Pagans.

The Golden Rule, individual freedom, and responsibility

The ethic of reciprocity, or the Golden Rule, was often seen as the core ethic of Paganism. This appears most frequently in the form that sees it as legitimating individual freedom: one has to grant the same freedom to others as is expected for oneself. To this is usually linked the imperative of respect: for instance, according to Frida in Scotland “there should be this respect in all things you do. Give and get respect.” Also, James in Ireland said that

“[my path] emphasises individual’s freedom. The principle is to follow your own true will, and in that there is internally also the need to respect others’ true will as well.” These and similar responses suggest that individual freedom is a two-way street for Pagans. You have to give freedom to others in order to have it yourself. Fred also says that

the rule of happiness without harming anyone is such a simple idea and yet so effective. Paganism is an extremely simple belief and yet it contains all the values and morals of other beliefs. It is mutual respect and an understanding that we are the only ones creating our own future and that we ourselves are ultimately responsible for everything that happens to us.

This form of the rule, with its emphasis on individual freedom with respect for others, appears to be widely accepted as a central guideline for Pagans. The phrase “an it harm none, do as you will” appears in a ritual text that is important in the Wicca religion – hence it is known as “the Wiccan Rede”¹⁸. The Rede is often attributed to Doreen Valiente, who was a central figure in the early formation of Wicca. In the quoted form it was printed in Valiente’s “Witchcraft for tomorrow” (Valiente 1978, p. 41). However, it can be traced back to a similar phrase, “Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law”, which appears in Aleister Crowley’s *The Book of the Law* (Crowley 2004, p. 13), and further back to François Rabelais. In *Gargantua and Pantagruel* (2005, p. 125) Rabelais wrote that for Thelemites, the inhabitants of the Abbey Thélème, the only rule was “Do what thou wilt” (original in French “*Fay çe que voudras*”), and it is possible that Crowley had adopted the phrase from this (La Fontaine 1999, p. 92).

The early authors of contemporary Paganism were certainly familiar with the writings of Crowley, and the phrase may have been adopted as the Wiccan Rede from Crowley (Hutton 1999, pp. 247–248) or directly from Rabelais (Clifton 1996, pp. 270–271), but Pierre Louÿs’s *The Adventures of King Pausole* (Louÿs 2002) has also been quoted in early contemporary Pagan writings as an inspiration for the Rede (Gardner 2004,

¹⁸ From the middle-English word *rede* for advise or counsel, similar to *råd* in Swedish.

p. 108).¹⁹ According to the leading Pagan scholar Graham Harvey, “will” in the Rede refers to “one’s true self” and the advice encourages people to discover what they really want, and then to follow these ideals as long as this does not conflict with the good of others (Harvey 1997, p. 38).

Pagans generally appear to be well aware of the literature that is related to their philosophy, and the Rede is so central that many have considered its meaning and explored its background. Gary in England goes back to Crowley’s wording when explaining to me the meaning of the Rede:

This is very similar to what Aleister Crowley was saying: do what you will shall be the whole of the law. ‘Shall be’, not ‘is!’... the whole of the law when everybody is responsible enough.

He continues to say that while simple to state, the Rede is not a simple rule to follow. It requires personal growth and maturation of people, otherwise it does not work. People have to learn to be responsible, and for Gary, the work he is doing as a Pagan priest, and the purpose of the rituals he is practising, is to learn this responsibility.

A sense of community

Despite the frequent references to individualistic values, such as individual freedom, community was also seen as important. It provides validation for one’s views, networks, and family-like feelings of belonging. The ideal of freedom on the one hand and, on the other, respect for others, indicates that links to others are important, but that they may have different purposes from those in a traditional community. They are not necessarily seen as something that creates and maintains an in-group, which would provide clear boundaries and a strong collective identity. Instead, the links create networks of people for the purpose of exchanging knowledge, getting support, and validating one’s views, as well as simply meeting like-minded people.

¹⁹ However, in Louy’s text the two-part code is in the form “Do no wrong to thy neighbour. Observing this, do as thou pleasest” (Louy’s 2002, p. 16).

For example, James sees the need to align with others as one of the prime human motivations, and “as such it is entirely natural that people will regulate into groups, and define themselves thus in relation to the wider universe, in relation to the wider community”. Frida also sees it as a natural human desire to “be part of a bigger group who think similarly to you [and] to form local groups”. For Fred, meeting other Pagans gave him self-confidence in his belief system. He says that, “as stupid as it sounds, it made my feelings on spirituality legitimate”. Similarly, according to James, it is a natural human need to “have your beliefs, your value system reinforced by other people, to validate you as a person”.

Godwin describes the process of community formation using a metaphor of how small villages grow into towns. Pagan groups start out as small and localised, like a village, and

then as these groups start to organise gatherings they attract solitary individuals, who come to feel that they are part of something bigger [...], then the village becomes a town, then the towns are talking to each other and trading with each other, and the town becomes an identity.

He describes the nuclear group – the “village” – that starts organising meetings and gatherings as an extended family. He also sees that “communities are not made up of individuals but, like any society, they are made up of these family groupings”. However, Godwin does not think there is a single Pagan community; rather there are several Pagan “communities”, with implied quotation marks around the word communities. “What we see is these communities, rather than one specific community with an identity. So we have the Druid community, we have Wiccan community, we have Asatru community.” He continues to say that “all those communities interact and talk to each other. And that is the other major change as well, because in the past that didn’t happen [...] we are realising that we are all working with the same goals.” Nevertheless, apart from the nucleus groups – the “family groupings” Godwin was talking about – the ties between individuals are in many

cases relatively weak, and they cannot be taken for granted. Furthermore, there appears to be no singular and clearly defined collective Pagan identity, but several, derived from the various “communities”, such as Heathen, Druid, and Wicca.

In this kind of context, creating and maintaining interpersonal ties requires respecting and accepting different views and different ways of doing things. The importance of seeking contacts with like-minded people for validation also indicates that Pagans feel that they are a minority group, different from the majority population. The way they view the world is different from the mainstream, and they feel that it is something that people around them may not understand and accept. The mainstream population, or the wider society, was often referred to as something in contrast to “us” – the Pagans. However, the defining boundary is created by departure from some perceived quality of the general population rather than by a shared quality of Pagans.

Joy of life, self-expression, and personal development

In addition to the value of freedom with responsibility and a feeling of belonging, on a personal level most Pagans say that happiness, contentment, and increasing their understanding of life are what is important to them. Often their view is that Paganism has taught people how to live more gratifying lives and to appreciate life. This appears to have been achieved by the example of other Pagans, but also through the rituals they take part in. The rituals include elements that encourage individuals to contemplate on one’s inner thoughts, desires, and emotions, and it is believed that this introspection enables them to live life that is more true to their personality and needs. This “work” is also seen as a form of healing, enabling people to free themselves from some psychological problems – or baggage – and thereby make them more balanced and happy individuals. Contentment comes also from being able to express oneself freely and to find validation for one’s views.

To an outside observer, going to a Pagan gathering or open ceremony in Avebury, Stonehenge, or London, much of that self-expression may seem to involve outrageous headgear and clothing. But for Pagans themselves these events are not just an excuse to dress up in velvet robes. There is a deeper and more serious side to it. According to Kenneth

there is certainly the Pagan bling people wear for ritual and ceremonies, but that is just part of the fun of it, the great pantomime of it all, dressing up and having fun. But focusing on that is just a superficial way of looking at it.

James sees the emergence of Paganism as a result of the unfettering of restrictions on the free expression of personal spirituality. For many people Paganism offers a framework where different spiritual or religious expressions are not only accepted, but expected. He observes that

There is definitely a need there to express a certain sort of spirituality that was not met by the established religions, which in the Western world obviously are Christianity in its half a dozen major forms and countless minor forms. So there is a trend there, of a reaction to the loosening of the grip of Christianity. People have a need to express themselves spiritually, and when the society changes, their expressions of spirituality change likewise as a reaction to that.

Equally important is finding joy in life, and through that, contentment and harmony. Fred said that “all in all, Paganism has made me more content and happy as I understand life and its workings better, and it makes sense to me”. It appears that joy of life is at least partially associated with understanding, or finding, the meaning of life. In other words, joy of life is not just about hedonism and having fun, but a deeper fulfilment. Understanding life is not only about learning the mechanics of how nature and things work, but also, or even primarily for many, about introspection. Rick put it most succinctly by saying that for him the most important benefit of practising Paganism has been that it has “opened up my personality, my creativity and given me a joy of living that I often see people around me lack”.

Self-expression, joy of living, and personal development appear to be related and intermixed, and learning through one's own personal experience is seen as the essential measure for the validity of understanding. The individual has to do all the work, even if in the beginning he or she may need some guidance and support. This was reflected on by Gary, who says that

one thing I like about Wicca is that when new people come in, and when they start to learn, they are told 'you are Priest, you are Priestess', you are the person, it will come to you. You might need help, you might need some guidance, but in the end of the day you can say, I don't want any guidance any more.

Individuals are empowered to make a change in their own life, and the role of the more experienced Pagans is that of a guide or an advisor, rather than an authority whose teachings and actions should be followed and emulated. Kenneth said that "learning by yourself, not following one guru, is a harsh way to learn and it is helpful to have a range of experiences", but for him this has resulted in a long and gradual process where "many things have been fine-tuned as a result of these experiences". Through this empowerment Beth has gained confidence and self-knowledge: she says that "confidence comes from inside now as opposed to outside. I'm not afraid of being in situations I would have been before". The source of confidence is internal, not based on faith in something external, and instead of clear guidelines, or gurus, Paganism is seen to offer tools that the individual can employ, and a framework that supports such work. For Peter

Paganism enhances the validity of doing inner work on your own personality. That has been the most valuable thing. Tools like tarot and astrology, which enable me to gain greater understanding of myself and other people. And then I've got more choice. If I'm blundering through unconsciously, I believe I behave more like a robot. Once I can recognise what's going on, then I have a choice, ways to act on it, more conscious, not just fulfilling old habits.

While personal development, happiness, and contentment are seen as important, the consequences of these are not limited to the individual. James describes this by saying that "Paganism changed me and the way I view the world. On a small scale it changed relationships with people and things. For me the most important thing is the evolution of

mankind as a whole, and evolution of self.” Relations to others are also affected and sometimes these changes are seen as part of a broad cultural change, the beginning of a new era for mankind, or evolution of humanity.

5.3. Opportunities and dangers

When asked about the relations to the wider community or to society, new opportunities were seen emerging from social and cultural changes, but potential threats were also acknowledged. Those who have been involved in Paganism from the early to mid 1980s observe a gradual change towards more tolerance in the social context. The majority also saw the changes as beneficial for Paganism. The threats were mostly related to negative reactions to increasing pluralism and the consequently increasing need for broadmindedness. The threat of the unknown feeds fundamentalism, but also the ideal of individual freedom creates opportunities within Paganism for individuals who abuse this freedom.

The changing narrative of the world

In the UK and Ireland, Pagans’ reflections point to relatively fast and recent changes in the attitudes of the general population and society towards Paganism. However, this change has not occurred in Finland to any noticeable degree, though this is very likely mainly because of the small scale of the movement there. Kenneth thinks that in England Paganism has become more accepted as something some people do, even if it is still considered a bit eccentric. In a way he feels it has been validated as not just a part of the hippie movement, but as a legitimate worldview. Kenneth attributes this to the increasing diversity within society and the interconnectedness of the world. He said that

the narrative of the world is changing. It is becoming more difficult to separate, differentiate, and classify units in today’s world. There are many layers of connections between people, and more complex identities.

The change in people's attitudes has been gradual, but in some cases the effect has been dramatic at a local level. One such example comes from Gary, who is a member of a town council:

We can now say that we are Pagans, but when I first came here [about ten years ago] the village hated me and the Pagans liked me. Now some of the Pagans don't like me and half the village think I'm great. So we are getting somewhere. Half the village still thinks I'm the Devil's spawn, you know, that's okay, this is about reversing the tide.

Gary is not talking about a revolution, but a slow change, like the turning of the tide. For him the slow pace is okay, the important thing is that the direction of change is right.

In Ireland, Joanna recalls that "when I first came here in 1976, I'd hit the national headlines even before I arrived in the country. Because some journalist had told newspapers that witches are coming to Ireland." She told me that from that time up until about five years ago they were considered slightly as oddities. However, this has changed considerably in the past couple of years. Now they have a public role in the community:

Now the local chamber of commerce ask us to go and do public rituals. Local villages ask us to do twinning of towns, we twinned a town called X with X in France, and we were asked to do the ritual for the public. And every year at Halloween, at the festival of Samhain, we go to a place called X and we lead the public, the ordinary people at the street up to an ancient site where we do a ritual for them. We did not go and ask them could we do it. They came and asked us.

She also acts as a counsellor for the local community. People in their fifties, sixties, and seventies, who are desperately looking for help and are in need, and who for some reason cannot relate to their priest in the Catholic Church, come to talk to her about their everyday problems. She sees that part of her job as a priestess is to be there for them, to talk with them and give them some hope, regardless of their religion. Joanna and Gavin view themselves as priestess/priest and as counsellors, and they have been given the status of ministers in their town.

Frida has witnessed similar changes in Scotland, where in the 70s people were very quiet about being a Pagan. There were a lot of stereotypes in the media, giving the public negative ideas about Paganism. But she says that "in recent years, in the last 15 years in

particular, there has been a lot of exploration of the old stories and re-interpretation of metaphors. It is the discussion and openness that has changed.” According to her there is now a good dialogue between the local Pagan organisation and town councils. They have successfully lobbied for the right for Pagans to conduct legal marriages, name-giving ceremonies and funerals. Pagans in Scotland also have prison and hospital counsellors, and they are active in communicating with the media if there are derogatory articles on Paganism. Frida admits that there is still a lot of work to do – issues about the education of the general public and nasty tabloid headlines – but all in all, Frida’s and Leah’s view was that things have been improving for the Pagan community in Scotland in recent years.

In the last ten to twenty years, particularly in the UK, but to some extent in Ireland and Finland too, societies have become more open towards accepting alternative religious movements. George, who is in his fifties and has identified himself as a Pagan for about ten years, said that around ten years ago, in the late 1990s, he started to notice adverts for Pagan meetings in London newspapers. In his view Pagans have since then become more open to mainstream society, participating in, for example, environmental campaigns and trying to connect with other real-life issues in the open rituals and gatherings they organise. According to Peter, recent changes in Irish legislation that were made to accommodate increasing religious and cultural pluralism have helped Pagans to be more open, and the new communication technologies have enabled people who are geographically separated to contact each other. His experience is that society in general is slowly becoming more tolerant of differences. James also reflects on the social changes in Ireland, saying that

The past ten years in the Western world saw [the] further fall of Christianity. What was acceptable twenty years ago would now be deemed as bigoted fundamentalism. Fundamentalist Christians have now a smaller grip on society. Even those who didn’t adhere to that belief system lived in a society where that belief system held power. And as such Pagans would have been viewed with a broad spectrum of suspicion, such as being regarded as being Devil worshippers. That was certainly a view that a lot of people held. But the society as a whole has relaxed, definitely in the Western world, in the past decade, in the past twenty years.

In Ireland, Scotland and England in the last five to ten years individual Pagans or Pagan organisations have been recognised as representatives of a segment of the population that has something to contribute to society. It looks like the tide started to turn some time in the 1980s. Kenneth describes a situation in which there was considerable interest in different kinds of worldviews and philosophies, but not enough opportunities for meeting people with similar interests. He describes how he came to start a discussion group for this purpose:

At art college, at 18, Paganism started to manifest in my social life. There was an occult bookshop, but what acted as a catalyst for my conscious spiritual development was when around that time I set up this forum with a friend of mine. It was meant to be a monthly discussion forum for different Pagan paths. There was nothing interesting around at the time, so we set one up. That was around the late 80s, time when New Age things started to happen and be in the ether of the zeitgeist. The forum drew these people out of the woodwork, helped people to look at different paths. I think I had found my path already anyway, but I wanted to make sure I had made an informed decision, based upon what was out there in the spiritual marketplace.

At the time people with similar views started to regulate into groups on a more noticeable scale than before, and started to become better organised. The number of published books and magazines began to increase rapidly, indicating that the demand had started to be noticed by keen-eyed publishers as well. By the end of the decade, but particularly in the second half of the 1990s, the internet started to revolutionise access to information and opportunities for communication.

Increasing dialogue and maturation of Paganism

Society has changed, but Paganism has also been changing. One indication of this is the increased dialogue between Pagans and local communities and town councils, in which Pagans are becoming more involved. In a way, while Pagans are becoming more accepted, they too are starting to tolerate and accept the mainstream religion, instead of always depicting it as the oppressive antagonist. Godwin describes this dialectical process by saying that

Paganism is growing up like a child, and it is going through phases of growth as it begins to mature. One of those is realising that – when we get to teenage years – is that we are not the centre of the universe, which I think Paganism for a long time ... many Pagans found that Paganism is egocentric. You joined a coven and you totally concentrated just on what you were doing within that group. And you never interacted with the outside world. This is changing considerably now. Pagans are realising they are part of the bigger world, and they are there. The outside world has become more tolerant in the same way Paganism has become more open. So there is a change on both sides.

Peter said that in addition to being a Pagan, he is also a member of the local Unitarian Church, and he conducts the services there occasionally. He also goes to camps organised by Catholic nuns, who appear to be open and accepting towards his Paganism. Pagans are becoming more self-aware as a part of the community in which they live, rather than isolating themselves from it. Godwin suggests that Paganism could find a social purpose in affecting the outside world, and on an individual level, he thinks that in order to fully mature as a person, it is important to find one's role in the wider community. For instance, Kenneth is reviving the bardic tradition by running storytelling groups with others, and these have now been established as part of the town's cultural scene. In the meetings I visited there were usually twenty to forty people, most of them people who have nothing to do with Paganism, but who enjoy telling and hearing stories, and talking about creating these stories. Like Joanna and Gavin who work as counsellors, Kenneth has found a way to contribute to the local community. In his view, a bard is someone who works for the local people – in community arts – and this is something that has been lost in modern communities.

Another example of this is Fergus in Finland, who is practising his Druidic path by organising walks around the botanical garden in his home town, talking about how different plants have been used in the past, and what kind of lore there is about them. Even though Fergus is originally from England, he is using imagery from the traditional Finnish religion, and from the Finnish national epic "Kalevala", and combining these with what he has learned in England. He is also running shamanic drumming workshops that are open to

the general public and are advertised as a form of meditation and relaxation. While these activities are hardly in the mainstream, or necessarily viewed as spiritual let alone religious by the audience, they signal the desire on the part of Pagans to contribute something to the community, and also an openness, acceptance, and maybe some level of need for these kinds of activities on the part of the general public.

Another reason why the Pagan movement is changing is because the younger generation of Pagans is now in the position of learning from older Pagans, and also because, according to Joanna, there is now less indoctrination of children with fear and images of hell than there were when she was growing up. She says that because of this,

when I started casting a circle I was scared that a demon was going to pop out. I was raised like that. The younger generation don't have that. They see no reason why it shouldn't work, and they see absolutely no reason why it shouldn't be safe either.

The fear that Joanna was imprinted with as a child is not there for the young generation.

But the younger Pagans also have the impatience of people who are used to a faster paced life, to instant access to information and instant communication. According to Frida,

the younger generation wants things 'now', and they don't realise that knowledge is about understanding, and if you get the knowledge from a book, you memorise it but you don't necessarily understand it until it is practised and developed and thought about in different meanings.

Not everybody, however, celebrates the changes and what has happened to Paganism as a result of them. John sees the changes as watering down the original idea of his religion. He sees that there is a loss of intimacy and trust, because of the larger number of people joining and the lack of commitment by the young. He says that "the old generation feels the sense of duty and commitment and hard work, and that is not something you find in many of the younger generation". For him there is a strong sense of belonging to a larger whole when people around the world are repeating the same rituals at the same calendar points. The lack of commitment to learn the old traditions and rituals weakens the

sense of connection with the history of the movement, and the sense of belonging to a larger community.

Nevertheless, for the majority of Pagans the changes in social values are seen as a positive move towards a society where they can fit in and find their place more easily. Some Pagans have a more analytical view of the changes, as, for example, James, who observed that the flip-side of conformity is bigotry, where failure to conform to certain norms is met with hostility, and similarly the flip-side of tradition is fundamentalism, where alternative traditions are seen as a threat to the stability and existence of the community. James says that in his view, both bigotry and fundamentalism are in decline as a result of a lessening emphasis on conformity and tradition, and on the increase are openness, understanding, and tolerance of difference. His general view was that Western societies are becoming more relaxed.

Opportunities for fundamentalism

In contemporary Western societies individuals' rights are recognised more broadly and equality and tolerance of differences are seen as important social values. As a result, opportunities for the emergence of new religious and spiritual movements have been created. Increasing pluralism through migration and movement of labour means that people are exposed to more diversity, but the pluralism and the ethos of equality also means that there is a growing social pressure for everyone to accept diverse worldviews and ways of life. Nonetheless, there are individuals and groups who see these developments as a threat to their view of a monolithic national culture or to their beliefs.

For example, Rick told me that when his ex-wife found out his religious beliefs from someone, she took it upon herself to "out" him to his entire family. But she was then surprised when, rather than being shocked, Rick's family accepted and understood his views. According to Rick, his ex-wife was completely taken aback by this response. When

societies change, the change is gradual and uneven, and instances where the views of some seem incomprehensible to others become more frequent than they would have been in a more homogeneous society. In this way cultural and religious plurality is an opportunity also for fundamentalism; the challenge and perceived threat from different worldviews motivate the formation of extreme groups (Herriot 2008, pp. 9–27). According to James, “this is the way some people interpret the changes they see. As their own picture of society is changing, they use these fear tactics more aggressively, so that they can defend their idea of society.” He continues to say that

it is the desire of those who have fundamentalist neo-conservative type of beliefs that their belief is better than everybody else's, and they have to impose it on everybody else. Cults in their death-throes will become more militant. It is like darkness before the dawn. We are observing it particularly in the Muslim world. The lunatic fringe, the fundamentalists, the moral sort of do-gooders, are expressing themselves in more and more violent ways.

In James's view, militant fundamentalist groups are behaving like a dying cult that is desperately trying to maintain its following and the integrity of its worldview. This view is shared by Frida, who identifies particular Christian groups who think that anything that is not in line with their way of thinking, not necessarily just Paganism, is automatically suspect. She also thinks that there may not actually be an increase of fundamentalism, but that these kinds of intolerant attitudes are now more noticeable because they seem so strange. Leah says the problem is mainly with Christian groups that are breaking away from mainstream Christianity. They are more evangelical, finding “parts of the Bible that are really against this or that, and really go for it”.

The Pagans I interviewed attributed the negative reactions to Paganism only to these extreme fundamentalists, and they were all careful to point out the positive links they have made with the wider community, and that the majority of people they encounter are tolerant towards their views. A major concern was the lack of information and education of the general population on what Paganism is. The lack of knowledge can easily be taken

advantage of by those spreading images of fear in order to cause emotive reactions and responses. In handling these kinds of confrontations the Pagans I interviewed appeared to have been educated through experience. There was recognition that things like negative media coverage must be taken seriously, but such examples of extreme fundamentalism were again seen as isolated cases. There were many examples of good official relations with local town councils and other authorities in Ireland, England, and Scotland, and Pagans there appeared confident and hopeful for the future. The situation is different in Finland. The Pagan movement is relatively small there, and it has been portrayed in the media, and also in academic research, as a youth movement. As a consequence, Pagans have very limited means to make connections with local communities.

Users and abusers in the Pagan movement

Another perceived threat comes from the inside. Paganism appears to attract some individuals who abuse the promise of freedom or take advantage of their role as more experienced guides. Kriegman and Solomon (1985) argued that the structure and process found in the Divine Light Movement matches the needs of a narcissistic personality, attracting people with that kind of personality trait. The same may be true to some extent with Paganism.

While there is a certain tolerance of these kinds of personalities, acting at the expense of others is never tolerated. That is the one thing Pagans distance themselves from. It was the general view that these abusers, in Rick's words, "break those few rules in our religion that are there to stop people taking advantage of others". Kenneth saw this kind of behaviour as an indication of a kind of addiction. He saw such people as "ego-maniacs, pumping themselves up for personal kudos, or power". He continued to say that these are a small minority of "people who can't govern themselves, are addicted to whatever, and I'm not interested in treating someone as a wise person if they can't act as

such”. James saw this kind of fundamentalism as something that takes over the spiritual side of any religion, where religion then becomes only a matter of form. Similarly Fred distanced himself from individuals who claim to be able to lead people on the one and only true path, and who “proclaim to be holier than anyone else whether Pagan or from any other religion or belief”.

With its strong emphasis on individual freedom and development Paganism offers opportunities for such individuals, but there is also the ethos of respect and responsibility, which moderates such excessive individualism. Nevertheless, it is clear that such individuals exist in all the different locales where I conducted interviews and participant observation. Some of them are still accepted and even respected to a varying degree – possibly with a disclaimer of moderate to severe eccentricity – but when such personality traits become abusive, they are no longer tolerated. For example, the “family groupings” are like family because, in Beth’s words, “you have to trust people you are working and going to [participate in a ritual] with”. Joanna says that she and her group “don’t want to work with the ones who are totally egocentric, where it is all about them, it is all about enlarging their ego”. Similarly “Pagan fundamentalists”, or people who see their way as the only true way, or a superior way compared to others, are criticised.

These “users and abusers” were seen as the cause of many kinds of problems. This was reflected on in a dialogue between two Scottish Pagans, Leah and Frida, who are both active in organising meetings and gatherings, but who have also been involved in developing relations with the wider community, town councils, and the media. As a response to a question about people with whom they do not like to be associated, they said the following:

Leah: People who use other people to their own ends. There are a few of them within the community. And we’d rather be aware of them. You just wouldn’t want to associate with them at all.

Frida: You get that in all walks of life, you know. They are the users and the abusers.

Leah: And we do occasionally have to pick up the pieces after what they have done.

Frida: And when you get bad press, they are likely the ones that caused it.

The problem appears to be that there is very little that can be done about these individuals, apart from being aware of them and not associating with them, and then picking up the pieces afterwards when things go wrong. These people “are perverting their belief to fit an illness within themselves, or an addiction. It has nothing to do with Paganism”, Beth said. Generally the increased openness of the society, the fact that Pagans can now be more open and public about their meetings, was seen as helpful in this matter as well. Individuals who have been attracted by these abusers can now more easily find out about others, and get external support.

5.4. Claiming space for Paganism

The last two themes are about validating Paganism as a religion or a worldview: in other words, ways to claim space for Paganism among other religions in the contemporary world. One theme is about the Pagan concept of personhood and the other is about Pagan beliefs and worldview.

The connected individual

The respondents described a similar interconnected view of a person, as was suggested by the survey findings in Chapter 4. The interviews confirmed the centrality of the combination of individualism with a strong sense of interconnectedness and an egalitarian view of others. This was elaborated as a concept of personhood that includes not only the individual as an embodied entity, but also a dense network of connections as an integral extension to it.

Earlier in this chapter I posited that while Pagans see freedom for self-expression as the ideal state of being, they also see connections to other people as necessary, even vital. Individual freedom is therefore moderated by a need to respect others. In addition to this,

there is a more abstract level of interconnectedness, tied to the core aspects of a Pagan worldview. It comes from the view that each individual is an interdependent part of a larger whole, not only in the social sense as a part of the community or, more broadly, of humanity, but also as a part of nature, the Earth, or the universe. Furthermore, this whole and its parts, including humans themselves, are considered sacred. Beth sees this as one attraction of Paganism. She says that

many people breaking away from standard monotheistic religion see the movement into Paganism as more, not a connection with the divine or anything else like that, but a connection with the Earth, connection with nature.

In her view nothing and nobody can exist solely on their own. "Interaction is the most important part of our existence, and that interaction is between our fellow humans, our gods and nature, and the cycle of the year." The same sentiment was shared by Joanna, who said that she is focusing more and more on engaging other people as well as connecting with gods and goddesses. Paganism for her is a "religion that is connected directly to the here and now, connected to the world itself". She saw this as a motive to start learning from each other, and to learn how to live on our planet today and work together in harmony.

The view that humans are part of the natural world like everything else, and the sense of connectedness stemming from this is also one way in which Pagans legitimise the rule of reciprocity. This view is also frequently offered as one of the very basic defining features of Paganism. Godwin contrasts the idea of being part of nature with his interpretation of the Christian view of humans having dominion over the world by saying that

We are not separate from the nature or the world around us. This differs very much to the monotheistic religions where they believe they have dominion over the world. We don't believe that. We believe we are part of the world, we are part of the natural world. We are intelligent, we are at the top of the evolutionary chain, but we are still an animal. And regardless of this Christian view of dominion over the world, we believe that, as we can see now by the changes going on particularly with the environment, that we are still influenced by the world around us. Although we do

influence the world and influence the environment. In the end, the environment will win over us, rather than us winning over the environment.

In Godwin's view, even though humans do influence the environment, there is no element of dominion; quite the contrary. We should be careful to respect it or else we risk our own existence.

Being a part of nature increases the value and legitimacy of the high emphasis on enjoying and celebrating life and nature. On a concrete level, Rick and Kenneth talk frequently about finding happiness and solace in nature; others talk more generally about love towards all life and finding personal happiness through that. Another aspect of being a part of nature is that it gives significance to observing the seasonal changes as well as the changes individuals go through in their life. Beth said that

Because the cycle, how the world turns, how the seasons work, how we work within the seasons, all of that influences us on a very subtle ... on a subtle and on an obvious level actually as well. So to respect that, to honour that turning of the year, to honour the turning points of our lives, all of those would have a pretty major part to play.

According to her it is central in Paganism to acknowledge that seasonal changes influence people. For this reason it is important to follow and respect the different character of each season. Similarly it is important to follow and respect the different stages of human life, and to live and be as much in harmony with these stages as possible. In Joanna's and Godwin's view this is why Paganism is looking to the past. They are trying to learn how to live more in tune with nature and to appreciate how "the Earth actually nurtures us and allows us to grow". They say that Paganism has changed the way in which they relate to the environment.

Flexibility of beliefs, not one true doctrine

A flexibility of beliefs, and an unmediated and democratic access to the sacred and to esoteric knowledge, were seen as particularly important in Paganism. In many ways individual disagreements over belief do not seem to matter much. Christianity and

particularly monotheistic traditions were frequently contrasted to this and portrayed as rigidly dogmatic, hierarchical, patriarchal, and authoritarian religions.

Pagans describe traditional religions as systems that on the one hand bind people to certain beliefs and set ways of religious practice, and on the other hand define non-acceptable beliefs and practices. This kind of classification into approved and non-approved beliefs is seen as an unnecessary source of prejudice and division. Dogmatism is seen by Pagans as a method that is built into these religions for the purpose of maintaining authority and exhorting social control. It is not seen as a particularly essential thing for any religion. For example, Danielle said that she does not like to be restricted like that, and suspects that

most of the mainstream religions are not intrinsically about belief or contact with the divine. I believe they are systems of social command and conditioning placed by those in power and then validated by the justification that 'God says so' to keep them secure.

This is the reason, in her view, why the patriarchal monotheistic religions are against change. It would destabilise their basis of power. In addition to supporting an established power-base, dogma is also a claim of superiority of one opinion over others, and it restricts free thinking. Kenneth, for example, sees the fixing of a body of dogma into a written form as problematic in culturally diverse contexts and with the fast increase of human knowledge and understanding. It divides people into those who believe in the "True Doctrine" and those who do not, and when there are fast changes in societies and in human understanding of the world, it soon becomes outdated even in the eyes of some of the believers, becoming more and more difficult to defend.

Harshest comments against traditional religions were about giving religious education to young people. The view was that because young children are incapable of the abstract thinking needed for understanding religious concepts, the narratives told to them amount to emotional indoctrination. This primes children at a young age to follow certain

patterns of thought and to avoid others, which can cause stress and trauma when the reality as it is observed and experienced does not conform to this dogma, or when other people and views challenge it later in life. According to Beth, there are people who reactively move into Paganism as a result of this kind of indoctrination and trauma. Paganism is attractive to these people because it is the antithesis to the beliefs, religion, or dogma of childhood that was enforced on them, but in the worst case

you are talking about damaged individuals, you know, people who have gone through a lot of psychic, soul damage through that religion. They seek Paganism out as a solution, and unfortunately, on these levels, beliefs and spirituality should not be seen as what is going to cure. They may be part of the cure, but they are not the cure, you know, because that has to come from within.

In Kenneth's view Paganism does not have this kind of dogma or orthodoxy, or one book to follow. This view is shared by many Pagans. There is considerable flexibility of beliefs within Paganism, and no authority whose claim to ultimate knowledge would be taken seriously by all other – or even most – Pagans. Gary said that

one of the things that attracted me to Paganism was that I am allowed to have my own feelings about it, you know, there are people within Paganism who would say that 'this is the way to do it' but there are a far greater number who say that, 'well, I do it this way, and you do it that way'. Down here we try to promote the idea that we don't do it wrong, we just do it different.

Gary talks about wanting to understand the mechanisms of how things work, and about forming an opinion that is based on acquired knowledge rather than the received wisdom of others. In his view, "each individual puts their little bit in, which makes up the whole", and because of this incremental way of increasing human understanding the disagreements are an essential part of being a Pagan. He said that "if we are all exactly the same, then we become like Christianity. We would all be saying what somebody else thought, and learn nothing new." Similarly James said that for him the whole point of being a Pagan is wanting to understand things by oneself, a will to have knowledge and understanding based on direct experience rather than belief in something that is told by others or described in books. For James and Gary spirituality does not rely on consensus. The individual is the

ultimate authority on their own religion or spirituality, and it is not necessary to agree with others.

However, within that, there are also people who are looking for a more structured form of Paganism. For example John, who sees that continuity, predictability, and sense of familiarity comes from having guidelines to follow, structure and hierarchy, and people to look up to who have higher degrees than you. For John, these encourage and strengthen the fellowship of the community one is committed to. Beth too is attracted to a more structured form of Paganism because it suits her best. She says that in her path initiations are important because it is kind of a mystery religion, and it is not meant to be open to everybody who has Pagan leanings. However, John and Beth were careful to point out that this is a matter of personal choice, and that this kind of structure is not necessarily what the majority of Pagans nowadays look for.

Homecoming

The themes of interconnected personhood and flexibility of beliefs are combined in one recurring theme in the interviews. In literature and in my interviews the often repeated phrase is that “I was a Pagan even before I knew there is such a thing as Paganism.”

Kenneth says that this organic and intuitive way of discovering Paganism gives validity to one’s beliefs. Danielle recalls that when she was young she

felt that the trees, the sky, the wind had life, that the beasts and all of nature was ensouled, that the sunset is its own music and to walk by the sea is to be in the presence of the divine. It is this truth that has made Paganism my home.

For her Paganism is just a way of living. Similarly, Frida said that you don’t really think about it, it’s just who you are, and it comes from the inside. Paganism is something that people arrive at intuitively. Joanna told me the story of her first encounter with Paganism. It was during the 60s. She was working as a Sunday school teacher because she had a deep religious philosophy and felt that educating children to spirituality was vitally important.

Then a friend of mine wanted to get involved in witchcraft, and I believed all the rubbish I had read about it, and went along to save her soul. I came out the other side of meeting the people who call themselves witches realising that here was a philosophy that made actual sense. And instead of going against Christianity, it tied in with Christianity.

She was not out there looking for a new religion or a change. After all, she was a Christian religious educator, and her purpose for meeting the witches in the first place was to “save their souls”. For her, Paganism complemented her already strong religiosity by making more sense than Christianity. Paganism was a reluctant discovery also for Beth. She was brought up as a Christian and, even though she was not entirely happy with it, she was not thinking about changing religion. Beth was introduced to literature on Paganism by her mother who was interested in alternative spirituality, and later she was introduced to some Pagans near where they lived. After some hesitation, she decided to accept the invitation to take part in a ritual. She describes the experience like this:

The first circle was the proverbial homecoming, this is what I was meant to do. It is like putting on a really fabulous piece of clothing, and finding that it folds perfectly, and feels good on your skin, and you look into a mirror and you are all glowy and shiny. And that's how I felt, you know, and that's how I still feel after 28 years when I go into a circle.

Joanna's and Beth's stories suggest that not all Pagans can be categorised as religious seekers. Beth was not actively looking for a new religion, even though she was in some undefined way unhappy with Christianity. For her the concrete experience of a Pagan ritual triggered a strong emotional reaction she describes as a feeling of homecoming, and a realisation of meaning for her life. Even though Beth had been convinced for many years that she was a Christian, things changed for her, like for Joanna, not through learning, but intuitively through the experience of meeting like-minded people. Nonetheless, some discover Paganism as a result of actively looking for something that would make more sense to them. For example, Fred said that

I was raised a Christian, but since an early age could make no sense of it. It was not logical and no one had proper answers to my questions. I studied and physically experienced most Christian paths looking for one that made sense. None did. I did the

same for other religions, like Buddhism and Hinduism, and even though some attracted and interested me more than Christianity, there was still something missing.

Fred was unhappy with the view of the world Christianity presented to him, and started to look for alternatives. He ended up with Paganism because it made cognitive and intuitive sense to him. Something that he could not verbalise was missing in Christianity and present in Paganism. Paganism felt right to him because it made more sense than traditional religions and was emotionally more fulfilling. As was discussed above, people who are attracted to Paganism do not want to be told how to worship. In Kenneth's words "the way the person perceives the world is directly upon themselves rather than mediated through some kind of priest or governing body". This is first and foremost a democratic view of religion. Frank says that

unlike all other religions we do not have any holy things, or people that are holier than anyone else, and that is the attraction of Paganism for people. The fact that no one tells you what to do, but instead all you have to do is use common sense.

Pagans are seen as capable of making decisions for themselves and Paganism is about personal choices, with no priest acting as intermediary.

Discussion

The interviews helped clarify the context in which the particular kind of values and views of interpersonal relations have developed. Together the interview responses and the survey results can be related to the social intuition model of morality and post-materialist value change; they indicate a need for revisions in religious change models. Paganism appears to attract people on both cognitive and emotional levels. People want to make up their own mind about life, the universe and everything based upon what feels right and makes sense to them, but they also want to have their interpretations legitimised.

As Geertz's view of the nature of religions suggests, Paganism is "a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations" which are then legitimised by "formulating conceptions of a general order of

existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic” (Geertz 1966, pp. 89–119). In response to the question I posed in the beginning of this chapter, I posit that the topics that emerged in the interviews together promote an egalitarian ethos.

Firstly, what can be seen as an irony of Pagan altruism compared to the Christian groups, is the Wiccan Rede. While apparently promoting self-interest, the Rede actually expects much from the individual. Both parts of the Rede are individual oriented, the person is active in both parts of the Rede (harm none ... do as you will) whereas the more usual form of the Golden Rule “do unto other as you would have them do unto you” juxtaposes the individual against “others” – a number of people. Even though it is usually read as encouraging people to do good, the Rule also implies a threat in case of wrongdoing, and positions the individual at the mercy of these other people. In effect, with the reciprocal set-up the Golden Rule encourages strong-tie networks and conventional morality whereas the Pagan version of the Golden Rule – the strong emphasis on individual freedom with responsibility – resembles the concept of post-conventional morality. Pagans frequently refer to their rituals as “work”, with the goal of personal growth and learning. They are neither service nor sacrifice to their gods. Their view is that learning how to be responsible by themselves rather than by following given norms is a more rewarding and effective way to grow as an ethical and moral individual. This is a conscious effort to activate the private reflection process of moral judgement. It is a move away from conventional morality – which would provide the rules, laws, and behavioural norms – into the difficult realm of having to learn for oneself. Because of the natural human disposition to develop systems of co-operation, the development of post-conventional morality is facilitated by exposure to diversity.

Secondly, a loose conception of community requires more attention: the links between individuals cannot be taken for granted. Community is not something Pagans

often mentioned when talking about Paganism. Instead, when talking about being part of a greater whole, the greater whole usually transcends community and society, referring to the whole of humanity and nature. This explains why Pagans emphasise Universalism more than Benevolence. According to Cohen (1985) the two things usually suggested by “community” are that the members think they have something in common with each other and that this shared thing distinguishes them significantly from other people. The search for “community” is generally motivated by the human need of relatedness (Reeve 2001, pp. 105–109), but community appears to be more like a network for Pagans. It is a method to form links to others, gain feelings of belonging and validity, but to some extent it also helps to define one’s identity in relation to others. Furthermore, Pagans are actually a relatively homogeneous group when it comes to value priorities, and the majority of Pagans emphasise a rather well-defined egalitarian and independent modality of interpersonal relations.

Finally, the important things for Pagans are grounded in the ideal of individual freedom that is generally the paradigm of the post-industrial Western societies. The third theme in the category of important things, under the subheading “Joy of life, self-expression, and personal development” matches Inglehart’s self-expression value pattern and Schwartz’s Self-direction, Stimulation and Hedonism value types. However, as was seen in the interviews, these are combined with an ethos of respect for others, extended to include not just the in-group but all of humanity and nature. What is common for Pagans is values that prioritise Openness to change and Universalism, and it is this combination of values that also sets them apart from the mainstream population. The apparent heterogeneity of the Pagan movement comes from the varying legitimations – beliefs and worldviews – individual Pagans have for these values, and it may be that this heterogeneity is only apparent because we – as researchers studying religion – have been trained to make distinctions based on these differences.

Pagan identity is linked to a shared value base in the way Hoggett sees identity linked to an intentional community of an elective group (Hoggett 1997, pp. 7–8), rather than in the way identity is linked to a collective that is defined by, for example, a place of origin, nationality, or a set of shared symbols, as in Anderson's imagined communities (Anderson 1983). In other words, a defined identity is not essential for Pagans, but is more like a utility. Looseness of collective identity is precisely what makes Paganism attractive in contexts in which individuals are more likely to have a composite rather than a culturally determined identity (Cohen 1982; Hall 1992). That kind of identity may be advantageous in pluralistic societies, because it creates a broader base for the individual to interface with other people, and less motive to segregate groups of people. It seems that Pagans are individuals who do not need the security brought by the sense of consensus and conformity to a shared worldview and clear us–them boundaries. Even more important may be the support Paganism offers for composite identities. The lack of means for a clear definition and the consequent lack of an encompassing boundary in Paganism shifted the focus in the interviews from talking about boundaries and community to talking about social interactions, concrete relationships between individuals, and a recognition of the innate human need to cultivate these relationships.

To sum up the answer to the question posed for this chapter: the prevalence of the egalitarian mode in the Pagan group is an adaptation to the particularly heterogeneous context the Pagan movement provides for people. This view is supported by the participants who recognise the diversity of Paganism as beneficial for increasing tolerance. For example, George said that “You learn to understand different cultures in Paganism, you see other paths.” In general he sees that “Pagans are this tolerant kind of folk towards other people, so that is how it has changed me, made me more tolerant.” The ability to exist in diversity and the inclination to not only tolerate, but also expect differences in

people was seen as one of the defining features of Paganism, which in Fred's view "can function perfectly in diversity". The heterogeneous context combined with the will to learn and to work on personal development makes Paganism a good framework for the development of and support for post-conventional morality.

The timeline of the emergence and growth of the Pagan movement fits the theory of post-materialist value change. However, this is generally true with the emergence of new religious and new social movements. Robert Wuthnow suggests that the 1960s had a dramatic impact on American spirituality because of the way social reform and civil rights movements of the time influenced young people's views. He argues that the new-found freedoms questioned white middle-class male definitions of who God was, and made the search for the sacred more uncertain (Wuthnow 2003). Ronald Hutton observes that the time from the late 1970s until the late 80s is like the coming of age period for modern Pagan witchcraft in Britain, as evidenced by organisational developments and a growing number of Pagan publications in that period (Hutton 1999, pp. 369–374). This timeframe also came up in several interviews as some kind of a watershed. The early 60s was a time when the post-world-war generation that predominantly embraced post-materialist rather than materialist values were in their late teens or early twenties, but on a societal scale they were still a minority. This started to change in the 80s and 90s. The recollections of the participants indicate that the changes seem to have happened mostly from the late 80s onwards and particularly since the mid to late 90s.

As a framework for legitimating an individual's values, motives, and actions, Paganism is markedly different from Christianity and other traditional religions. Pagans often use Christianity as an example of things they do not agree with. It may be argued that in many cases they operate on a stereotypical and unfair understanding of Christianity, which after all has also evolved and encompasses a diverse selection of groups and religious interpretations. However, it doesn't matter whether their assessment of

Christianity is theologically or empirically correct or not. The point is that that is their image of it, and it indicates their motives, or views of what is wrong with traditional religions, and these views can illuminate the nature and causes of religious change.

6. Restyling religion: from moulds to trellises

Religious Studies scholars have recently been exercised about the meaning and use of the term 'religion' (in the same way that other Anthropologists worried about the meaning of 'culture'). The inherited 'world religions' approach mistook religions for objects with certain qualities and boundaries, and upon which different external and internal forces then impose influence. More recent approaches to the lived realities and vernacular practice of religion may be advanced by engagement with the Actor-Network theory approach. Thus, in this chapter, I employ Latour and others' concept of quasi-object as a non-entity, non-object model of religion (Latour 1993; Law 1992; Harman 2009). I formulate a revised theory of what has been observed as religious change and secularisation. In this formulation, the declining and emerging religions are seen as representing two different types of legitimating frameworks for individuals' values.

6.1. The undeniable decline of traditional religious belonging

Despite the current trend of talking about the re-emergence of religion in the public sphere, membership of Christian churches is declining, and other indicators also point to a steady

decline in belief, belonging, and participation in traditional religions (Crockett & Voas 2006; Kosmin, et al. 2009). In Finland and Ireland, belonging to the Church has been an integral part of national identity, and until the 1980s membership has been relatively stable, with about 90% of the population identifying with the majority Church. Since the early 90s, however, in both countries Church membership has started to decline at an increasing rate (Kääriäinen, et al. 2005; Central Statistics Office 2007). Other changes have also been noticed, such as increasing religious pluralism partially caused by immigration and partially by the emergence of a number of different Christian denominations and new religious movements. These changes are slowly turning Finland and Ireland into religiously pluralistic societies, more like the UK is today.

The falling Church membership and attendance numbers have had the effect of stimulating public discussion on the role of religion and Church in the societies, seemingly increasing the public and media visibility of religion. Public discussion about religion has also increased because of media-attractive campaigns that promote secularism and aim to separate Church and State. For example, from the beginning of 2004 it has been possible in Finland to leave the Church by e-mail. To bring this to public knowledge the Freethinkers of Tampere launched an internet service in November 2003 in order to facilitate the Church-leaving process. The service includes information and statistics on Church membership in Finland, a calculator for estimating the amount of Church tax individuals pay out of their salary, and a simple form that people can use to send the e-mail notification to the authorities (Freethinkers Tampere 2003). By mid September 2009 162,224 individuals (about 2,300 per month) had used the service. This has been reported in the media as a major reason for the massive decrease in Church membership in Finland. In Ireland, a similar campaign, called “Count Me Out”, was started in July 2009 by three individuals (Count Me Out 2009). Like the Freethinkers of Tampere, they also campaign for the separation of Church and State, and for curbing the influence of Church in

educational institutions. By mid September 2009, 2,420 individuals had used the service. In the UK a de-baptism campaign was launched in 2004 by the National Secular Society to criticise the practice of baptising infants who are too young to consent to religious rites. According to their website, their de-baptism certificate has been downloaded over 100,000 times by September 2009 (National Secular Society 2004).

These campaigns are aiming at the formation and promotion of secular societies. The numbers, particularly in Finland, suggest a significant decline in identification with the traditional religious institutions. This is partly because people have a secular worldview, but they also have more varied reasons for leaving the Church. According to statistics collected by the Freethinkers in Finland, in the first half of 2009 38% left the Church because of the tax collected from Church members (1 to 2% of personal income depending on the municipality), 22% left because of a lack of faith, 14% because they feel that the Church has become separated from the teachings of the Bible, 9% because they were disappointed by the Church's activities, 8% said that faith does not need the Church, and 7% left because of inequality and intolerance within the Church (Freethinkers Tampere 2009). Some people leave because they think the Church has become too secular, some feel that it is not operating according to their values, some do not need religious institutions for their personal faith, and others feel that they are not getting their money's worth in the services.

The emergence and popularity of these and other similar campaigns and the varied reasons individuals give for leaving the Church highlight two points that are important for my thesis. First, the intrinsic value of conforming to the norm of belonging to the Church has diminished rapidly. Secondly, an increasing secular-rational worldview is not the only religious change process taking place in these countries. Some people are rejecting the traditional religion in favour of a more personal religious or spiritual path. I argue that the

individuals' relationship to, and motives for, involvement in religious organisations has changed, and this change is fundamental and irreversible.

Even though an increasing secular-rational worldview may be one result of this process, it is more appropriate to talk more generally about value change than about secularisation or religious change. A significant process behind these changes is the loosening of the collective norms that have kept Church membership high; in other words, a decline in Security, Tradition, and Conformity values. I use the concept of quasi-object in order to distance the study of "religious" change from the idea of objective religion and focus it more on processes that are related to what people do with religions, or, rather, what religions do for them.

6.2. Religion as a quasi-object

Sociological models such as the secularisation, de-secularisation and spiritual revolution theories, are based on an idea that "culture" and "nature" are two separate domains.

Human culture is believed to be a diverse domain of alternative interpretations, viewpoints, or discourses, whereas the natural world is that of unity and objective reality. Furthermore, religion is assumed to belong essentially to one of the domains. Therefore these models explain changes as either changing cultural trends (i.e., religious change), as changes in the human understanding of the reality of the natural domain (i.e., secularisation), or as a reformulation of somehow forgotten knowledge of some fundamental natural reality (i.e., resurgence of religion).

Actor-Network theory: bridging the objective–subjective divide

The two-domain model has been criticised, most notably by Latour (1993). He sees it as a misguided project that is based on a modernist ideal separating human culture as a pure domain from the domain of nature, which is the observable reality. He maintains that there is no pure and separate domain of objective nature filled with genuine realities and a

subjective cultural sphere filled with fabricated fictions. Not everything that is real is in the domain of nature and not everything that is constructed is in the domain of culture. Instead, everything is in between the two domains. There is a single plane of *actors* that encompasses “neutrinos, stars, palm trees, rivers, cats, armies, nations, superheroes, unicorns, and square circles”. All objects are treated in the same way; an actor is anything that has an effect on other things (Harman 2009, p. 189). An Actor-Network is progressively constituted and re-constituted in negotiations between human and non-human actors. It links together actors such as religious symbols, standing stones, priests, narratives, hedgehogs, crystals, planets, and churches.

The Actor-Network theory is not a theory in the sense that it would explain how anything works. It is just a model or a way to conceptualise complex social or technical processes in a way that avoids the nature–culture, or objective–subjective division. In that way it avoids suggesting objective reality for some things while not for others, and agency for some things while not others. To view something as an Actor-Network is therefore a process-oriented view, focusing on translation as the process in which actors construct common meanings and definitions, and co-opt each other in the pursuit of individual and collective goals. For example, a religious symbol may co-opt a narrative to give it meaning, or an institution may co-opt a symbol to legitimate its authority. In this process the identities of the actors are defined and redefined according to prevailing strategies of interaction (Wolf & Fukari 2007, pp. 23–24).

An Actor-Network does not have to be internally coherent; what matters is that each connection between two actors is successfully and continually negotiated. When all these heterogeneous actors interact successfully and continue to do so, the Actor-Network becomes stable. A function of this kind of stable Actor-Network is an artefact, such as religion in this case, which is by nature a quasi-object. The *quasi* should be read as indicating a lack of solidity, or essence, and the *object* as an indication of object-like

internal integrity: a quasi-object resists deconstruction into pristine parts (Harman 2009, pp. 63–64).

The important point is that in order for the quasi-object religion to exist in any practical sense rather than disbanding into just a collection of disparate things, the Actor-Network must function. First, the actors must translate – alter in a meaningful way – the flow of information in the Actor-Network. If an actor fails to do that and it no longer makes a difference it becomes just an intermediary; the Actor-Network would function just as well without it. When an actor fails that way, the topography of the Actor-Network changes, and because the quasi-object religion is a function of the Actor-Network, it also changes. Secondly, the connections must continue to be relevant and meaningful for the actors so that they can be constantly re-negotiated. Failing this, the Actor-Network stops functioning and does not produce the quasi-object religion any more. In either case, a new Actor-Network may emerge, which might become stable and produce a different quasi-object artefact. Or, the things that made up the Actor-Network may become just an arbitrary collection of loose items. In other words, despite the apparent stability, Actor-Networks are not fixed. Their dynamic nature comes from the continuous negotiation of connections between actors.

This theory is relevant for religious studies that deal with various objects, such as symbols, idols, and images that have been imbued with the power to make a difference, and various abstract concepts that have been given objective status. For the study of religious change this model circumvents the need for grand theories, essentialist definitions of religion, or arbitrary contrasts such as religion and spirituality. It is open to several scenarios where new networks emerge out of existing ones, and the outcomes are like those suggested by the traditional religious change and secularisation models. These include 1) secularisation of societies and of individuals' worldviews when actors such as symbols, institutions, and narratives no longer translate information and thereby make a

difference for society or for the individual; 2) privatisation of religion when connections to actors such as social and political institutions can no longer be negotiated because of a changing strategy of interaction, such as a move from collectivistic to individualistic modes of interaction; and 3) emergence of new-religions through change, expansion, or a total restructuring of the Actor-Network by connecting with new actors and disconnecting some of the old ones.

Complexity

The revised model of religious change is based on viewing religions as quasi-objects and this introduces several sources of complexity to the model. First, some of the features of the Actor-Networks that produce a quasi-object religion are constrained: determined, and motivated by universal properties of human physiology and common features of our environments. The strategies of interaction between actors are influenced by the way humans relate to the environment as embodied entities with certain physiological, emotional, and cognitive needs (Lakoff & Johnson 1999). Furthermore, the curious, creative, and inventive mind-brain is capable of postulating connections between human and non-human actors, and this propensity makes humans effective religion-constructing organisms (Mithen 1996). Together these can give the appearance that there is a universal human propensity and need for religion, but this mistakes the effect for the cause. This mistake is responsible for the prevailing objectivist concept of religion.

Secondly, the quasi-object religion does not have an essence that could be seen as an absolute meaning or definition. Instead, the meaning is generated in the negotiations between the actors, is never fixed, and is stable only in so far as the negotiations are successful. This causes problems for the functional and substantial definitions of religion as well as for models explaining religious change. Our relation to the environment and our needs – or more specifically the needs that are subjectively most relevant – are influenced

by socio-economic factors. Variability in these causes variability in the prevailing strategy of interaction between the actors, effectively transmuting the composition of the quasi-objects. It may be possible to find broadly predictable patterns in the effects of socio-economic changes on the quasi-object religion, but there is considerable complexity involved.

The third source of complexity, and confusion, is what can be called the false perception of continuity. It confounds the first two sources of complexity. Beckford (2003) sees recycling as the basis of what he calls the theory of conservation of religious matter. In his view, when high emphasis was placed on cultural and social norms and traditions, these traditions and norms contained the necessary explanations and orientation guides so that individuals could find meaning from them. However, "the declining authority of religious institutions leaves individuals exposed to the need to make their own sense of their lives" (Beckford 2003, p. 56). The decline of tradition has taken away the inherited explanations and expectations, effectively making the old strategies of interaction irrelevant and therefore the whole Actor-Network defunct. When recycled, the religious matter that was co-opted in the Actor-Network following certain strategies of interaction is put to new uses, and this gives an illusion of continuity. However, the way the religious matter is co-opted in the new emerging Actor-Network is different because of the varying prevailing strategies of interaction, or different individual and collective goals.

Together these sources of complexity reveal a quasi-object religion that is not entirely socially constructed but nevertheless is not an objective fixed structure. Religion is neither inherently social nor is it inherently psychological. It is a hybrid that cannot be divided or reduced into social or psychological components without acknowledging the other.

Evidence from data and implications for the study of religions

The observations made so far lay the groundwork for a revised model of religious change.

First, while to a large extent universal, the prioritisation of human needs are related to the individuals' socio-economic context. This was observed in Chapter 3 as the parallel trajectories of change for all mainstream groups. Whether highly religious or non-religious, none of the mainstream groups retained the same value pattern from cohort to cohort. Instead, all these groups followed a path of increasingly individualistic and egoistic values. Such a trajectory is predicted when basic existential security improves while societies also become progressively more competitive. This trajectory also indicates that traditional religion is not relevant for the younger cohorts as a support for their actual motives and priorities; the priorities of the younger cohorts are increasingly different from what the traditional religions purport to emphasise. The religiously most active group retained relatively high Conservation values suggesting that traditional religions may be relevant to people as traditions and as collective identity, as well as symbols for values they would like to hold, but not as a support for the values they actually hold and that motivate their actions.

Secondly, from cohort to cohort the Pagan group retained the same alternative value pattern that combines individualism with altruism. This indicates that a personally meaningful worldview can make a difference in people's values in the altruism–egoism dimension. Furthermore, it may be necessary to have some kind of personally salient framework in order to legitimise different kinds of priorities in a competitive social context that otherwise supports and promotes increasing egoism. In the Pagan case this kind of framework develops at the grassroots level rather than being obtained ready-made from some source. The interviews revealed that individuals are empowered to make a change for themselves. They are supported by a network of like-minded individuals, and given advice when needed, but not taught by a guru-like character. The prime movers in this

development are the interactions between people who are working towards similar goals. This is in line with the social capital model that highlights the value of social networks (e.g., Putnam 2000), and the grassroots approach has been shown in several fields of research to invest the individual with a feeling of ownership of the solutions, thereby making the solutions more sustainable.²⁰ This may be essential for the salience and personal meaningfulness of the framework.

Thirdly, it is necessary to look through the illusion of continuity. Even though religions may go by the same name and utilise the same symbols and narratives, when people's priorities change they employ religion for different purposes. For example, instead of providing security through a strong-tie community made possible by conforming to its norms and following its tradition, religion may be a part of an individual's composite identity and provide social networks composed mainly of weak ties. Recycling religious matter creates a new kind of quasi-object, even if the religious matter looks familiar. Similarity does not mean continuity.

As a solution for seeing through the illusion, and in order to be sensitive to different individual and collective objectives that a religion may serve, I proposed abandoning the essentialist, or entity view of religion that is underlying the World Religions –paradigm, where some religions are seen as textbook examples against which others are measured. Instead of defining religion as an independently real object with certain properties, such as origins, important people, texts, particular beliefs, or features of cosmology, one should look at what people do with religion, and how they talk about it (Harvey 2010). What actors – human and non-human – are involved, how do they translate information, and how are the connections between actors negotiated?

Actor-Networks that work with different prevailing strategies of interaction have different topographies. They have various constellations of actors connected by different

²⁰ For example, child development (Daniel, et al. 2010), development co-operation (Stiles 2000), and human resource management (Werner & DeSimone 2008).

kinds of connectors. Therefore, a way to study this complex process is to focus attention on the differences in the strategies of interaction. This is the significant input of Actor-Network-Theory for the study of religions that is most relevant to the present study. Further, the motive for using different language is the need to make explicit the transfer of agency from reified religions – and the particular beliefs, dogma, rules, and narratives embodied in these – to the individuals and other things that are invoked in the Actor-Networks. For this reason the different ways people use religion are more important than what people believe in. Such as, for example, how the Wiccan Rede – ostensibly a self-serving statement – is seen as an advice to learn responsibility.

6.3. Two ways to use religion

Previous research has indicated that a major division in motivational values is the difference between collective security values and individualistic self-expression values, and this is also supported by the present study. This leads to a model that postulates two fundamentally different strategies of interaction, or ways the quasi-object religion can be relevant as a legitimating framework for the individual.

Religion as a template

In one model the interaction is oriented towards security, conformity, and tradition. Like a mould it provides security by giving form and clear prescribed norms for a community, acting like a template for behaviour and belief. One aspect of the basic human need for security is need for the kind of certainty or existential security that comes from a clear meaning and explanation for life. This need motivates a strategy that aims to create, maintain, and strengthen a belief that the quasi-object religion is a real object and therefore capable of providing such security. For this strategy to be successful the constellation of actors – what actors are included, how they are connected to each other, and how the non-human actors are supposed to mediate information – must be somehow fixed.

Institutionalised religions are successful because they have been able to fix the constellation of actors over a long period of time and have developed elaborate methods for maintaining it.

The styles of talking about actors and connections reflect and advance this strategy. This is achieved, for example, by portraying the topography of the Actor-Network as prescribed and narrated in a special and exclusive tradition, and then privileging the network by including a clause that in order to get the benefits (i.e., security, certainty) one must conform to the set beliefs, including the objectivity of the quasi-object. This produces a set of parameters for the quasi-object, and limits the acceptable deviance from them. It provides standards to follow and exemplary narratives and allegories as guides, abstract rationalisations as legitimations, and it has a system of punishments and rewards as stick-and-carrot motivators. When this strategy is successful the function of the Actor-Network produces a stable quasi-object that has the appearance of a real object. For the individual this kind of quasi-object religion is what Heelas and Woodhead call life-as-religion, which emphasises “a transcendent source of significance and authority to which individuals must conform” (Heelas & Woodhead 2005, p. 6).

Template-type legitimating frameworks are built on a collectivist mode of interpersonal relations with the purpose of binding the in-group together. Motivational values, such as Benevolence, are legitimised as a function of the Actor-Network, by the laws, commandments, and norms that are part of the quasi-object religion. These legitimations are tied to the continued working of the Actor-Network, and if that fails the laws and commandments that legitimate the values cease to be meaningful to individuals. Because of this, it is not surprising that Tradition and Conformity are value types that are strongly emphasised by these types. They are essential for the perpetuation of the Actor-Network. As a consequence of these links between the collectively oriented values, altruism becomes associated with collective orientation and conversely individualism with

egoism. For this reason template-type religion is unable to legitimise a value pattern that would link post-materialistic individualism with altruism. Nor does it support the development of post-conventional morality that would also operate in pluralistic and global contexts. The principle of post-conventional morality is that it transcends local conventions and boundaries, and templates are precisely that: local conventions and boundaries that define the privileged in-group. Prescriptive template-type frameworks are good for the conservation of a community and conventional morality, but bad for pluralism and post-conventional morality.

The upshot of the social value change is, therefore, that in a post-materialistic and multicultural context, a template-type religion has a limited functionality compared to what it has had before in a homogeneous and more security-oriented society.

Religion as a trellis

In the other model, interaction is oriented towards self-expression and individuality. Unlike a mould, it does not give shape, but instead it offers tools for individuals, enables them to use these in ways that suit different needs and purposes, and legitimises the resulting multitude of ways to co-opt religious matter. In this study contemporary Paganism is used as an example of a framework that gives legitimacy to the post-materialistic value pattern, linking it to individualistic, egalitarian and interconnected views of personhood. However, there are other examples; the recycling of religious matter causes an illusion of continuity of traditional religions, but, as I argued above, this illusion can hide fundamental differences. Forms of Christianity that emphasise personal experience have emerged and these may also be trellis-type rather than template-type frameworks. Similarly, a loose interpretation of Christianity, such as that promoted by the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Church, allows space for alternative interpretations and creative combinations of Christian and other traditions, such as, for example, belief in reincarnation rather than heaven and

hell, and in a feminine rather than masculine God. A trellis-type framework is not particular about its boundaries. It allows the harvesting of traditions from different cultures for symbols and narratives that suit the individual. There can also be secular alternatives that provide legitimation for individuals' values, such as new atheism and secular humanism, and various social movements like the environmental, global democracy, and solidarity movements. Based on the value pattern of post-materialist society and the evidence from the surveys and interviews, I suggest some common features for the trellis-type legitimating frameworks.

First, there is no compartmentalisation of beliefs. Individual items of belief – such as belief in reincarnation, hell, god(s), afterlife, magic, and spirits – are separating from traditional constraints. These can be combined in more personalised ways. In other words, the connections and links between particular belief items and traditions are loosening and changing. Secondly, authority is dispersed and democratic. As far as democratisation is part of the social change process – and it is frequently seen as an integral part of it (e.g., Inglehart & Welzel 2005) – the prevailing ethos in the social context is that individuals have the right to choose and decide about things in life for themselves. However, this right to choose does not necessarily mean individualism; people can also choose to be a part of a tight community and to submit to external authority. Thirdly, communication focuses on creating connections rather than defining boundaries. Weak ties need more work to maintain, and they regularly defy traditional similarity-based boundaries, and because of this the norm of communication; in other words, the prevailing strategy of interaction has changed. Communication is more about connections than about separation because the need to connect is more urgent than the need to create boundaries between us and them. This tendency was also observed in the interviews as a lack of spontaneous reference to Paganism as a community separate from something else, and frequent references to

Paganism as a network that connects individuals and to individuals being part of some greater whole.

These three features lead to some important functional differences from a template-type religion. Generally, rather than having a prescriptive function as a provider of norms, easy explanations, and in-built comfort and consolation devices, the trellis-type framework enables individuals to develop norms, explanations, and comfort and consolation devices by allowing for creative combinations of beliefs and worldviews according to what is plausible for the individual.

6.4. A revised model of religious change

A revised model of religious change needs to focus on a level of abstraction that is above the distinction of religious and secular, and in processes rather than things. The variance and change in particular beliefs, institutional structures, practices, and in whether religion is private or collective, are trivial as the focus of a model of religious change. These can simply be expressions of individual preference. Instead, what people do with these is significant. Are they used as templates that prescribe appropriate behaviour or as trellises that enable the individuals to learn to live in a way that is in accordance with their values and appropriate for them in the social place they inhabit?

Why secularisation but not the secularisation thesis? The problem with the classical secularisation thesis is not that it is wrong about the effect of the Enlightenment, but because it assumes that that is the end of the story. It has been built upon an objectivist view of religions. Translated into the terms of the Actor-Network model, the premise of the secularisation thesis is that through modernisation and rationalisation religious things do not make a difference to the individual or the society any more, and therefore they cease to be actors, making the quasi-object religion defunct. However, because of the dynamic nature of the Actor-Networks, and the persistence of motives to reconstruct personally

necessary networks through creative combinations of actors, new quasi-objects will emerge. Nevertheless, an increasing number of actors co-opted in these may actually be secular alternatives to former religious ones, such as evolution replacing creation as the narrative explaining the origin of the multiplicity of life. These creative combinations do not mean the continuous re-invention of religion (Dawson 2004, pp. 68–98), but instead, a continuous re-negotiation of legitimating frameworks for individuals' values.

Why change but not spiritual revolution or religious change? The description Heelas and Woodhead give for a “life-as-religion” is a good definition of a traditional template-type framework, but their assessment of the change process is hampered by their desire to find clear classifications. The alternative to monopoly of “life-as-religion” is not necessarily spirituality, but a diversity of legitimating frameworks. New religions may emerge through restructuring or expanding the old Actor-Networks or through entirely new creative combinations of actors, and some of these may be template-type religions if that is what works for the individual. Some may be like the “holistic spirituality” types in Heelas and Woodhead's classification, but using the term “spirituality” may also create an illusion of similarity and continuity. For example, tarot and horoscopes can be rationalised as methods of lay-psychology, and as such they may be used as tools for introspection. Meditation can be a relaxation technique, yoga a combination of physical exercise and meditation, and using traditional forms of therapy with Western medicine can be justified as an acknowledgement that an individual's psychological and physiological welfare should be considered together.

Why not resurgence of religion? There has never been a more secular society, and according to indicators measuring template-type religiosity, societies are becoming steadily more secular, but, as I suggested above, this is not the whole story. Instead of assuming that there is an object to study, which has known features and which answers to some specific religious or spiritual need, attention should be on the nature of human needs,

the values people uphold to justify them, and the means by which they are legitimised. General psychological studies on human needs and values can provide tools for this. Instead of objective things, focus is therefore on processes of justification and legitimation, and the needs that motivate these. One must look at what people do with the observable things that are brought into this process, or rather, what these actors do for people as mediators in the Actor-Network.

From the process view, religious change has a slightly different character from what the previous models have suggested. Changes in the socio-economic context alter people's motivational values and these place different demands for a legitimating framework. Increases in human understanding, knowledge, and the globalisation of communication change the available resources for the formation of the quasi-objects. The contextual factors alter the composition of the frameworks, but they do not necessarily mean increasing rationality; the Actor-Networks that produce the quasi-objects do not have to be internally consistent or rational. It is enough that each connection is salient and that the actors mediate communication in a way that is meaningful to the individual. The frameworks are restyled as trellises because that is the way people use them. Neither type of religion is an objective thing; both are quasi-objects, but the strategy of interaction involved in templates tends to make them more self-perpetuating and gives them an object-like appearance.

I posit that new religions that have emerged during the latter half of the 20th century – including contemporary Paganism – are expressions of adaptations of worldviews on an individual level to the changing needs that emerge as a result of the substantial social and economic changes the advanced post-industrial societies have experienced. These changes prompt the emergence of new kinds of worldviews that can act as legitimating frameworks for a new value pattern. Ultimately this process may result in entirely individualistic

worldviews, but to the degree that people still need to form some kinds of collectives, common places must also be negotiated. This requires the openness and flexibility of worldviews so that they can integrate difference, and fluidity so that they can adapt to different situations and eventualities and still remain functional.

The case of contemporary Paganism

Contemporary Paganism has been successful because the heterogeneity of the movement has created incentives for the development and cultivation of egalitarian modalities of interpersonal relations, universalistic and individualistic priorities, and flexibility of beliefs. It has been necessary for Pagans to learn to accommodate many traditions and cosmologies, and not to impose personal views and values on others. Paganism is a diverse and loose enough framework to appeal to different kinds of people. Some look for things that make sense to them cognitively, others look for something that connects with their sensibilities. Their beliefs and practices vary, but particular beliefs, cosmologies, self-identifications and ways of religious or spiritual expression are secondary. More importantly, there is a certain way of seeing oneself in relation to others – and the world – which is linked to an individualistic-altruistic value pattern which the majority of Pagans share. Paganism is therefore a network, or elective community of individuals with similar values, and it acts as an indicator of their values and as a legitimating framework for these values. Within this network individual normative structures develop through private reflection processes, as well as through interactions with others. The label “Pagan” itself appears to act, in a kind of inverted Durkheimian way, not as a symbol for a community, but as a symbol for a vaguely understood but relatively coherent set of values that then attracts individuals by suggesting a framework of conceptions of a general order of existence to legitimate these values. As such it is therefore not primarily, but incidentally also acting as a form of connector between these individuals.

Paganism can be seen as a type of group or organisation that is characterised by collectively-oriented individualism, where group membership is an important factor not only for an individual's identity, but as a method of social self-orientation. This can be observed as a particular pattern of emphasis in Pagans' modes of interpersonal relations. Network theories have recognised the importance of weak ties, and point to a mechanism by which the principle of co-operation can function in post-industrial and pluralistic societies, and beyond strong kin and in-group ties. I have attributed the high tolerance of differences among Pagans to the plurality of expressions of personal religious or spiritual path or worldview, and a weak and largely undefined collective identity. The need for self-orientation in heterogeneous contexts may be what is at stake with the development of trellis-type legitimating frameworks. They offer orientation but do not impose untenable absolute and exclusive templates when there is an abundance of alternative templates.

The change is, therefore, a move from a system of symbols and conceptions of a general order of existence that in practice act as boundaries of survival and security, to those that in practice act as resources for identity and self-expression. It is a difference between elective conditions of association versus prescribed normative community. The new type of legitimating framework is "a form of sociation that reflects the topological complexity of identity politics rather than one that smoothes things out" (Hetherington 1998, p. 53).

Paganism appears to support the position that, while the modern world promotes greater individuation through its weakening of the tie of any imposed community, it also promotes elective and collective conditions of association that act to promote individuality as well as provide an intense experience of communion into which that individuality is subsumed (Hetherington 1998, pp. 95–99; Maffesoli 1996, pp. 20–28, 160–164).

Conclusion

Rather than resulting from modernisation, rationalisation or pluralisation, or a combination of these, religious change and secularisation are outcomes of the loss of relevance of the values promoted and supported by the traditional religions. Therefore, to answer my research question, the changing value priorities of the general population contribute significantly to the decline of traditional religions, the emergence of new religions, and the increasing appeal of a secular worldview. These are outcomes of one and the same process of change, which was identified by Norris and Inglehart (2004) as a move away from prioritising security and towards prioritising self-expression. This move causes a fundamental change in the role religion plays – or can play – in individuals' lives, and consequently in the kinds of legitimating frameworks that are relevant to them.

I have argued for the view that values are justifications for individuals' biological and psychological needs and that an operational "quasi-object religion" is a source of social support and legitimation for those individually made justifications. The values of Pagans closely match the post-materialist value pattern in all cohorts. In the other groups there is a cohort-to-cohort value difference, where the oldest people hold materialist values

emphasising security and the youngest hold fairly similar post-materialist values regardless of their religious association. From this I concluded that Paganism emerged as an answer to a need for a legitimating framework for values – such as individualism and self-expression – that were not supported by mainstream religions, and this may also be the case with other new religions.

Security, tradition, conformity – and bigotry?

The decline of traditional religions is sometimes seen as a social problem because of fears of a loss of certain kinds of values. Altruism is generally believed to be the core of these religious values; hence, a decline in traditional religiosity is feared to bring a decline in altruism. A quick look at empirical evidence gives the impression that this assessment is correct. Self-transcendence values are in steady decline from cohort to cohort in the three countries I studied. However, this decline follows the same trajectory in all the mainstream groups from non-religious to active Christians. The link between traditional religion and values is not found in the Self-transcendence to Self-enhancement dimension, but rather in the Conservation to Openness to change dimension. What distinguishes traditional religions is not their support for altruism but instead their support for conservation values. Strong traditional religiosity is associated with values that are connected with the maintenance of an in-group and the need for security. This is particularly apparent in the youngest cohort.

Even though Habermas (1990) and Featherstone (1991b) are optimistic about the effects of cultural and religious pluralism, the importance of the collectivistic self-identification aspect of traditional religion for the young generation can also be linked to an increasing plurality of the reality of individuals' lives. Social identity theory posits that individuals' self-categorisation is inherently variable and highly dependent on contextual shifts in frames of reference (Turner, et al. 1994). In multicultural and globally

interconnected societies these frames of reference are increasingly fluid. One cannot automatically assume that the views and values of the people with whom one comes into contact are the same as one's own. Therefore the assumption of shared values can no longer be used to define and consolidate social ties, and active participation in traditional religion can offer some compensation. Brewer and Gardner (2006) argued that when needs for security brought by predictability and familiarity, and intimacy brought by recognition of similarity at the interpersonal level, are not met, collective identities can become more important. When collective identities are more salient than individual identities, in-group-out-group categorisations can become the most important basis for evaluating others. This activation of collective identities lowers the threshold for perceived similarity and, they suggest, it would also increase reactivity to dissimilarity. Individuals are then more likely to respond to others in terms of simplified social categorisations, or stereotypes, and discriminate more strongly between similar and dissimilar others. In this way modernisation and pluralism can be seen to provide opportunities for fundamentalism (Herriot 2008, pp. 9–27).

This brings to mind James's acute observation in the interview, of fundamentalism and bigotry as the flip-sides of tradition and conformity. His observations are based on living in Catholic Ireland and experiencing bigotry and fundamentalism first hand. Egyptologist Jan Assmann (2010) looks for the roots of the use of religion as a divisive factor in the history of monotheistic religion. According to him the invention of the true god-false god dichotomy – by Moses in the Hebrew Bible – was the ultimate distinction between the in-group and the out-group. The consequence of this monotheistic revolution has been the exclusion, as heresy, of everything deemed incompatible with the truth it proclaims. In Assmann's view, the increased potential for bigotry and religiously motivated violence is the price we are paying for monotheism (2010, pp. 15–23). I put that in slightly different words in the last chapter. Much more broadly than just true versus

false gods, template-type frameworks are about one true way of being and making moral judgements based on that fixed model. This is what is being challenged in multicultural communities.

As Peter Beyer (1994) argued in his analysis of the effects of globalisation on religion, two kinds of interpretations of traditional religions are coming to prominence because of social value change: the fundamentalist and the liberal. Adding to Beyer's analysis, I suggest that this means that two kinds of value patterns motivate people's belonging to traditional religions. One underlines the collective nature of the religion and emphasises the specific qualities that separate the privileged in-group from others. The other downplays the separation by emphasising, for example, personal religious experience and individual virtues rather than the privileged nature of the collective. The value difference between the active and the passive Christian groups may hint at this division.

As a collective identity, fundamentalist Christianity, for example, has great opportunities in multicultural communities as a rallying flag, but to what extent can the liberal interpretation of Christianity work in real life? Beyer suggested that the dilution of traditional religion would lead to its eventual demise and I concur with that view. In a world where there are people who believe in many gods and goddesses, or none at all, the true-false dichotomy is not tenable in the long run. As Berger suggested (1967), it can lead to the bracketing of religion in social interactions, or different explanatory strategies can be used, such as viewing different religions as alternative expressions of the same core truth. In reality, however, it means constant challenges to one's beliefs, and – depending on the personality of the individual – reaction to these challenges can manifest as condescension, prejudice, or bigotry at a conscious or unconscious level. On the other hand, if religion is not significant to people any more, membership of traditional religious organisations can still stay high if these organisations are seen as culturally meaningful. However, in these cases the emotional disconnection of these organisations from the role of providing support

for individuals' values results in people looking elsewhere for this support. Therefore, even though in some cases social value change leads to a fundamentalist interpretation of traditional religions, in more and more cases the template-type religions with set true–false dichotomies are no longer relevant for people or helpful in their everyday interactions, and new kinds of frameworks have started to emerge.

Self-expression: selfish egoism or universalistic individualism?

The value change model described by Inglehart and others is based on the principle that individuals optimise their priorities to suit the need they experienced when growing up, emphasising tradition and conformity when insecure and self-expression when secure. To some extent this appears to be the case. However, that is only one dimension of human values. In the other dimension there appear to be two alternative routes for value change. One combines individualism with egoism and the other combines individualism with altruism.

Even though self-transcendence is still the highest priority for all mainstream groups, it is in decline. Similarly, increasing self-enhancement dominates the priorities of the mainstream population. The prevalent strategy of interaction is built on the same principle that helped build the highly developed and wealthy knowledge societies in the first place: competition. It looks like the real problem communities are facing is the lack of relevant mainstream frameworks that would support the association of altruism with individualism. I posit that this is fundamentally a problem of motivation and confused moral intuition. The networks of association that people have do not register in their moral intuition radar as communities worthy of group loyalty or suitable for reciprocal altruism. The reason for this may be the same as the reason why traditional religions have lost their relevance: the boundaries of community are no longer clear and definable in the way they have been in the past – in all likelihood throughout human evolution until recent times. If – as the social

intuition model of morality suggests – moral intuition is the elephant that the consciousness attempts to ride, it looks like the rider may need some new advice.

For my thesis the most important process in the social intuition model of morality is private reflection. It points to a rarely used capability of individuals to change the rules of moral reasoning independently of social persuasion processes. Traditional religions are institutionalised tools for moral justification. They work primarily through the processes of social and reasoned persuasion. Paganism represents a new type of tool that works primarily through the private reasoning process as well as the four core processes. I linked this process to the prevalence of symmetric social interactions, which is, I argued, higher for individuals who favour an egalitarian mode of social interaction. Trellises are better for the development of non-fixed moral reasoning because that is how morality works. Morality is not a quality or a content (as suggested when people say that someone is moral, or talk about the moral law), but social doing – a process of distributed reasoning (Haidt & Björklund 2008, p. 181).

The general sense of interconnectedness expressed by Pagans contributes to their higher emphasis on universalistic altruism, and that heterogeneity of the movement and exposure to differences in views motivate the negotiation of interests and views. This encourages private reflection on morality and as such aids the development of the kind of moral reasoning that is advantageous in pluralistic settings. This is not a new kind of moral intuition, but the old kind adapting to a changed context where kin, tribe, religion, and nation have been supplanted by a network that is potentially global in its scope, and qualitatively and quantitatively different from the boundaried collectives. The core of this idea is the human capacity to understand that other people also act intentionally, and the potential, which follows from this capacity, of understanding the interchangeability of perspectives. This is also the core of many better thought-through moral philosophies, and of the Golden Rule, which has been re-invented by numerous religions throughout history.

Concluding remarks

My intention was to identify differences between traditional religions and new religions in how they are connected with people's motivational values. However, because this study is limited to one particular new religion the results should not be seen as automatically transferable to others as well. When institutional constraints on religion are loosened multiplicity unfolds, and it is multiplicity rather than singularity that describes the contemporary religious landscape. Different motives attract individuals to different religions, and some look for moulds rather than trellises. Nevertheless, I maintain that the religions that are growing are those that support the post-materialist value pattern.

Social changes are not happening as a wholesale cultural transition. Instead, some attitudes, beliefs, and values change fast, while others are slow to change (Brewer & Chen 2007). This is problematic because the increasing value of individual autonomy and the simultaneous social diversification reduce the salience of relational – or strong-tie – collectivism and the Conservation values associated with it. The consequences of this process have been observed above, but to rephrase: the unit of reference for Conservation values is a traditional community and as the salience of these is declining, the kind of altruism that is linked with these values also declines. In a way, the highly heterogeneous Pagan movement has acted like a lab experiment, demonstrating that this does not have to be the case. From my findings I concluded that the route the mainstream population is following is caused by an abundance of salient frameworks that emphasise competition, and a lack of salient frameworks that emphasise tolerance of differences. Brewer and Chen (2007) suggest that unless there is a compensating increase in what they term “group collectivism”, the ongoing social changes will disrupt the established balance between individuals' self-interest and collective interests. To avoid the resulting social instability, they call for the establishment of effective regulatory mechanisms across political,

financial, and legal spheres in society. Unfortunately they do not proceed to suggest how to create and implement such mechanisms.

As a response and an alternative to their suggestion, I propose that rather than establishing top-down regulations, enabling and supporting the development of new frameworks of legitimation would be more effective. This can be achieved by allowing sufficient social space and support for the various kinds of grass-root movements that emerge as people look for alternative meaning-making worldviews and ways to interact across differences. As an example of such, Paganism appears to be well adapted to dealing with plurality, implying that diversity is an important element in the development of egalitarian modalities. Rather than being disconnected individualists or in-group bound collectivists, Pagans see themselves as interconnected based upon a more universalistic feeling of connectedness. This makes it easier for them to form connections that bridge differences between individuals and groups across cultural, religious, and social boundaries.

The findings of this study suggest that individuals' perception of self in relation to others has consequences on how they react to diversity. By offering frameworks that legitimate particular types of values and views of self in relation to others, different worldviews give people incentives to react differently when facing increasing numbers of people who look, act, talk, and believe in diverse ways and unlike themselves. These incentives can push people in different directions: either towards fundamentalist protection of the integrity of the beliefs and boundaries of one's in-group, or towards an increasing tolerance and the development of more inclusive and flexible ways to form and maintain connections between individuals. In both cases, diversity is needed to tip the balance, or to disturb the status quo. Fundamentalism needs the "Other"; it defines itself in opposition to the perceived threat. The growth of tolerance needs exposure to diversity in order for people to learn to navigate the differences by experience, possibly through trial and error.

If I had the opportunity to start my research again I would make some alterations to the data collection procedures. I learned that relatively low-cost web surveys were much more effective in reaching members of distributed organisations such as Pagans. Furthermore, I would use focus groups rather than individual interviews in order to stimulate more discussion. The paired interviews proved to be valuable because they did develop into discussions, and sometimes arguments and justifications of viewpoints between the participants. With a few focus groups of Pagans and a few groups representing the mainstream population I could have obtained comparative qualitative data. If I had infinite resources I would add other popular new religions, such as FWBO (Friends of the Western Buddhist Order), ISKCON (International Society for Krishna Consciousness) and Mata Amritanandamayi Mission (Mother Amma Mission), modern branches of traditional religions, such as Christian Science, Pentecostalism and Jehovah's Witnesses, and secular humanist and atheist organisations. Nevertheless, a strength of the methodology I chose is that using web-based surveys is easily deployable. It is transferable to studies focusing on a variety of groups – not just religious groups – and the material is already available in multiple languages. It is also a new approach in Religious Studies, providing quantitative information that has not been available before, and it provides a foundation for a database that can be incremented by subsequent studies.

Abduction as a logic of enquiry does not lend itself to straight and sure answers, but my findings indicate that the increasing difference between values supported by the traditional religions and individuals' motivational values is an important, if not the key factor in religious change, causing a loss of relevance of these religions to people. Further studies are needed to test the linkage between individuals' worldviews and their values, and I am looking forward to future opportunities in research projects or programmes that continue from where this study concludes.

Acknowledgements

Researching and writing this thesis has been the most significant academic challenge I have ever had to face. That much should really be obvious for all upon embarking on a PhD course, and I was certainly told so several times before I started. I was also advised to take up carpentry instead. I cannot sufficiently emphasise how truly grateful and indebted I am to Professor Michael York. One warm May afternoon in 2004, during our walk in Suomenlinna in Helsinki, he not only convinced me that I could do it, but also encouraged me to try doing it in England. Thank you, Michael, for that! That serendipitous chat started a new track in my life and brought me into contact with two brilliant and wonderful people. The more I get to know Graham Harvey and Marion Bowman the better I understand how truly lucky I am to have them as supervisors. They have supported me in so many ways that, in my blunt Finnishness, I do not find words to describe my gratitude. Most importantly they have believed in me, often more than I believed in myself. Thank you Graham and Marion. Operating in the “Friend” mode of interpersonal relations as well as in the “Supervisor” mode, you walked me through the unpleasant times, and guided me to some of the most wonderful experiences of my life.

I am also grateful to Professor John Wolffe for supporting me and for his kindness and calm advice when things looked bad. If I ever arise to professorhood, I know where to look for an exemplar. Likewise, Professor John Richardson; thank you for teaching me what I need to know about statistical analysis, and for your words of wisdom in how to carry out psychological surveys in real life. Professor David Wulff, your suggestions helped me position my research in the field of the psychology of religion, and your inspiration pointed me towards a path leading to interesting future projects, and thus motivated me to finish this one.

I received support from different institutions in various stages of this project. I thank Pro-Vice-Chancellor Professor Brigid Heywood of the Open University, The Finnish

Cultural Foundation, The Emil Aaltonen Foundation, The Donner Institute, and Jack Shand Foundation of the Society for Scientific Study of Religions.

Topi, you told me that there are such people as Pagans; thus pushing me down a rabbit hole to find a wondrous world I didn't know existed. Lydia, I owe you more than one pint of Guinness now, I think. Thank you for all the introductions. To all the participants in this research, who tolerated my strange and innocently stupid questions, I am truly grateful. Amy, co-stranger in the strange land, thank you for the long talks. Funny how time flew, eh? Finally, and most of all, I want to thank Maarit, my love, my beautiful and brilliant wife, for unfaltering support when I was falling, and for filling even the rainy days with joy. This is for you.

Appendix A, Ethics committee approval

MEMORANDUM

HUMAN PARTICIPANTS AND MATERIALS ETHICS COMMITTEE

From:	John Oates, Chair, HPMEC	Email:	j.m.oates@open.ac.uk
To:	Mika Lassander (PhD student, Religious Studies, Faculty of Arts)	Tel:	52395
CC:		Date:	13 August 2007
SUBJECT:	Ethics application: Pagan Communities Research Project	Ref:	HPMEC/07/#334/1

This memorandum is to confirm that the research protocol for the above-named research project, as submitted on 7th August 2007, is approved by the Open University Human Participants and Materials Ethics Committee subject to the following two recommendations.

1. The informed consent form should contain a further provision at the end of para.3 to say that the interviewee may also withdraw at any time and their interview data would then be destroyed.
2. The survey invitation form (as in point 1 above) should contain a further provision (after sentence 4 of para.3) to say that the interviewee may also withdraw at any time and their interview data would then be destroyed.

Please submit revised documentation for review so that full ethics approval can be progressed.

At the conclusion of your project, by the date that you stated in your application, the Committee would like to receive a summary report on the progress of this project, any ethical issues that have arisen and how they have been dealt with.

John Oates

Chair, OU HPMEC

Appendix B, Survey invitation letter

The Open University

Pagan Communities Research Project

Invitation to take part in a survey

This research is being undertaken in order to improve understanding about the changing nature of religion in the contemporary world. It specifically focuses on new forms of religious or spiritual associations.

This survey will explore what kinds of values you emphasise regarding the pagan groups, associations, or organisations you belong to or feel part of (called group in the questionnaire). It will also include some questions about you and your religious or spiritual path, however your name and contact information are not asked. The questionnaire will remain completely anonymous. I will use the information you provide in my ongoing research and publications (e.g. articles in academic journals, chapters in books, monographs, presentations to academic and non-academic audiences, and in non-academic writing). This survey information will not be released to any other individuals or organisations.

Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. Your identity will be kept strictly confidential, and no information will appear in any of the final material that would serve to identify you in any way. No harm will come to you, your family, or your associates from your participation in this research. If you are uncomfortable with any question in the questionnaire, please feel free not to answer it. If at any time you feel that you do not want to take part in this survey you can discard the survey material. But please try to answer all the questions. Fully completed forms are most valuable to me.

If you understand the description of the survey given above and agree to participate in this study, please fill in the survey questionnaire and return it to me in the self-addressed free-post envelope provided. This will be considered as a declaration of informed consent on your part to take part in this survey.

If you have any questions or concerns regarding this project, you can contact me at 01908 659164, or email me at m.lassander@open.ac.uk. You can also contact my supervisor Dr. Graham Harvey at g.harvey@open.ac.uk. The Human Participants and Materials Ethics Committee at the Open University has approved this project. Any questions about the ethics review process should be directed to Research Ethics Team, Research School, web: <http://www.open.ac.uk/research-ethics>, email: Research-ethics@open.ac.uk, or telephone: 01908 654858.

Completing the questionnaire will only take a few minutes, and every returned form is valuable to me. I hope that you can find the time to participate in this survey.

Mika Lassander, PHD Student
Lead Researcher, Pagan Communities Research Project
Department of Religious Studies, Faculty of Arts
The Open University, Walton Hall
Milton Keynes MK7 6AA

Appendix C, Survey questionnaire



The Open University

Pagan Communities Research Project

This research is being undertaken in order to further understanding about the changing nature of religion in contemporary world. It is specifically focussing on new forms of religious, or spiritual, associations.

This survey will explore what kinds of values you emphasise regarding the pagan groups, associations, or organisations you belong to or feel part of (called *group* in the questionnaire). It will also include some questions about you and your religious or spiritual path, however your name and contact information are not asked. The questionnaire will remain completely anonymous.

Filling the questionnaire will only take a few minutes, and every returned form is valuable to me. I hope that you can find the time to participate in this survey.

Please use a ballpoint pen to complete the questionnaire. Do not use fountain or felt pens, as the ink may be visible on the other side of the page. The questionnaire will be read with the help of a scanner so please fill it in as described. Please put an 'X' in the appropriate box keeping within the boundary of the box. For example: ☒.

Make sure that there is only one crossed box in each line. If you make a mistake and cross the wrong box, please block out your answer and then cross the correct box. For example: ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐

Do not spend too long on each item.

First three pages (Part A) contain a few questions about your pagan path and about you.

The second part (Part B) consists of 32 short statements, and asks you to indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statement by crossing the appropriate box:

- 5 means that you definitely agree
- 4 means that you agree, but with reservations
- 3 should only be used if you really find it impossible to give a definite answer
- 2 means that you disagree, but with reservations
- 1 means that you definitely disagree

The third and final part (Part C) lists 21 short descriptions of different kinds of people, asking you to evaluate how similar or dissimilar the described person is to you:

- 6 means that the person is very much like you
- 5 means that the person is like you
- 4 means that the person is somewhat like you
- 3 means that the person is a little like you
- 2 means that the person is not like you
- 1 means that the person is not like you at all

Please check that for each item there is a single clear response.

(Please start the questionnaire overleaf ➡)

Part A

Please cross one box only for each question. If you make a mistake, black out the wrong box.

- 1 Which age group you belong to?
 - ☐ Under 20
 - ☐ 20 to 24
 - ☐ 25 to 29
 - ☐ 30 to 34
 - ☐ 35 to 39
 - ☐ 40 to 49
 - ☐ 50 to 59
 - ☐ 60 or over

- 2 Please state your gender?
 - ☐ Female
 - ☐ Male

- 3 What is your current country of residence?
(If other, write below.)
 - ☐ United Kingdom
 - ☐ Republic of Ireland
 - ☐ Finland

- 4 What is the region you currently live in (please write in county or town name)?

- 5 What is your highest level of education?
 - ☐ No official qualifications
 - ☐ Primary Education (9 to 10 years)
 - ☐ Secondary Education (12 to 13 years)
 - ☐ Lower academic or vocational degree (BA or equivalent)
 - ☐ Degree or postgraduate qualification (Master's or equivalent)
 - ☐ Higher academic degree (PhD or equivalent)

(Please continue the questionnaire overleaf =>)

Part A (continued)

Please cross one box only for each question. If you make a mistake, black out the wrong box.

6 Which of the following best describes the religious or spiritual path, tradition, or practice you are following?

You can describe your specific path or tradition further in the box below.

- ☐ Wicca or Witchcraft
- ☐ Druidic
- ☐ Shamanic
- ☐ Heathen
- ☐ Eco-Pagan
- ☐ Pagan
- ☐ Reconstructionist
- ☐ Goddess Spirituality
- ☐ Esoteric (excl. Thelema)
- ☐ Thelema
- ☐ Satanist
- ☐ New Age
- ☐ None of the above (please specify below)

6b Further Description (optional):

7 How many other pagans do you know personally?

- ☐ Under 10
- ☐ 10 to 24
- ☐ 25 to 50
- ☐ 51 to 100
- ☐ Over 100

(Please continue the questionnaire overleaf ➡)

Part A (continued)

Please cross one box only for each question. If you make a mistake, black out the wrong box.

- | | | |
|----|---|---|
| 8 | Apart from special occasions such as handfastings and funerals, about how often do you take part in religious or spiritual ceremonies or rituals with others? | <input type="checkbox"/> Every day
<input type="checkbox"/> More than once a week
<input type="checkbox"/> Once a week
<input type="checkbox"/> At least once a month
<input type="checkbox"/> Only on Sabbats
<input type="checkbox"/> Less often
<input type="checkbox"/> Never |
| 9 | Apart from religious or spiritual rituals with others, how often, if at all, do you carry out private religious rituals or practices? | <input type="checkbox"/> Every day
<input type="checkbox"/> More than once a week
<input type="checkbox"/> Once a week
<input type="checkbox"/> At least once a month
<input type="checkbox"/> Only on Sabbats
<input type="checkbox"/> Less often
<input type="checkbox"/> Never |
| 10 | Apart from religious or spiritual rituals, how often do you meet with people who share the same or similar religious or spiritual path? | <input type="checkbox"/> Every day
<input type="checkbox"/> More than once a week
<input type="checkbox"/> Once a week
<input type="checkbox"/> At least once a month
<input type="checkbox"/> Only on Sabbats
<input type="checkbox"/> Less often
<input type="checkbox"/> Never |

(Please start Part B of the questionnaire overleaf =>)

Part B

Please show whether you agree or disagree with each of the statements listed below. Please put a cross in the one box beside each statement that best reflects your personal view.

- 5 means that you definitely agree;
- 4 means that you agree, but with reservations;
- 3 should only be used if the statement doesn't apply to you or if you really find it impossible to give a definite answer;
- 2 means that you disagree, but with reservations;
- 1 means that you definitely disagree.

Please cross one box only in each row.

	Definitely agree			Definitely disagree	
	5	4	3	2	1
1 I prefer to be direct and forthright when I talk to people.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2 My happiness depends very much on the happiness of those around me.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3 I would do what would please my family, even if I detested that activity.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4 Winning is everything.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5 One should live one's life independently of others.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6 What happens to me is my own doing.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7 I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8 It annoys me when other people perform better than I do.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9 It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10 It is important to me that I do my job better than others.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11 I like sharing little things with my neighbours.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12 I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13 We should keep our ageing parents with us at home.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14 The well-being of my co-workers or classmates is important to me.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15 I enjoy being unique and different from others in many ways.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16 If a relative were in financial difficulty, I would help within my means.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

(Please continue the questionnaire overleaf ➡)



Part B (continued)

Please cross one box only in each row.

	Definitely agree				Definitely disagree
	5	4	3	2	1
17 Children should feel honoured if their parents receive a distinguished award.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18 I often "do my own thing."	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19 Competition is the law of nature.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20 If a co-worker or classmate gets a prize, I would feel proud.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21 I am a unique individual.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22 To me, pleasure is spending time with others.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23 When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24 I would sacrifice an activity I enjoy very much if my family did not approve of it.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
25 I like my privacy.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
26 Without competition it is not possible to have a good society.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
27 Children should be taught to place duty before pleasure.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
28 I feel good when I co-operate with others.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
29 I hate to disagree with others in my group.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
30 Some people emphasise winning: I am not one of them.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
31 Before taking a major trip, I consult with most members of my family and many friends.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
32 When I succeed it is usually because of my abilities.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

(Please start Part C of the questionnaire overleaf →)

Part C

Read each description, and evaluate how similar or dissimilar the described person is to you.
Answer by selecting the most fitting number.

- 6 means that the person is very much like you;
- 5 means that the person is like you;
- 4 means that the person is somewhat like you;
- 3 means that the person is a little like you;
- 2 means that the person is not like you;
- 1 means that the person is not like you at all.

Please cross one box only in each row.

	Very much like me			Not like me at all		
	6	5	4	3	2	1
1 Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to them. They like to do things in their own original way.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2 It is important to them to be rich. They want to have a lot of money and expensive things.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3 They think it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. They believe everyone should have equal opportunities in life.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4 It is important to them to show their abilities. They want people to admire what they do.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5 It is important to them to live in secure surroundings. They avoid anything that might endanger their safety.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6 They like surprises and are always looking for new things to do. They think it is important to do lots of different things in life.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7 They believe that people should do what they are told. They think people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8 It is important to them to listen to people who are different from them. Even when they disagree with them, they still want to understand them.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9 It is important to them to be humble and modest. They try not to draw attention to themselves.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10 Having a good time is important to them. They like to "spoil" themselves.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11 It is important to them to make their own decisions about what they do. They like to be free and not depend on others.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12 It is very important to them to help the people around them. They want to care for their well-being.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

(Please continue the questionnaire overleaf ➡)



Part C (continued)

Please cross one box only in each row.

Very much like me			Not like me at all		
6	5	4	3	2	1

13	Being very successful is important to them. They hope people will recognise their achievements.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14	It is important to them that the government ensures their safety against all threats. They want the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15	They look for adventures and like to take risks. They want to have an exciting life.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16	It is important to them always to behave properly. They want to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17	It is important to them to get respect from others. They want people to do what they say.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18	It is important to them to be loyal to their friends. They want to devote themselves to people close to them.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19	They strongly believe that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to them.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20	Tradition is important to them. They try to follow the customs handed down by their religion or their family.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21	They seek every chance they can to have fun. It is important to them to do things that give them pleasure.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Now please look back over the questionnaire to make sure you have put a cross in one and only one box for each of the statements.

Do you have any comments about this questionnaire?

Thank you very much for your help.
Please return the questionnaire as soon as possible to:
Mika Lassander, 1 Saxon Court, Broad Street, Bath BA1 2LU, UK.



Pagan Communities Research Project

Informed Consent Form

This research is being undertaken in order to improve understanding about the changing nature of religion in the contemporary world. It specifically focuses on new forms of religious or spiritual associations.

This interview will explore your path into and through contemporary paganism, and what impact it has had on your life. I will use the information you provide in my ongoing research and publications. These may include articles in academic journals, chapters in books, monographs, presentations to academic and non-academic audiences, and in non-academic writing. Your interview tape will not be released to any other individuals or organisations.

Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. Your identity will be kept strictly confidential, and no information will appear in any of the final material that would serve to identify you in any way. No harm will come to you, your family, or your associates from your participation in this research. If you are uncomfortable with any question posed during the interview, please feel free not to answer it. If you find yourself feeling uncomfortable at any time during the interview, please feel free to ask me to end the interview.

If you understand the description of the interview given above and agree to participate in this study, please sign each of the Consent Forms in the space provided below. One is for your own files the other is to be returned to me in the envelope provided.

If you have any questions or concerns regarding this project, you can contact me at 01908 659164, or email me at m.lassander@open.ac.uk. You can also contact my supervisor Dr. Graham Harvey at g.harvey@open.ac.uk. The Human Participants and Materials Ethics Committee at the Open University has approved this project. Any questions about the ethics review process should be directed to Research Ethics Team, Research School, web: <http://www.open.ac.uk/research-ethics>, email: Research-ethics@open.ac.uk, or telephone: 01908 654858.

Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed in connection with this research.

Mika Lassander, PhD Student
Lead Researcher, Pagan Communities Research Project
Department of Religious Studies, The Open University

Date: ____/____/2008

Participant's Signature

Researcher's Signature

Religion, values, Paganism

Interview Questions

This is the basic framework of the discussion I would like to have with you. It is not exhaustive – that is, I may also pursue discussion of things that you raise in your answers. Please remember, you may ask to have any of these questions omitted if you would prefer not to discuss them.

- How do you describe yourself, in terms of your religion?
- How would you describe Paganism? (Is it a spiritual, religious, or cultural movement?)
- Tell me about how you first became involved in the Paganism? What was your involvement like then? Has it changed over time? How? Why do you think it changed?
- Do you think being Pagan has changed you? In what ways?
- Has it changed your values? What do you think are the most important things in life?
- Do you think that there is a particular emphasis in what most pagans see as most valuable things in life?
- Is there such a thing as a pagan community?
- What do you think is distinct in Paganism compared to other religious or spiritual movements? What attracts people to it?
- Are there some people or groups you would rather not be associated with?
- Is there a story you would like to tell me, that has come out of you being Pagan?

Appendix F, Value item scores per group

	Pagan (n = 451)		Non-religious (n = 508)		Non-belonging (n = 1271)		Cultural Chris- tians (n = 524)		Passive Chris- tians (n = 605)		Active Chris- tians (n = 822)	
Item	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
1.	5.18	0.99	4.40	1.28	4.35	1.21	4.29	1.22	4.39	1.26	4.42	1.30
2.	2.29	1.23	2.75	1.33	2.76	1.24	2.82	1.24	2.54	1.19	2.49	1.21
3.	5.07	1.16	4.92	1.12	4.87	1.07	4.85	1.01	4.95	1.05	5.11	1.01
4.	3.87	1.39	3.91	1.37	3.74	1.31	3.78	1.34	3.62	1.37	3.69	1.42
5.	3.88	1.34	4.33	1.39	4.47	1.23	4.52	1.22	4.74	1.12	4.81	1.20
6.	4.53	1.17	4.06	1.33	4.08	1.28	3.97	1.27	4.00	1.32	3.93	1.40
7.	2.18	1.30	3.24	1.49	3.58	1.39	3.78	1.32	4.07	1.34	4.10	1.44
8.	5.22	0.93	4.67	1.06	4.62	1.02	4.57	1.01	4.73	0.99	4.75	1.00
9.	3.52	1.39	3.92	1.36	4.13	1.21	4.13	1.19	4.13	1.24	4.52	1.16
10.	4.03	1.22	3.84	1.36	3.84	1.33	3.79	1.28	3.75	1.36	3.26	1.38
11.	5.10	0.93	5.01	1.04	4.81	1.05	4.81	0.96	4.82	1.06	4.71	1.20
12.	4.82	1.01	4.70	1.01	4.72	0.98	4.65	0.96	4.82	0.90	5.02	0.94
13.	3.47	1.38	3.56	1.40	3.61	1.32	3.59	1.32	3.50	1.34	3.39	1.42
14.	3.18	1.51	4.41	1.42	4.56	1.18	4.71	1.10	4.79	1.12	4.79	1.17
15.	3.90	1.31	3.38	1.50	3.32	1.36	3.24	1.40	2.96	1.36	2.88	1.43
16.	2.68	1.34	3.92	1.45	4.16	1.23	4.29	1.22	4.44	1.20	4.65	1.27
17.	3.07	1.38	3.42	1.38	3.48	1.30	3.63	1.32	3.49	1.37	3.70	1.44
18.	4.88	1.01	4.94	0.96	4.97	0.88	4.97	0.91	5.20	0.78	5.17	0.91
19.	5.59	0.72	4.76	1.16	4.85	1.04	4.77	1.06	5.03	0.94	5.11	0.96
20.	3.88	1.53	3.29	1.55	3.79	1.40	4.10	1.30	4.56	1.14	5.07	1.04
21.	4.22	1.21	4.07	1.33	3.95	1.29	3.98	1.26	3.79	1.38	3.74	1.42

Items

1. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to them. They like to do things in their own original way.
2. It is important to them to be rich. They want to have a lot of money and expensive things.
3. They think it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. They believe everyone should have equal opportunities in life.
4. It is important to them to show their abilities. They want people to admire what they do.
5. It is important to them to live in secure surroundings. They avoid anything that might endanger their safety.

6. They like surprises and are always looking for new things to do. They think it is important to do lots of different things in life.
7. They believe that people should do what they are told. They think people should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching.
8. It is important to them to listen to people who are different from them. Even when they disagree with them, they still want to understand them.
9. It is important to them to be humble and modest. They try not to draw attention to themselves.
10. Having a good time is important to them. They like to “spoil” themselves.
11. It is important to them to make their own decisions about what they do. They like to be free and not depend on others.
12. It is very important to them to help the people around them. They want to care for their well-being.
13. Being very successful is important to them. They hope people will recognise their achievements.
14. It is important to them that the government ensures their safety against all threats. They want the State to be strong so it can defend its citizens.
15. They look for adventures and like to take risks. They want to have an exciting life.
16. It is important to them always to behave properly. They want to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.
17. It is important to them to get respect from others. They want people to do what they say.
18. It is important to them to be loyal to their friends. They want to devote themselves to people close to them.
19. They strongly believe that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to them.
20. Tradition is important to them. They try to follow the customs handed down by their religion or their family.
21. They seek every chance they can to have fun. It is important to them to do things that give them pleasure.

Appendix G, Individualism–Collectivism item scores per group

	Pagan (n = 451)		Open University (n = 130)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
1. I prefer to be direct and forthright when I talk to people.	4.18	0.84	4.03	0.83
2. My happiness depends very much on the happiness of those around me.	3.25	1.16	3.82	1.10
3. I would do what would please my family, even if I detested that activity.	2.10	1.07	2.84	1.19
4. Winning is everything.	1.63	0.90	2.02	1.13
5. One should live one's life independently of others.	3.21	1.16	2.97	1.25
6. What happens to me is my own doing.	3.79	0.98	3.71	1.20
7. I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group.	2.87	0.94	3.13	1.01
8. It annoys me when other people perform better than I do.	2.24	1.11	2.35	1.25
9. It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group.	3.90	0.93	4.00	0.89
10. It is important to me that I do my job better than others.	2.83	1.16	3.09	1.14
11. I like sharing little things with my neighbours.	3.41	1.16	3.51	1.07
12. I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others.	2.33	1.11	3.02	1.19
13. We should keep our ageing parents with us at home.	2.97	1.12	3.05	1.26
14. The well-being of my co-workers or classmates is important to me.	3.88	0.91	4.19	0.64
15. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many ways.	4.12	0.94	3.82	1.05
16. If a relative were in financial difficulty, I would help within my means.	4.28	0.83	4.42	0.67
17. Children should feel honoured if their parents receive a distinguished award.	3.28	1.18	3.67	1.22
18. I often do my own thing.	4.49	0.67	3.74	1.10
19. Competition is the law of nature.	3.03	1.19	3.25	1.19
20. If a co-worker or classmate gets a prize, I would feel proud.	3.64	1.01	3.78	1.01
21. I am a unique individual.	4.58	0.70	4.40	0.87
22. To me, pleasure is spending time with others.	3.52	1.02	3.59	1.05
23. When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused.	1.95	0.95	1.98	0.99
24. I would sacrifice an activity I enjoy very much if my family did not approve of it.	1.71	0.92	2.72	1.19
25. I like my privacy.	4.61	0.66	4.37	0.79
26. Without competition it is not possible to have a good society.	2.58	1.18	3.05	1.14
27. Children should be taught to place duty before pleasure.	2.91	1.12	2.85	1.19
28. I feel good when I co-operate with others.	3.92	0.85	4.18	0.68
29. I hate to disagree with others in my group.	2.71	1.11	2.66	1.14
30. Some people emphasise winning: I am not one of them (reversed).	2.25	1.22	2.35	1.17
31. Before taking a major trip, I consult with most members of my family and many friends.	2.62	1.36	3.12	1.43
32. When I succeed it is usually because of my abilities.	4.02	0.76	4.19	0.78

Appendix H, Pattern factor matrices for Individualism–Collectivism

	Pagans						Open University students				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5
4, Winning is everything (VI)	-0.10	0.61	-0.13	-0.17	0.09	0.23	-0.08	0.61	-0.05	-0.01	-0.15
8, It annoys me when other people perform better than I do (VI)	-0.04	0.27	0.00	-0.75	0.07	0.07	-0.60	0.47	-0.06	0.31	-0.10
10, It is important to me that I do my job better than others (VI)	0.07	0.53	0.12	-0.48	0.07	0.06	-0.02	0.60	0.05	0.08	0.11
12, I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others (VI)	0.14	0.71	0.02	-0.18	0.00	0.12	0.12	0.74	-0.06	-0.02	0.22
19, Competition is the law of nature (VI)	-0.12	0.72	0.17	-0.12	0.11	0.05	0.08	0.60	0.09	-0.13	-0.31
23, When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused (VI)	0.07	0.36	-0.03	-0.65	0.06	-0.02	-0.67	0.40	0.03	0.23	0.01
26, Without competition it is not possible to have a good society (VI)	0.01	0.76	0.06	-0.04	0.18	0.07	-0.02	0.60	-0.02	0.10	-0.19
30, Some people emphasise winning: I am not one of them (VI)	-0.05	0.42	-0.28	-0.21	-0.02	0.34	-0.08	0.76	-0.12	-0.16	0.14
1, I prefer to be direct and forthright when I talk to people (HI)	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.18	-0.04	0.54	0.57	0.00	0.17	-0.18	0.24
5, One should live one's life independently of others (HI)	-0.25	0.05	0.28	-0.12	-0.04	0.63	0.03	0.12	0.34	0.03	-0.57
6, What happens to me is my own doing (HI)	0.22	0.13	0.09	0.04	-0.02	0.52	0.05	0.07	0.08	-0.07	-0.56
15, I enjoy being unique and different from others in many ways (HI)	0.28	0.13	0.49	-0.15	-0.02	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.68	-0.14	0.07
18, I often do my own thing (HI)	0.04	0.06	0.73	0.03	-0.06	0.10	-0.09	-0.04	0.66	-0.04	-0.20
21, I am a unique individual (HI)	0.26	0.04	0.70	0.06	0.00	0.09	-0.05	-0.18	0.61	0.01	0.14
25, I like my privacy (HI)	-0.19	0.01	0.64	0.07	0.12	0.04	0.07	-0.10	0.49	0.08	-0.34
32, When I succeed it is usually because of my abilities (HI)	0.18	0.28	0.34	0.09	-0.24	0.25	-0.04	0.03	0.47	0.01	-0.05
3, I would do what would please my family, even if I detested that activity (VC)	0.09	0.17	0.02	0.12	0.69	-0.22	0.22	0.14	-0.20	0.49	-0.30
7, I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group (VC)	0.37	0.08	-0.01	0.00	0.54	0.14	0.55	-0.01	-0.26	0.22	-0.24
13, We should keep our ageing parents with us at home (VC)	0.17	0.15	0.07	0.33	0.43	0.02	0.46	0.10	-0.00	-0.00	-0.10
17, Children should feel honoured if their parents receive a distinguished award (VC)	0.37	0.47	0.15	0.12	0.22	-0.22	0.23	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.31
24, I would sacrifice an activity I enjoy very much if my family did not approve of it (VC)	0.07	0.24	-0.20	0.05	0.47	-0.34	0.14	0.12	0.03	0.68	-0.20


27, Children should be taught to place duty before pleasure (VC)	-0.02	0.26	0.02	-0.01	0.49	0.37	0.44	0.26	0.08	-0.07	0.05
29, I hate to disagree with others in my group (VC)	0.30	-0.06	0.09	-0.28	0.37	-0.16	-0.15	-0.33	-0.21	0.65	0.02
31, Before taking a major trip, I consult most family members and many friends (VC)	0.20	0.01	0.07	-0.14	0.52	-0.02	0.12	0.09	0.31	0.40	0.08
2, My happiness depends very much on the happiness of those around me (HC)	0.46	0.06	0.03	0.01	0.42	-0.17	0.45	0.02	-0.14	0.16	-0.05
9, It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group (HC)	0.61	-0.07	0.13	0.05	0.42	-0.03	-0.11	0.01	0.01	0.68	0.33
11, I like sharing little things with my neighbours (HC)	0.40	0.08	0.04	0.49	0.05	0.04	0.35	0.07	-0.06	-0.03	0.40
14, The well-being of my co-workers or classmates is important to me (HC)	0.62	-0.04	0.18	0.25	0.06	-0.10	0.49	-0.10	0.09	0.12	0.15
16, If a relative were in financial difficulty, I would help within my means (HC)	0.29	0.03	0.14	0.50	0.17	0.10	0.33	-0.08	0.00	0.18	-0.21
20, If a co-worker or classmate gets a prize, I would feel proud (HC)	0.54	0.17	0.28	0.26	0.08	-0.11	0.55	-0.04	-0.03	0.21	0.04
22, To me, pleasure is spending time with others (HC)	0.60	0.10	-0.06	0.08	0.13	0.29	0.16	-0.09	-0.11	0.39	0.28
28, I feel good when I co-operate with others (HC)	0.60	0.03	0.10	0.01	0.17	-0.01	0.08	-0.02	0.28	0.48	0.48

Note. The items are organised according to the original scale design. The letters after each item indicate the scale to which that item was originally assigned: VI = Vertical Individualism, HI = Horizontal Individualism, VC = Vertical Collectivism, and HC = Horizontal Collectivism. Item 30 was reverse-scored as per the original. Loadings stronger than $\pm .30$ are indicated with bold font.

Appendix I, Scree plots


Pagans

Scree Plot



OU students

Scree Plot



References

- Alexander, R.D., 1987, *The biology of moral systems*, A. de Gruyter, New York.
- Allport, G.W., 1966, *The individual and his religion: A psychological interpretation*, Macmillan, New York.
- Anderson, B., 1983, *Imagined communities*, 2nd edn, Verso, London.
- Arendt, H., 1958, *The human condition*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Assmann, J., 2010, *The price of monotheism*, Stanford University Press, Stanford.
- Atran, S., 2002, *In gods we trust: the evolutionary landscape of religion*, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Bainbridge, W.S., 1997, *The sociology of religious movements*, Routledge, New York and London.
- Barnea, M.F. & Schwartz, S.H., 1998, Values and voting. Political psychology, *Political Psychology*, 19(1), pp. 17–40.
- Bauman, Z., 1993, *Postmodern ethics*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
- Bauman, Z., 1994, 'Alone again: ethics after certainty', *Demos*, pp. 3–37.
- Bauman, Z. & May, T., 2001, *Thinking sociologically*, 2nd edn, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
- Beckford, J.A., 2003, *Social theory and religion*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Berger, P.L., 1967, *The sacred canopy*, Doubleday, New York.
- Berger, P.L., 1979, *The heretical imperative: contemporary possibilities of religious affirmation*, Doubleday, New York.
- Berger, P.L., 2002, 'The cultural dynamics of globalization', in P.L. Berger & S.P. Huntington (eds), *Many globalizations: cultural diversity in the contemporary world*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 1–16.
- Berger, P.L. & Luckmann, T., 1967, *The social construction of reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge*, Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Bernstein, R.J., 1983, *Beyond objectivism and relativism: science, hermeneutics, and praxis*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia.
- Beutel, A.M. & Marini, M.M., 1995, 'Gender and values', *American Sociological Review*, 60(3), pp. 436–448.
- Beyer, P., 1994, *Religion and globalization*, Sage Publications, London.
- Bhaskar, R., 1978, *A realist theory of science*, 2nd edn, Harvester Press, Brighton.
- Bhaskar, R., 1986, *Scientific realism and human emancipation*, Verso, London.
- Billig, M., 1996, *Arguing and thinking: a rhetorical approach to social psychology*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Bond, M.H., 1988, 'Finding universal dimensions of individual variation in multicultural studies of values: the Rokeach and Chinese value survey', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 55(6), pp. 1009–1015.

- Boom, J., Brugman, D. & van der Heijden, P.G.M., 2001, 'Hierarchical structure of moral stages assessed by a sorting task', *Child Development*, 72(2), pp. 535–548.
- Bowman, M.I., 2002, 'Contemporary Celtic spirituality', in J. Pearson (ed.), *Belief beyond boundaries: Wicca, Celtic spirituality and the New Age*, Ashgate in association with the Open University, Aldershot, pp. 55–101.
- Boyes, M.C. & Walker, L.J., 1988, 'Implications of cultural diversity for the universality claims of Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning', *Human Development*, 31(1), pp. 44–59.
- Braithwaite, V.A. & Scott, W.A., 1991, 'Values', in J.P. Robinson, P.R. Shaver, L.S. Wrightsman & F.M. Andrews (eds), *Measures of personality and social psychological attitudes*, Academic Press, San Diego, pp. 661–753.
- Brewer, M.B. & Chen, Y.R., 2007, 'Where (who) are collectives in collectivism? Toward conceptual clarification of individualism and collectivism', *Psychological Review*, 114(1), pp. 133–151.
- Brewer, M.B. & Gardner, W., 2006, 'Who is this "we"? Levels of collective identity and self representation', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 71(1), pp. 83–93.
- Brint, S., 2001, 'Gemeinschaft revisited: a critique and reconstruction of the community concept', *Sociological Theory*, 19(1), pp. 1–23.
- Brislin, R.W., 1980, 'Translation and content analysis of oral and written materials', in H.C. Triandis & J.W. Berry (eds), *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology*, Allyn & Bacon, Boston, pp. 389–444.
- Brown, C.G., 1992, 'A revisionist approach to religious change', in S. Bruce (ed.), *Religion and Modernization*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 31–58.
- Bruce, S. 2001, 'The curious case of the unnecessary recantation: Berger and secularisation', in L. Woodhead, P. Heelas & D. Martin (eds), *Peter Berger and the Study of Religion*, Routledge, London, pp. 87–100.
- Bruce, S., 2002, *God is dead: secularization in the West*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
- Bruce, S. & Voas, D., 2007, 'Religious toleration and organisational typologies', *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, 22(1), pp. 1–17.
- Bryman, A., 2007, 'Barriers to integrating quantitative and qualitative research', *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 1(1), pp. 8–22.
- Burt, R.S., 2001, 'The social capital of structural holes', *New Directions in Economic Sociology*, pp. 201–247.
- Burt, R.S., Jannotta, J.E. & Mahoney, J.T., 1998, 'Personality correlates of structural holes', *Social Networks*, 20(1), pp. 63–87.
- Calhoun, C.J., 2002, *Dictionary of the social sciences*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Campbell, D.T. & Fiske, D.W., 1959, 'Convergent and discriminant validation by the multitrait-multimethod matrix', *Psychological Bulletin*(56), pp. 81–105.
- Caprara, G.V., Schwartz, S., Capanna, C., Vecchione, M. & Barbaranelli, C., 2006, 'Personality and politics: values, traits, and political choice', *Political Psychology*, 27(1), pp. 1–28.

- Carlo, G., Koller, S.H., Eisenberg, N., Da Silva, M.S. & Frohlich, C.B., 1996, 'A cross-national study on the relations among prosocial moral reasoning, gender role orientations, and prosocial behaviors', *Developmental Psychology*, 32, pp. 231–240.
- Central Statistics Office, 2007, *Census 2006, Volume 13: Religion*, Stationery Office, Dublin.
- Chaiken, S. & Trope, Y., 1999, *Dual-process theories in social psychology*, Guilford Press, New York.
- Chaves, M. & Gorski, P.S., 2001, 'Religious pluralism and religious participation', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27(1), pp. 261–281.
- Cipriani, M., Giuliano, P. & Jeanne, O., 2007, 'Like mother like son? Experimental evidence on the transmission of values from parents to children', *CEPR Discussion no. 6305*, pp. 1–25.
- Cipriani, R., 2001, 'Religion as diffusion of values. "Diffused religion" in the context of a dominant religious institution: the Italian case', in R.K. Fenn (ed.), *The Blackwell companion to sociology of religion*, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, pp. 292–305.
- Clifton, C. & Harvey, G., 2003, *The Paganism reader*, Routledge, London.
- Clifton, C.S., 1996, 'What has Alexandria to do with Boston? Some sources of modern Pagan ethics', in J.R. Lewis (ed.), *Magical religion and modern witchcraft*, SUNY Press, New York, pp. 269–275.
- Cody, M.L. & Diamond, J.M., 1979, *Ecology and evolution of communities*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Cohen, A.P., 1982, *Belonging: identity and social organisation in British rural cultures*, Manchester University Press, Manchester.
- Cohen, A.P., 1985, *The symbolic construction of community*, Routledge, New York.
- Costa, P. & Goodwin, R., 2006, 'The role of religion in human values: a case study', *Journal of Beliefs & Values: Studies in Religion & Education*, 27(3), pp. 341–346.
- Count Me Out, 2009, *Count Me Out*. Retrieved September 14, 2009, from <http://www.countmeout.ie/>
- Crain, W.C., 2005, *Theories of development: concepts and applications*, Pearson/Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River.
- Creswell, J.W., 2003, *Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*, Sage Publications, London.
- Crockett, A. & Voas, D., 2006, 'Generations of decline: religious change in 20th-century Britain', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 45(4), pp. 567–584.
- Crowley, A., 2004, *The book of the law*, Red Wheel/Weiser, Boston.
- Cukur, C.S., De Guzman, M.R.T. & Carlo, G., 2004, 'Religiosity, values, and horizontal and vertical individualism-collectivism: a study of Turkey, the United States, and the Philippines', *Journal of Social Psychology*, 144(6), pp. 613–634.
- D'Andrade, R.G. & Strauss, C., 1992, *Human motives and cultural models*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Daniel, B., Wassell, S. & Gilligan, R., 2010, *Child development for child care and protection workers*, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, Philadelphia.

- Datta, L., 1994, 'Paradigm wars: a basis for peaceful coexistence and beyond', *New Directions for Program Evaluation* (61), pp. 53–71.
- Davie, G., 2000, *Religion in modern Europe: a memory mutates*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Dawkins, R., 1976, *The selfish gene*, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Dawson, L.L., 2004, 'The sociocultural significance of modern new religious movements', in J.R. Lewis (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of New Religious Movements*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 68–98.
- Dennett, D.C., 1995, *Darwin's dangerous idea: evolution and the meanings of life*, Simon & Schuster, New York.
- Dennett, D.C., 2006, *Breaking the spell: religion as a natural phenomenon*, Allen Lane, London.
- Dewey, J., 2004, *Reconstruction in philosophy*, Dover Publications, New York.
- Di Dio, L. & Saragovi, C., 1996, 'Linking personal values to gender', *Sex Roles*, 34(9/10), pp. 621–636.
- Diamond, J.M., 1997, *Guns, germs and steel: the fates of human societies*, Jonathan Cape, London.
- DiLalla, D.L. & Dollinger, S.J., 2006, 'Cleaning up data and running preliminary analysis', in F.T.L. Leong & J.T. Austin (eds), *The psychology research handbook: a guide for graduate students and research assistants*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London & New Delhi, pp. 241–253.
- Dobbelaere, K., 2002, *Secularization: an analysis at three levels*, Peter Lang, Oxford.
- Dumont, L., 1970, *Homo hierarchicus: the caste system and its implications*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London.
- Dumont, L., 1986, *Essays on individualism: modern ideology in anthropological perspective*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Dunbar, R.I.M., 1996, *Grooming, gossip, and the evolution of language*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Durkheim, E., 1997, *The division of labour in society*, translated by L.A. Coser & W.D. Halls, Free Press, New York.
- Durkheim, E., 2001, *The elementary forms of religious life*, translated by C. Cosman & M.S. Cladis, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Eckensberger, L.H., 1994, 'Moral development and its measurement across cultures', *Psychology and Culture*, pp. 71–78.
- Edwards, C.P., 1981, 'The comparative study of the development of moral judgement and reasoning', in R.H. Munroe, R.L. Munroe & B.B. Whiting (eds), *Handbook of cross-cultural human development*, Garland Press, New York, pp. 501–528.
- Edwards, C.P., 1982, 'Moral development in comparative cultural perspective', in D.A. Wagner & H.W. Stevenson (eds), *Cultural perspectives on child development*, Freeman, San Francisco, pp. 248–279.
- Egri, C.P. & Ralston, D.A., 2004, 'Generation cohorts and personal values: a comparison of China and the United States', *Organization Science*, 15(2), pp. 210–220.

- Elias, N., 1991, *The society of individuals*, translated by M. Schröter, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
- Evans, J.S.B.T., 2008, 'Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition', *Annual Review of Psychology*, 59(1), pp. 255–278.
- Everitt, B., 1993, *Cluster analysis*, Edward Arnold, London.
- Farias, M. & Lalljee, M., 2008, 'Holistic individualism in the age of Aquarius: measuring individualism/collectivism in New Age, Catholic, and Atheist/Agnostic groups', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 47(2), pp. 277–289.
- Feather, N.T., 1987, 'Gender differences in values: implications of the expectancy value model', in F. Halisch and J. Kuhl (eds), *Motivation, intention, and volition*, Springer-Verlag, Berlin and London, pp. 31–45.
- Feather, N.T., 1995, 'Values, valences, and choice: the influences of values on the perceived attractiveness and choice of alternatives', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 68(6), pp. 1135–1151.
- Feather, N.T., 2004, 'Value correlates of ambivalent attitudes toward gender relations', *Personality And Social Psychology Bulletin*, 30(1), pp. 3–12.
- Featherstone, M., 1991a, *Consumer culture and postmodernism*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks.
- Featherstone, M., 1991b, 'Consumer culture, postmodernism, and global disorder', in R. Robertson & W.R. Garrett (eds), *Religion and global order*, Paragon House, New York, pp. 133–160.
- Feyerabend, P., 1993, *Against method*, Verso, New York.
- Finke, R., 1997, 'The consequences of religious competition: supply-side explanations for religious change', in L.A. Young (ed.), *Rational choice theory and religion. summary and assessment*, Routledge, New York and London, pp. 45–65.
- Fontaine, J.R.J., Duriez, B., Luyten, P., Corveleyn, J. & Hutsebaut, D., 2005, 'Consequences of a multidimensional approach to religion for the relationship between religiosity and value priorities', *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 15(2), pp. 123–144.
- Fox, J., 2005, 'Secularization', in J.R. Hinnells (ed.), *The Routledge companion to the study of religion*, Routledge, London, pp. 291–305.
- Freethinkers Tampere, 2003, Kirkosta eroaminen, *Eroa kirkosta*. Retrieved September 14, 2009, from <http://www.eroakirkosta.fi/>
- Freethinkers Tampere, 2009, Eroakirkosta.fi puolivuotiskatsaus 2009, *Eroa kirkosta*. Retrieved September 14, 2009, from http://www.eroakirkosta.fi/media/muut/puolivuotiskatsaus_2009.html
- Gardner, G.B., 1997, *A goddess arrives*, Godolphin House, Hinton.
- Gardner, G.B., 1999, *High magic's aid: wonderful tale of medieval witchcraft*, Pentacle Enterprises, London.
- Gardner, G.B., 2004, *The meaning of witchcraft*, Red Wheel/Weiser, Boston.
- Geertz, C., 1966, *The interpretation of cultures*, Basic Books, New York.
- Gergen, K.J., 1994, *Toward transformation in social knowledge*, Sage Publications, London.

- Gergen, K.J., 1999, *An invitation to social construction*, Sage Publications, London.
- Gibbs, J.C., 2006, 'Should Kohlberg's cognitive developmental approach to morality be replaced with a more pragmatic approach? Comment on Krebs and Denton (2005)', *Psychological Review*, 113(3), pp. 666–671.
- Gibbs, J.C., Basinger, K.S., Grime, R.L. & Snarey, J.R., 2007, 'Moral judgment development across cultures: revisiting Kohlberg's universality claims', *Developmental Review*, 27(4), pp. 443–500.
- Goffman, E., 1970, *Strategic interaction*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
- Goodman, R.F. & Ben-Ze'ev, A., 1994, *Good gossip*, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence.
- Gothóni, R. (ed.), 2005, *How to do comparative religion? Three ways, many goals*, Walter de Gruyter, New York.
- Granovetter, M., 1983, 'The strength of weak ties: a network theory revisited', *Sociological Theory*, pp. 201–234.
- Granovetter, M., 1985, 'Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness', *American Journal of Sociology*, 91(3), p. 481–521.
- Green, E.G.T., Deschamps, J. & Páez, D., 2005, 'Variation of individualism and collectivism within and between 20 countries: a typological analysis', *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 36(3), pp. 321–339.
- Greene, J. & Haidt, J., 2002, 'How (and where) does moral judgment work?', *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 6(12), pp. 517–523.
- Greene, J., 2003, 'Opinion: from neural "is" to moral "ought": what are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology?', *Nature Reviews Neuroscience*, 4(10), pp. 846–850.
- Greene, J., 2005, 'Emotion and cognition in moral judgment: evidence from neuroimaging', in J. Changeux (ed.), *Neurobiology of human values*, Springer-Verlag, New York, pp. 57–66.
- Greene, J.D., Nystrom, L.E., Engell, A.D., Darley, J.M. & Cohen, J.D., 2004, 'The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment', *Neuron*, 44(2), pp. 389–400.
- Greene, J.D. & Paxton, J.M., 2009, 'Patterns of neural activity associated with honest and dishonest moral decisions', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 106(30), pp. 12506–12511.
- Greene, J.D., Sommerville, R.B., Nystrom, L.E., Darley, J.M. & Cohen, J.D., 2001, 'An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment', *Science*, 293(5537), pp. 2105–2108.
- Greenfield, P.M., 2000, 'Three approaches to the psychology of culture: Where do they come from? Where can they go?', *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 3(3), pp. 223–240.
- Grimm, S.D. & Church, A.T., 1999, 'A cross-cultural study of response biases in personality measures', *Journal of Research in Personality*, 33(4), pp. 415–441.
- de Groot, J.I. & Steg, L., 2007, 'Value orientations and environmental beliefs in five countries: validity of an instrument to measure egoistic, altruistic and biospheric value orientations', *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 38(3), pp. 318–332.

- Grunert, S. & Juhl, H.J., 1995, 'Values, environmental attitudes, and buying of organic foods', *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 16(1), pp. 39–62.
- Guba, E.G., 1990, *The paradigm dialog*, Sage Publications, Newbury Park.
- Haack, S., 2004, 'Pragmatism, old and new', *Contemporary Pragmatism*, 1(1), pp. 3–41.
- Habermas, J., 1990, *Moral consciousness and communicative action*, Polity, Cambridge.
- Habermas, J., 1996, *Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy*, MIT Press, Cambridge.
- Haidt, J., 2001, 'The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment', *Psychological Review*, 108(4), pp. 814–834.
- Haidt, J., 2006, *The happiness hypothesis: finding modern truth in ancient wisdom*, Basic Books, New York.
- Haidt, J. & Björklund, F., 2008, 'Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral psychology', in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), *Moral psychology, volume 2: The cognitive science of morality: intuition and diversity*, MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 181–217.
- Haidt, J. & Joseph, C., 2004, 'Intuitive ethics: how innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues', *Daedalus*, 133(4), pp. 55–66.
- Hair, J.F., Black, W.C., Babin, B.J. & Anderson, R.E., 2009, *Multivariate data analysis*, 7th edn, Pearson, Upper Saddle River.
- Hall, S., 1992, 'The question of cultural identity', in S. Hall, D Held & T. McGrew (eds), *Modernity and its futures*, Polity Press in association with the Open University, Cambridge, pp. 273–325.
- Halman, L. & de Moor, R.A., 1994, 'Value shift in Western societies', in P. Ester, L. Halman & R.A. de Moor (eds), *The individualizing society: value change in Europe and North America*, Tilburg University Press, Tilburg, pp. 21–36.
- Hardman, C. & Harvey, G. (eds), 1996, *Pagan pathways: a complete guide to the ancient earth traditions*, Thorsons, London.
- Harman, G., 2009, *Prince of networks: Bruno Latour and metaphysics*, re.press, Melbourne.
- Harris, J.R., 1995, 'Where is the child's environment? A group socialization theory of development', *Psychological Review*, 102(3), pp. 458–489.
- Harvey, G., 1997, *Listening people, speaking earth: contemporary paganism*, C. Hurst, London.
- Harvey, G., 2006, *Animism: respecting the living world*, Columbia University Press, New York.
- Harvey, G., 2010, 'Introduction', in G. Harvey (ed.), *Religions in focus: new approaches to tradition and contemporary practices*, Equinox Publishing, Oakville, pp. 1–9.
- Hau, K.T. & Lew, J.F., 1989, 'Moral development of Chinese students in Hong Kong', *International Journal of Psychology*, 24(5), pp. 561–569.
- Heelas, P. & Woodhead, L., 2005, *The spiritual revolution: why religion is giving way to spirituality*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
- Herriot, P., 2008, *Religious fundamentalism: global, local, and personal*, Routledge, London and New York.

- Hervieu-Léger, D., 1998, 'The transmission and formation of socioreligious identities in modernity: an analytical essay on the trajectories of identification', *International Sociology*, 13(2), pp. 213–228.
- Hervieu-Léger, D., 2000, *Religion as a chain of memory*, Polity, London.
- Hetherington, K., 1998, *Expressions of identity: space, performance, politics*, Sage Publications, London.
- Hofstede, G., 1980, *Culture's consequences: international differences in work-related values*, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills.
- Hofstede, G.H. & Hofstede, G.J., 2005, *Cultures and organizations: software of the mind*, McGraw-Hill, New York.
- Hoggett, P., 1997, 'Contested communities: experiences, struggles, policies', in *Contested communities*, Policy Press, Bristol, pp. 3–16.
- Holland, D. & Quinn, N., 1987, *Cultural models in language and thought*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Huismans, S. & Schwartz, S.H., 1992, 'Religiosity and value priorities: a study of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews', in S. Iwawaki, Y. Kashima & K. Leung (eds), *Innovations in cross-cultural psychology*, Swets & Zeitlinger Publishers, Lisse, pp. 237–249.
- Hume, D., 2000, *A treatise of human nature*, edited by D.F. Norton & M.J. Norton, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Hutton, R., 1999, *The triumph of the moon: a history of modern pagan witchcraft*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Inglehart, R., 1971, 'The silent revolution in Europe: intergenerational change in post-industrial societies', *American Political Science Review*, 65(4), pp. 991–1017.
- Inglehart, R., 1977, *The silent revolution: changing values and political styles among Western publics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Inglehart, R., 1997, *Modernization and postmodernization: cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Inglehart, R. & Welzel, C., 2005, *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: the human development sequence*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- James, O., 2007, *Affluenza: how to be successful and stay sane*, Vermilion, London.
- James, W., 1995, *Pragmatism*, Dover Publications, New York.
- Jowell, R. & Central Co-ordinating Team, 2008, *ESS Round 3 2006/2007 Final Activity Report*, edited by R. Fitzgerald & S. Widdop, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University, London.
- Jowell, R. & Central Co-ordinating Team, 2009, *European social survey: monitoring attitude change in over 30 countries*, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University, London.
- Joyce, R., 2006, *The evolution of morality*, MIT Press, Cambridge.
- Kagitçibasi, C. 1997, 'Individualism and collectivism', in J.W. Berry, M.H. Segall & C. Kagitçibasi (eds), *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology*, Allyn & Bacon, Boston, pp. 1–50.

- Kalish, Y., 2008, 'Bridging in social networks: who are the people in structural holes and why are they there?', *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 11(1), pp. 53–66.
- Kalish, Y. & Robins, G., 2006, 'Psychological predispositions and network structure: the relationship between individual predispositions, structural holes and network closure', *Social Networks*, 28(1), pp. 56–84.
- Kääriäinen, K., Ketola, K., Niemelä, K., Palmu, H. & Salomäki, H., 2009, *Facing diversity: the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland from 2004 to 2007*, Church Research Institute, Tampere.
- Kääriäinen, K., Niemelä, K. & Ketola, K., 2005, *Religion in Finland: decline, change and transformation of Finnish religiosity*, Church Research Institute, Tampere.
- Keller, M., Edelstein, W., Schmid, C., Fang, F. & Fang, G., 1998, 'Reasoning about responsibilities and obligations in close relationships: a comparison across two cultures', *Developmental Psychology*, 34(4), pp. 731–741.
- Kelley, D.M., 1986, *Why conservative churches are growing: a study in sociology of religion*, Mercer University Press, Macon.
- Killen, M., 1991, 'Social and moral development in early childhood', *Handbook of moral behavior and development*, 2, pp. 115–138.
- Klein, P., 1994, *An easy guide to factor analysis*, Routledge, London.
- Kluckhohn, F.R. & Strodtbeck, F.L., 1961, *Variations in value orientations*, Row and Peterson, Evanston.
- Kohlberg, L., 1981, *Essays on moral development*, Harper & Row, San Francisco.
- Kohlberg, L., 1984, *The psychology of moral development: the nature and validity of moral stages*, Harper & Row, San Francisco.
- Kosmin, B.A., Keysar A., Cragun R. & Navarro-Rivera, J., 2009, *American Nones: the profile of the No Religion population*. Retrieved February 24, 2010, from http://www.americanreligionsurvey-aris.org/reports/NONES_08.pdf
- Krebs, D.L., 1998, 'The evolution of moral behavior', in C.B. Crawford & D.L. Krebs (eds), *Handbook of evolutionary psychology: ideas, issues, and applications*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, pp. 337–368.
- Krebs, D.L., 2000, 'The evolution of moral dispositions in the human species', in D. LeCroy & P. Moller (eds), *Evolutionary perspectives on human reproductive behavior*, New York Academy of Sciences, New York, pp. 132–148.
- Krebs, D.L. & Denton, K., 2005, 'Toward a more pragmatic approach to morality: a critical evaluation of Kohlberg's model', *Psychological Review*, 112(3), pp. 629–49.
- Krebs, D.L., Denton, K.L., Vermeulen, S.C., Carpendale, J.I. & Bush, A., 1991, 'Structural flexibility of moral judgment', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 61(6), pp. 1012–1023.
- Krebs, D.L. & Hesteren, F.V., 1994, 'The development of altruism: toward an integrative model', *Developmental Review*, 14(2), pp. 103–158.
- Kriegman, D. & Solomon, L., 1985, 'Cult groups and the narcissistic personality: the offer to heal defects in the self', *International Journal of Group Psychotherapy*, 35(2), pp. 239–261.

- Kuhn, T.S., 1996, *The structure of scientific revolutions*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- La Fontaine, J. 1999, 'The history of the idea of Satan and Satanism', in W. De Blécourt, R. Hutton & J. La Fontaine (eds), *Witchcraft and magic in Europe: the twentieth century*, Athlone Press, London, pp. 83–93.
- Lakatos, I., 1970, 'Falsification and the Methodology of scientific research programmes', in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds), *Criticism and the growth of knowledge*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 91–196.
- Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M., 1999, *Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought*, Basic Books, New York.
- Larson, C.J., 1986, *Sociological theory: from the enlightenment to the present*, General Hall, Dix Hills.
- Latour, B., 1993, *We have never been modern*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Latour, B., 2005, *Reassembling the social: an introduction to actor-network-theory*, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Law, J., 1992, 'Notes on the theory of the actor-network: ordering, strategy, and heterogeneity', *Systemic Practice and Action Research*, 5(4), pp. 379–393.
- Li, F. & Aksoy, L., 2007, 'Dimensionality of individualism–collectivism and measurement equivalence of Triandis and Gelfand's scale', *Journal of Business and Psychology*, 21(3), pp. 313–329.
- Lindeman, M. & Verkasalo, M., 2005, 'Measuring values with the short Schwartz's value survey', *Journal of Personality Assessment*, 85(2), pp. 170–178.
- Louy's, P., 2002, *The adventures of King Pausole*, translated by C.H. Lumley, Fredonia Books, Amsterdam.
- Luckmann, T., 1967, *The invisible religion: the problem of religion in modern society*, Macmillan, London.
- Luckmann, T., 1990, 'Shrinking transcendence, expanding religion?', *Sociological Analysis*, 50(2), pp. 127–138.
- Lukes, S., 1973, *Individualism*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
- Lyons, S., Duxbury, L. & Higgins, C., 2005, 'Are gender differences in basic human values a generational phenomenon?', *Sex Roles*, 53(9), pp. 763–778.
- Ma, H.K., 1988, 'Objective moral judgment in Hong Kong, mainland China, and England', *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 19(1), pp. 78–95.
- Ma, H.K., 1997, 'The affective and cognitive aspects of moral development: a Chinese perspective', in H.S.R. Kao and D. Sinha (eds), *Asian perspectives on psychology*, Sage, New Delhi and London, pp. 93–109.
- Ma, H.K. & Cheung, C.K., 1996, 'A Cross-cultural study of moral stage structure in Hong Kong Chinese, English, and Americans', *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 27(6), p. 700.
- Maffesoli, M., 1996, *The time of the tribes: the decline of individualism in mass society*, Sage Publications, London.
- MAPI Institute, 2004, 'Methodology', *Linguistic validation*. Retrieved May 14, 2010, from <http://www.mapi-institute.com/linguistic-validation/methodology>

- Margolis, J., 2006, 'Pluralism, relativism, and historicism', in J.R. Shook & J. Margolis (eds), *A companion to pragmatism*, Blackwells, Malden, MA, and Oxford, pp. 239–248.
- Markus, H.R. & Kitayama, S., 1991, 'Culture and the self: implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation', *Psychological Review*, 98(2), pp. 224–253.
- Martin, D., 1969, *The religious and the secular: studies in secularization*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
- Martin, D., 1978, *A general theory of secularization*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
- Marx, K., 1995, *Capital: an abridged edition*, translated by D. McLellan, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Maslow, A.H., 1987, *Motivation and personality*, translated by R. Frager, Harper & Row, New York.
- Matsumoto, D.R. & Juang, L.P., 2004, *Culture and psychology*, Wadsworth/Thomson, Belmont.
- Mauss, M., 1954, *The gift: forms and functions of exchange in archaic societies*, Free Press, New York.
- McCauley, R.N. & Lawson, E.T., 2002, *Bringing ritual to mind: psychological foundations of cultural forms*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Mill, J.S., 1998, *On liberty and other essays*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Miller, J.G. & Bersoff, D.M., 1992, 'Culture and moral judgment: how are conflicts between justice and interpersonal responsibilities resolved?', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 62(4), pp. 541–554.
- Miller, J.G. & Bersoff, D.M., 1995, 'Development in the context of everyday family relationships: culture, interpersonal morality, and adaptation', in M. Killen & D. Hart (eds), *Morality in everyday life: developmental perspectives*, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 259–282.
- Miller, J.G., 2001, *The handbook of culture and psychology*, edited by D.R. Matsumoto, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Miller, P.A., Eisenberg, N., Fabes, R.A. & Shell, R., 1996, 'Relations of moral reasoning and vicarious emotion to young children', *Developmental Psychology*, 32(2), pp. 210–219.
- Mithen, S.J., 1996, *The prehistory of the mind: a search for the origins of art, religion, and science*, Thames and Hudson, London.
- Morgan, D.L., 2007, 'Paradigms lost and pragmatism regained: methodological implications of combining qualitative and quantitative methods', *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 1(1), pp. 48–76.
- Moshman, D., 1995, 'The construction of moral rationality', *Human Development*, 38(4–5), pp. 265–281.
- Moshman, D., 2005, *Adolescent psychological development: rationality, morality, and identity*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah.
- Moshman, D. & Geil, M., 1998, 'Collaborative reasoning: evidence for collective rationality', *Thinking and Reasoning*, 4(3), pp. 231–248.

- Myers, J.L. & Well, A.D., 2003, *Research design and statistical analysis*, 2nd edn. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah.
- Narvaez, D., 1998, 'The influence of moral schemas on the reconstruction of moral narratives in eighth graders and college students', *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 90(1), pp. 13–24.
- National Secular Society, 2004, 'Debaptise Yourself', *National Secular Society*. Retrieved September 14, 2009, from <http://www.secularism.org.uk/debaptism.html>
- Nisbett, R.E., 2003, *The geography of thought: how Asians and Westerners think differently – and why*, Free Press, New York.
- Norris, P. & Inglehart, R., 2004, *Sacred and secular: religion and politics worldwide*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Nucci, L.P., 2001, *Education in the moral domain*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Nunner-Winkler, G., 2007, 'Development of moral motivation from childhood to early adulthood', *Journal of Moral Education*, 36(4), pp. 399–414.
- O'Connor, B.P., 2000, 'SPSS and SAS programs for determining the number of components using parallel analysis and Velicer's MAP test', *Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, and Computers*, 32(3), pp. 396–402.
- Office for National Statistics, 2004, *Focus On Religion*. Retrieved November 19, 2010. from <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/focuson/#religion>
- Oyserman, D., 1993, 'The lens of personhood: viewing the self and others in a multicultural society', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 65(5), pp. 993–1009.
- Oyserman, D., Coon, H.M. & Kemmelmeier, M., 2002, 'Rethinking individualism and collectivism: evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-analyses', *Psychological Bulletin*, 128(1), pp. 3–72.
- Paine, T., 1999, *Rights of man*, Dover Publications, Mineola.
- Peirce, C.S., 1931, *Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, edited by C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Peirce, C.S., 1940, *The philosophy of Peirce: selected writings*, edited by J. Buchler, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
- Piaget, J., 1965, *The moral judgment of the child*, translated by M. Gabain, Free Press, New York.
- Pinker, S., 2002, *The blank slate: the modern denial of human nature*, Penguin Books, London.
- Polanyi, K., 1944, *The great transformation*, Farrar & Rinehart, Toronto.
- Popper, K.R., 1972, *The logic of scientific discovery*, Hutchinson, London.
- Potter, J., 1996, *Representing reality: discourse, rhetoric and social construction*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks.
- Prince-Gibson, E. & Schwartz, S.H., 1998, 'Value priorities and gender', *Social Psychology Quarterly*, pp. 49–67.
- Putnam, R.D., 2000, *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community*, Simon & Schuster, New York.

- Pyysiäinen, I., 2001, *How religion works: towards a new cognitive science of religion*, Brill, Boston.
- Pyysiäinen, I., 2004, *Magic, miracles, and religion: a scientist's perspective*, AltaMira Press, Walnut Creek.
- Rabelais, F., 2005, *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, translated by T. Urquhart & P. Le Motteux, Barnes & Noble Books, New York.
- Ragin, C.C., 1987, *The comparative method: moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies*, University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Ralston, D.A., Hallinger, P., Egri, C.P. & Naathinsuhk, S., 2005, 'The effects of culture and life stage on workplace strategies of upward influence: a comparison of Thailand and the United States', *Journal of World Business*, 40(3), pp. 321–337.
- Ramos, A., 2006, 'Social values dynamics and socio-economic development', *Portuguese Journal of Social Science*, 5(1), pp. 35–64.
- Realo, A., Allik, J. & Vadi, M., 1997, 'The hierarchical structure of collectivism', *Journal of Research in Personality*, 31(1), pp. 93–116.
- Realo, A., Koido, K., Ceulemans, E. & Allik, J., 2002, 'Three components of individualism', *European Journal of Personality*, 16(3), pp. 163–184.
- Reeve, J., 2001, *Understanding motivation and emotion*, Harcourt College Publishers, Fort Worth.
- Rest, J.R., Narvaez, D., Thoma, S.J. & Bebeau, M.J., 2000, 'A neo-Kohlbergian approach to morality research', *Journal of Moral Education*, 29(4), pp. 381–395.
- Richardson, J.T., 2007, 'Mental models of learning in distance education', *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, 77(Pt 2), pp. 253–270.
- Ritzer, G., 1996, *The McDonaldization of society: an investigation into the changing character of contemporary social life*, Pine Forge Press, Thousand Oaks.
- Robertson, R., 1992, *Globalization: social theory and global culture*, Sage Publications, London.
- Roccas, S., 2005, 'Religion and value systems', *Journal of Social Issues*, 61(4), pp. 747–759.
- Roccas, S., Sagiv, L., Schwartz, S.H. & Knafo, A., 2002, 'The Big Five personality factors and personal values', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28(6), pp. 789–801.
- Roccas, S. & Schwartz, S.H., 1997, 'Church–state relations and the association of religiosity with values: a study of Catholics in six countries', *Cross-Cultural Research: The Journal of Comparative Social Science*, 31(4), pp. 356–375.
- Rogers, B. & Muir, R., 2007, *The power of belonging: identity, citizenship and community cohesion*, Institute for Public Policy Research, London.
- Rokeach, M., 1968, *Beliefs, attitudes, and values: a theory of organization and change*, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.
- Rokeach, M., 1973, *The nature of human values*, Free Press, New York.
- Rousseau, J., 2005, *The social contract*, translated by G.D.H. Cole, J.H. Brumfitt & J.C. Hall, Barnes & Noble Books, New York.

- Saroglou, V., Delpierre, V. & Dernelle, R., 2004, 'Values and religiosity: a meta-analysis of studies using Schwartz's model', *Personality and Individual Differences*, 37(4), pp. 721–734.
- Schiller, F.C.S., 1970, *Studies in humanism*, Greenwood Press, London.
- Schwartz, S.H., 1992, 'Universals in the content and structure of values: theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries', *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 25, pp. 1–65.
- Schwartz, S.H., 1994, 'Beyond individualism/collectivism: new cultural dimensions of values' in U. Kim, H.C. Triandis, C. Kagitcibasi, S.C. Choi and G. Yoon (eds), *Individualism and collectivism: theory, method, and applications*, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, CA, pp. 85–123.
- Schwartz, S.H., 2001, 'ESS core questionnaire development', in *A proposal for measuring value orientations across nations*, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University, London, pp. 259–319.
- Schwartz, S.H. & Bardi, A., 2001, 'Value hierarchies across cultures: taking a similarities perspective', *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 32(3), pp. 268–290.
- Schwartz, S.H. & Bilsky, W., 1990, 'Toward a theory of the universal content and structure of values: extensions and cross-cultural replications', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 58(5), pp. 878–891.
- Schwartz, S.H. & Boehnke, K., 2004, 'Evaluating the structure of human values with confirmatory factor analysis', *Journal of Research in Personality*, 38(3), pp. 230–255.
- Schwartz, S.H. & Huismans, S., 1995, 'Value priorities and religiosity in four Western religions', *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 58(2), pp. 88–107.
- Schwartz, S.H., Melech, G., Lehmann, A., Burgess, S., Harris, M. & Owens, V., 2001, 'Extending the cross-cultural validity of the theory of basic human values with a different method of measurement', *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 32(5), pp. 519–542.
- Selman, R.L., 1971, 'The relation of role taking to the development of moral judgement in children', *Child Development*, 42(1), pp. 79–91.
- Shank, G., 1998, 'The extraordinary ordinary powers of abductive reasoning', *Theory and Psychology*, 8(6), pp. 841–860.
- Singelis, T.M., Triandis, H.C., Bhawuk, D. & Gelfand, M.J., 1995, 'Horizontal and vertical dimensions of individualism and collectivism: a theoretical and measurement refinement', *Cross-Cultural Research: The Journal of Comparative Social Science*, 29(3), pp. 240–275.
- Smith, A., 1952, *An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations*, William Benton, Chicago.
- Smith, J.Z., 2004, *Relating religion: essays in the study of religion*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Smith, P.B. & Schwartz, S.H., 1997, 'Values', in J.W. Berry, M.H. Segall & C. Kagitcibasi (eds), *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology*, Allyn & Bacon, Boston, pp. 79–117.
- Snarey, J.R., 1985, 'Cross-cultural universality of social-moral development: a critical review of Kohlbergian research', *Psychological Bulletin*, 97(2), pp. 202–232.

- Spong, J.S., 2005, *The sins of Scripture: exposing the Bible's texts of hate to reveal the God of love*, HarperSanFrancisco, New York.
- Stainton-Rogers, W., 2006, 'Logics of enquiry', in S. Potter (ed.), *Doing postgraduate research*, Open University in association with Sage Publications, London, pp. 73–91.
- Stark, R. & Finke, R., 2000, *Acts of faith: explaining the human side of religion*, University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Steenkamp, J.E.M., Hofstede, F.T. & Wedel, M., 1999, 'A cross-national investigation into the individual and national cultural antecedents of consumer innovativeness', *Journal of Marketing*, 63(2), pp. 55–69.
- Steinmetz, G., 1998, 'Critical realism and historical sociology: a review article', *Comparative Studies in Society & History*, 40(1), pp. 170–186.
- Stiles, K.W., 2000, 'Grassroots empowerment', in R.A. Higgott, G.R.D. Underhill & A. Bieler (eds), *Non-state actors and authority in the global system*, Routledge, New York, pp. 32–48.
- Strauss, C. & Quinn, N., 1997, *A cognitive theory of cultural meaning*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Struch, N., Schwartz, S.H. & van der Kloot, W.A., 2002, 'Meanings of basic values for women and men: a cross-cultural analysis', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28(1), pp. 16–28.
- Sundback, S., 1988, 'The process of secularization. A neglected issue in Finnish Sociology', *Social Compass*, 35(1), pp. 91–106.
- Sutcliffe, S. & Bowman, M. (eds), 2000, *Beyond New Age: exploring alternative spirituality*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.
- Tabachnick, B.G. & Fidell, L.S., 2007, *Using multivariate statistics*, 5th edn, Pearson, Boston.
- Tamney, J.B., 2002, *The resilience of conservative religion: the case of popular, conservative Protestant congregations*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Taniguchi, M., 2006, 'A time machine: new evidence of post-materialist value change', *International Political Science Review*, 27(4), pp. 405–425.
- Tashakkori, A. & Teddlie, C., 1998, *Mixed methodology: combining qualitative and quantitative approaches*, Sage Publications, London.
- Taylor, C., 1991, *The ethics of authenticity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London.
- Tomlinson, J., 1999, *Globalization and culture*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Tönnies, F., 2002, *Community and society*, translated by C.P. Loomis, Dover Publications, New York.
- Triandis, H.C., 1995, *Individualism and collectivism*, Westview Press, Boulder.
- Triandis, H.C. & Gelfand, M.J., 1998, 'Converging measurement of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74(1), pp. 118–128.
- Turiel, E., 1998, 'The development of morality', in N. Eisenberg (ed.), *Handbook of child psychology, volume 3: Social, emotional and personality development*, Wiley, New York and Chichester, pp. 863–932.

- Turiel, E., 2002, *The culture of morality: social development, context, and conflict*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Turner, J.C., Oakes, P.J., Haslam, S.A. & McGarty, C., 1994, 'Self and collective: cognition and social context', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 20(5), pp. 454–463.
- Vaisey, S., 2009, 'Motivation and justification: a dual-process model of culture in action', *American Journal of Sociology*, 114(6), pp. 1675–1715.
- Valiente, D., 1978, *Witchcraft for tomorrow*, Hale, London.
- Valjus, P. (ed.), 2007, *Taskutieto*, Väestörekisterikeskus, Helsinki.
- de Vaus, D.A., 2002, *Surveys in social research*, 5th edn, Routledge, London.
- Voas, D. & Bruce, S., 2004, 'The 2001 census and Christian identification in Britain', *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, 19(1), pp. 23–28.
- Voas, D. & Crockett, A., 2005, 'Religion in Britain: neither believing nor belonging', *Sociology*, 39(1), pp. 11–28.
- Voas, D., Olson, D.V.A. & Crockett, A., 2002, 'Religious pluralism and participation: why previous research is wrong', *American Sociological Review*, 67(2), pp. 212–230.
- Voronov, M. & Singer, J.A., 2002, 'The myth of individualism-collectivism: a critical review', *Journal of Social Psychology*, 142(4), pp. 461–480.
- Walker, L.J., 1989, 'A longitudinal study of moral reasoning', *Child Development*, 60(1), pp. 157–166.
- Walker, L.J., Gustafson, P. & Hennig, K.H., 2001, 'The consolidation/transition model in moral reasoning development', *Developmental Psychology*, 37(2), pp. 187–197.
- Walker, L.J., Hennig, K.H. & Krettenauer, T., 2000, 'Parent and peer contexts for children's moral reasoning development', *Child Development*, 71(4), pp. 1033–1048.
- Waters, M., 1995, *Globalization*, Routledge, New York.
- Watkins, K. & United Nations Development Programme, 2007, *Human Development Report 2007/2008*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Weber, M., 1930, *The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism*, edited by T. Parsons, Allen & Unwin, London.
- Weber, M. 1991, 'Social psychology of world religions', in H.H. Gerth & C.W. Mills (eds), *From Max Weber: essays in sociology*, Routledge, New York, pp. 267–301.
- Weber, M., 2002, *The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
- Weller, P., 2008, *Religious diversity in the UK: contours and issues*, Continuum, New York.
- Werner, J.M. & DeSimone, R.L., 2008, *Human resource development*, 5th edn, South-Western College, Mason.
- Whitbeck, L.B. & Gecas, V., 1988, 'Value attributions and value transmission between parents and children', *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 50(3), pp. 829–840.
- Whitehouse, H. & McCauley, R.N., 2005, *Mind and religion: psychological and cognitive foundations of religiosity*, AltaMira Press, Lanham.
- Wilson, B.R., 1966, *Religion in secular society: a sociological comment*, Watts, London.

- Wilson, B.R., 1982, *Religion in sociological perspective*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Wilson, B.R., 1985, 'Secularization: the inherited model', in P.E. Hammond (ed.), *The Sacred in a Secular Age*, University of California Press, Berkeley, pp. 9–20.
- Wilson, M.S., 2005, A Social-Value Analysis of Postmaterialism, *Journal of Social Psychology*, 145(2), pp. 209–224.
- Wilson, T.D., 2002, *Strangers to ourselves: discovering the adaptive unconscious*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Wolf, M. & Fukari, A., 2007, *Constructing a sociology of translation*, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Philadelphia.
- Wuthnow, R. 2003; The New Spiritual Freedom, in LL Dawson (ed), *Cults and New Religious Movements: A Reader*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, pp. 89–111.